Consider now this application of language: I send someone shopping. I give him a slip of paper, on which are the marks || I have written the signs: “five red apples”. He takes it to the grocer; the grocer opens the box || drawer that has the mark || sign “apples” on it; then he looks up the word “red” in a table, and finds opposite it a coloured square; he now speaks || pronounces || says out loud the series of cardinal numbers || numerals – I assume that he knows them by heart – up to the word “five” and with each numeral he takes an apple from the box that has the colour of the square || that has the colour of the square from the drawer. – This is how one works || In this way & in similar ways one operates with words. – “But how does he know where and how he is to look up the word ‘red’ and what he has to do with the word ‘five’?” – Well, I am assuming that he acts, as I have described. The explanations || Explanations come to an end somewhere. – What is || What's || But what's the meaning of the word “five”? – There was no question of any || such an entity ‘meaning’ here; only of the way in which “five” is used. || Nothing of that sort was being discussed, only the way in which “five” is used.

      That philosophical concept of meaning is at home in a primitive notion of || way of describing ◇◇◇ || picture of the way in which our language functions. But one || we might also say that it is the notion || a picture of a more primitive language than ours.

      Let us imagine a language for which the description which Augustine has given would be correct. The language shall help a builder A to make himself understood by an || is to be the means of communication between a builder A and his assistant B. ¤ A is constructing a building out of building stones || blocks; there is a supply of || are cubes, columns, slabs and beams. B has to hand him the building stones in the order in which A needs them. For this purpose they use a language consisting of the words: “cube”, “column”, “slab”, “beam”. A shouts || calls out the words; – B brings the stone that he has learned to bring at this call.
     Take || Regard this as a complete primitive language.

      Augustine describes, we might say, a system of communication; only not everything || not everything, however, that we call language is this system.
     (And this must be said || one must say in ever so many cases where || when the question arises, || : “can this description be used or can't it be used? || is this an appropriate description or not?”. The answer is, “Yes, it can be used || is appropriate; but only for this narrowly restricted field, not for everything that you were professing || professed to describe by it.” Think of the theories of the economists.)

      It is as though someone explained: “Playing a game consists in moving things about on a surface according to certain rules …”, and we were to answer || answered him: You are apparently || seem to be thinking of games played on a board; but those || these aren't all the games there are. You can put your description right by confining it explicitly to those games.

      Imagine a way of writing || type || script in which ◇◇◇ letters are used to indicate || stand for sounds, but are used also to indicate emphasis || as accents and as marks of punctuation || punctuation signs. (One can regard a way of writing || type || script as a language for the description of sounds.) Now suppose someone understood || interpreted this || our way of writing || type || script as though it were one in which to every letter there simply corresponded a sound || all letters just stood for sounds, and as though the letters here did not have other very different functions as well || also have quite different functions. – An oversimplified view of the type like this one resembles, I believe, || Such an oversimplified view of our script is the analogon, I believe, to Augustine's view of language.

      If one considers example (2) one || we look at our example (2) we may perhaps begin to suspect || get an idea of how far the commonly accepted || general concept of the meaning of words || a word surrounds the functioning || working of language with a mist that makes clear vision impossible || it impossible to see clearly. It scatters the fog || The fog is dispersed if we study the phenomena || workings of language in primitive kinds of || cases of its application, where the simplicity enables one || in which it is easy to get a clear view of the way the words function and of what their purpose is. || purpose of the words and of the way they function.
     Primitive forms of language of this sort are what the child uses when it learns to speak. And here teaching the language does not consist in explaining but in training.

      We might || could imagine that the language (4) is the entire language of A and B; even the entire language of a tribe. The children are brought up to carry out just these || these activities, to use just these || these words and to react in just this || this || the activities in question, to use such & such words and to react in such & such a way to the words of another || others.
     An important part of the training will consist in the teacher's pointing to the objects, directing the attention of the child || child's attention to them and at the same time pronouncing a word; for instance, the word ‘slab’ in pointing to this block. (I do not || don't want to call this “ostensive explanation” or “definition”, because the child can't as yet ask what the thing is called. I will call it “ostensive teaching of words”. – I say it || this will constitute an important part of the training, because that || this is the case among || so with human beings, not because it couldn't be imagined || we couldn't imagine it differently || otherwise.) This ostensive teaching of the words, one might say, fixes || makes an associative connection between the word and the thing. But what does that mean? Well, it may mean various things; but probably what first comes to one's mind is that || occurs to one is that || what first occurs to one is probably that an image of the thing comes before the child's mind when it hears the word. But suppose that happens – is that the purpose ¤ of the word? – Yes, it || It may be the || its purpose || aim. – I can imagine words (i.e. here || I mean || i.e. series of sounds) having an application of this sort. || such a use of words (i.e. series of sounds). (Their utterance is so to speak the striking of || To pronounce them would be like striking a key on the || a piano of ideas || images.) But in the || our language (3 || 4) it is not the purpose || aim of the words to call up ideas || images. (Though it may of course turn out that this is conducive || this may, of course, be found to be helpful to their real aim || purpose.)
     But if that is what the ostensive teaching brings about, – shall I say that it brings about the understanding of the word? Doesn't someone || he understand the cry || order “slab!” if he acts in such and such a way on hearing it? – The ostensive teaching helped to produce this no doubt || indeed helped to bring this about, but only in connection with a certain course of instruction || training. With a different course of instruction || training the same ostensive teaching of these words would have brought about quite a different understanding. – Of that || this more later. || at a later point.
     “When I connect || By connecting up the rod with the lever || this lever with this rod by means of the || a peg, I make the brake ready for use || put the brake in order.” – Yes, given all the rest of the mechanism. Only together with this mechanism is it a brake lever; and without || detached from its support it isn't even a lever, but can be all sorts of things, or nothing || it may be anything.

      As the language (3) is used in practice || In the use of the language (4) the one party calls out the words and the other acts according to them. But in the teaching || instruction of the language || In the teaching of this language however there will be || you will find this procedure: the one who is learning || pupil calls the objects || blocks by name || their names; that is, he speaks || pronounces the word when the teacher points to the stone || block. – In fact you || we will find here even the || an even simpler exercise: the pupil repeats the words that || which the teacher recites to him || pronounces for him: both processes || of these exercises that resemble language. || already primitive uses of language. ¤
     We may even imagine that the entire process of the use of the words || use of the words we make in (4) is one of those games by means of which children learn our || our children learn language. I will call these “language games”, and I will frequently speak of a primitive language as a language game.
     And one might call the processes || exercises of calling the stones || blocks by their names and of repeating the word that has been spoken out || words which the teacher has pronounced language games as well. Think of the various || various uses that are || the use made of words in nursery-rhymes.

      Let us now consider an extension of the language (4): Besides the four words “cube”, “column” etc., let it contain a series of words applied in the way in which the grocer in (2) applies || applied the numerals, – it can || may be the series of the letters of the alphabet; further, let there be two words, which we may pronounce || say || let us choose “there” and “this”, since this already suggests roughly their purpose, – they are to be used in connection with a pointing movement of the hand || gesture; and finally let us use certain little squares || bits of paper of various colours. A now gives a command of the || this sort: “d slab there” – at the same time letting the assistant see || showing his assistant a coloured square, and with the word “there” pointing to a certain place. B takes from the supply of slabs one || a slab of the same colour as the coloured square for each letter of the alphabet up to “d” || for each letter of the alphabet up to “d” a slab of the same colour as the coloured square and brings it to the place which A indicates. – On other occasions A gives the command “this there” – with “this” he points to || at a building stone || block – and so on.

      When the child learns this language it has to learn the series of “ || “numerals” || ” “a”, “b”, “c”, … by heart. – And it has to learn their use. Will an ostensive teaching of words come || enter into this ¤ instruction also? – Well, someone || one will point at slabs, for instance, and count: “a, b, c slabs”. A greater similarity with the ostensive teaching in example (3) would appear in the ostensive teaching of numerals when || There would be a greater similarity between the ostensive teaching in (4) and the ostensive teaching of numerals if these are not used for counting but rather to indicate || refer to groups of objects that can be grasped with || by the eye. This is the || In this way children learn the use of the first five or six cardinal numbers || numerals. Are “there” and “this” taught || Do we teach “there” and “this” ostensively? – Think of || Imagine how you || one might teach their use. You point to places and things; – but here || in this case the pointing occurs in the use of the words as well || also, and not simply in the learning || teaching of it || the use. –

      What || Now what do the words of this language denote? – How can this show itself – what they denote – except || What they denote – how is this to appear, unless in the way they are used? And this is what we have described. The expression, “this word denotes that || so & so” would have then to be || now become a part of this description. Or: the description should || is to be put in the form: “The word … denotes …”.
     Now one can certainly shorten || it certainly is possible to condense the description of the use of the word “slab” in this way, and say || into saying that this word denotes this object. That || This is what one would do, for instance, if the question was || were simply || if the question were, for instance, to prevent the misunderstanding of thinking that the word “slab” referred to the kind of building stone that || block which we actually call a “cube”, while || and the particular sort of “reference”this is || , however, i.e. everything else about the use of || all the rest of the game with these words, is || were familiar.
     Similarly one might say that the signs “a”, “b”, “c”, etc. denote numberswhen this removes || , if this is to remove the misunderstanding of thinking that “a”, “b”, “c”, play the role in the || our language which actually is ¤ played by “cube”, “column”, “slab”. And one can say also that “c” denotes this number and not that, – when this is to explain, say, that the letters are to be used in the order “a”, “b”, “c”, “d” etc., and not “a”, “b”, “d”, “c”.
     But because you assimilate || by assimilating in this way the description || descriptions of the use of these words to one another, their use doesn't || uses of words to one another, their uses don't grow || become more similar: || . For, as we have seen, their use is || uses are of widely different sorts.

      Think of the tools in a tool chest: There is || It has a hammer, a pair of pincers, a saw, a screw-driver, a ruler, a pot of glue, glue, nails and screws. – Different as the functions of these objects are, just as different || As different as the functions of these objects are the functions of words. (And there are similarities in the one case and in the other.)

      What confuses us, of course, is the uniformity of their appearance when the words are spoken to us or when we meet them in writing || we hear the words or see them written or in print. For their application || use isn't so clearly there in front of us || before our eyes. Especially not if || when we are philosophizing || doing philosophy.

      It is like when we look || looking || As when we look into the driver's cabin of a locomotive: we see handles that || which all look more or less alike. (That is understandable || That's natural, since they are all supposed || made to be grasped || held with the hand.) One || But one is the crank that can be moved continuously over (it regulates the opening of an air valve) || valve that can be regulated by continuous degrees; the other || another is the handle of a switch, which has only two positions in which it is effective || effective positions, it's either shut or open; a third is the handle of a brake lever, the more strongly || harder you pull it the more strongly the brake is applied; a fourth, the handle of a pump, works only as long as it is ¤ moved back and forth.

      If we say: “every word of the language denotes something”, – then, so far, nothing at all has been said || we've said nothing at all; || , that is, unless we explain precisely what distinction we wish to make. (It might be that we wanted || wished to distinguish the words of our language (9 || 11) from “nonsense” words such as || words ‘without meaning’ which occur in Lewis Carroll's poems.)

      Suppose someone said, || : “All tools serve to modify something. Thus the hammer modifies the position of the nail, the saw the form || shape of the board, etc..” – And what is modified by the ruler, the glue pot, the nails? || And what does || what's the ruler modify, or the glue pot, or the nails? – “Our knowledge of the length of the || a thing, the temperature of the glue and the firmness of the chest || box.” – Would anything be gained by this assimilation under one expression || of our expressions? –

      The word “denote || name” || The expression “the name of an object” is probably best || very straightforwardly applied where the sign || mark || name is actually a mark on the object which it denotes || itself.
     Suppose then that there are signs || marks scratched on the tools which A uses in building. When || If A shows his assistant a sign || character of this sort, then the assistant brings the tool which bears that sign. || mark, character.
     In this and in more or less similar ways a name denotes a thing, and a name is given to a thing. (Of this more later.) – It will often prove useful if we say to ourselves in doing philosophy || in doing philosophy we say to ourselves: Naming something, that is something like hanging a name plate on || attaching a label to a thing. –

      What about the colour-samples that A shows to B, – do they belong to the language? As you like. They don't belong to the verbal || our spoken language; but if I say to someone, “Pronounce the word ‘that || the‘”, you will count the second “the” also as || call the second “the” also a part of the sentence. Yet it plays a very similar role to that of a coloured square || bit of paper in the language game (11): it is a sample of what the other person is supposed to say, just as the coloured square is a sample of what B is supposed to bring.
     It is the most natural thing and it causes the least confusion if we reckon || count the samples among the instruments of the language.

      We may say that in language (11) we have various parts of speech. For the functions of “slab” and “cube” are more alike than the functions of “slab” and “d”. But how || the way we classify the words together as various parts of speech will depend on the purpose of the classification, and on our inclination.
     Think of the different points of view from || according to which one might classify tools as different kinds of tools. Or chess pieces as different kinds of pieces.

      Don't let it bother you that the languages (4) and (11) consist only of commands. If you are inclined to say that they are therefore incomplete, then ask yourself whether our language is complete; whether it was complete before the symbolism of chemistry and the infinitesimal calculus were embodied in it: for these are, so to speak || as it were, suburbs of our language. (And with how many houses or streets does a city || town begin to be a city || town?) One || We can regard our language as an old || ancient city || town, a quarter || the center a maze of narrow alleys and squares, old and new houses, & houses with additions from various periods; and all this surrounded by a mass of new suburbs with straight and regular streets and uniform houses. ¤
     One can easily imagine a language which consisted || consists only of commands and announcements || dispatches || reports in battle. – Or a language which consisted || consists only of questions and an expression of affirmation and of denial. And || – and countless others || other things. – And to imagine a language means to imagine a way of living.

      But let's see: is the cry || call “slab!” in example (4) a sentence or a word? – If it's a word, then surely it hasn't anyway the same meaning as the word that's pronounced the same || “slab” in our ordinary language, for in our language (4) it is a cry || call; but if it's a sentence, then surely it isn't the elliptical sentence “slab!” of our language. ‒ ‒ ‒ As regards the first question, || : you can call “slab!” a word, and you can also call it a sentence; perhaps fittingly || best a “degenerate sentence” (as one speaks of a degenerate hyperbola). And it is precisely our “elliptical” sentence. ‒ ‒ ‒ But that is surely just a shortened form of the sentence, “Bring me a slab”, and || isn't this a shortened form of the sentence “Bring me a slab”? And there isn't any such || such a sentence in example || the language (4). – But why should I not || shouldn't I rather call the sentence “Bring me a slab” a lengthening of the sentence “slab!”? ‒ ‒ ‒ Because the person who calls out “slab!” really means “Bring me a slab!”. ‒ ‒ ‒ But how do you do that || this, meaning this while you say “slab”? Do you say the unshortened sentence to yourself? And why should I, in order to say what you mean by the cry || call “slab!”, translate this expression into another? And if they mean the same, – why shouldn't I say: “When you say ‘slab!’ you mean ‘slab!’”? – Or: Why shouldn't it be possible for you to mean “slab!”, if you can mean “Bring me the slab”? ‒ ‒ ‒ But when I shout “slab!”, then surely what I want is ¤ that he shall || shall bring me a slab. ‒ ‒ ‒ Certainly, but does “wanting this” consist in the fact that you, in some way, think || think in any form a different sentence from the one you speak? –

      “Well but || But if someone says ‘Bring me a slab’ it looks now || now looks as though he could mean this expression as one long word, – correspondingnamely || , that is, to the word || one word ‘slab!’.” – Can one mean it sometimes as one word and sometimes as four words? And how does one generally mean it? – I believe || think that what we shall be inclined to say: is that we mean the sentence as a sentence of four words when we are using it as contrasted with sentences such as || like, “Hand me a slab”, “Bring him a slab”, “Bring two slabs”, etc.: as contrasted, that is, with sentences which contain the words of our command in different || other combinations. – But what does using one sentence as contrasted with || in contrast to other sentences consist in? Does one have these other sentences in mind at the time? And all of them? And while one is speaking the sentence, or before or afterwards? – No. Even if such an explanation has some attraction for us, we have only to think || consider for a moment what actually happens in order to see that we are on the wrong road here || a wrong track. We say we use that || this command as contrasted with || in contrast to other sentences. because our language contains the possibility of these other sentences. || because in our language these other sentences are possible. Someone who did not understand our language, a foreigner who had frequently heard someone giving the command “Bring me the slab”, might suppose that this entire series of sounds was one word and corresponded, say, to the word “building stone || block” in his language. If he had then to give this command himself, he would perhaps pronounce it differently and we

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¤ should say: He pronounces it so curiously || queerly because he takes it to be || thinks it is one word. – But then doesn't anything || something different happen in him when he utters this sentence || it, corresponding to the fact that he takes the sentences to be || views the sentences as || regards the sentence as one word? The same thing may happen in him, or again something different may. What happens in you when you give a command of that sort? Are you conscious that it consists of four words while you are uttering it? Of course, you have a mastery of || know this language, in which there are those other sentences also, – but is this mastery || knowing something that happens while you are uttering the sentence? – And I have admitted, that the foreigner will probably give the sentence he views differently a different pronunciation; || who views the sentence differently will probably also pronounce it differently, but what we call the || his wrong view || idea doesn't have to lie || necessarily consist in anything that accompanies the uttering of the command. (Of that || this more later.)

      The sentence is not ‘elliptical’ because it leaves out || omits something which || that we mean || think when we utter it, but because it is shortened || abbreviated, in comparison || as compared with a particular standard of our grammar. – One might here make the objection: “You admit that the shortened || abbreviated and the unshortened || unabbreviated sentence have the same meaning. – What || Well, what meaning have they then? || ? Is there not || Isn't there one verbal || an expression for this meaning?” – But doesn't the || their identical meaning of the sentences consist in their having the same application || use? (In Russian they say “stone red” instead of “the stone is red”; is the copula left out of the meaning for them || don't they get the full meaning, as they leave out the copula? or do they think the copula || it to themselves without pronouncing it? –)

      One can easily imagine a language also || also imagine a language in which B, in reply to a question by A, informs him of || has to report to him the number of slabs or cubes ¤ || stacked up in some place; or the colours and forms || or shapes of the || certain building-stones that lie in one place and another. || building-blocks.
     The purport of such a report might then be: “five slabs.”. ¤ || Such a report might then say || be of the form: “five slabs.”. Now what is the difference between the report, or assertion, “five slabs.”, and the command “five slabs!”? – Well, || It is the role which the utterance of || saying these words plays in the || our language game || games. But the tone of voice in which they are uttered will probably || probably the tone of voice in which they are uttered will be different as well || too, and the facial expression and various other things. But we can also imagine || it may well be that the tone of voice is the same in both cases – for a command and a report can || may be uttered in various || a lot of different tones of voice and with various || a lot of different facial expressions – and that the difference lies in the application alone || may lie only in what is done with the words “five slabs”. – (Of course we might also use the words “assertion” and “command” just to indicate a grammatical combination || form of a sentence or || and a word || particular intonation, just as one calls || would call the sentence, “Isn't it glorious weather today?”, a question, even though || although it is used like || as an assertion.) We could imagine a language in which all assertions had the form and the intonation of a rhetorical question; or every command || in which every command had the form: “Would you like to do that || …?”. One would then || might perhaps say in this case: “What he says has the form of a question but it is really a command”, i.e. has the function of a command in the practical employment of language. || . (Similarly one says “you will do that || so & so” not as a prophecy but as a command. What makes || would make it the oneand || , what the other?)

      Frege's view that in an assertion there is contained || an assertion contains a supposal || an Annahme, and that it is this that || which is asserted, is based really || really based on the possibility that there is in our language of writing every ¤ assertion sentence in the form: “It is asserted that so and so is the case”. But “that so and so is the case” is not a sentence in our language – it || this is not yet a move in our language game. And if I write instead of “It is asserted that …”, || instead of “It is asserted that …”, I write “It is asserted: so and so is the case”, then in this case the words “It is asserted” are quite superfluous.
     We might very well write every assertion in the form of a question followed by an affirmative reply; thus instead of “It's || It is raining”, “Is it raining? Yes.”. Would that show that in every assertion there is || every assertion contained a question?

      Of course one has a right to use a mark of assertion || an assertion sign in contrast, for instance, to a question mark. The mistake is only in thinking || to think that the assertion now consists in || of two acts, the consideration and the assertion || considering and the asserting (assigning the truth value, or something of that sort || whatever you call it), and that we perform these acts according to the signs in || of the sentence, rather || almost as we sing from notes. We might certainly compare reading loudly or softly || silently according to the written sentence with singing from notes, || What can be compared with || to the singing from notes is the reading aloud, or to oneself, of the signs of the sentence; but not “the meaning” (◇the thinking) of the sentence that is read.

      The important sense of || point about || of Frege's mark of assertion || assertion sign is put perhaps || perhaps put best if we say: || by saying: it indicates clearly the beginning of the sentence. – That || This is important: because || for our philosophical difficulties concerning the nature of “ || ‘negation” || ’ and of “ || ‘thinking” || ’, originate || spring in a sense from || in a sense, are due to the fact that we don't see || realise that a sentence || an assertion “⊢ not p”, or “⊢ I believe p”, and the sentence || assertion “⊢ p” have “p” in common, but not “⊢ p”. (For if I hear someone say, || the words “it's raining”, then I don't know what he has said if I don't know

¤ whether I have heard the beginning of the sentence.)

      How many kinds of sentence are there, though || But how many kinds of sentence are there? Assertion, question and command perhaps || Is it assertions, questions and commands? – There are innumerable kinds: innumerable different kinds of application || applications of everything || all that we call “signs”, “words”, “sentences”. And this variety is nothing that is fixed, given once and for all, but new types of language, new language games – as we may say – spring up || come into being and others grew || become obsolete and are forgotten. (We can get a rough picture of this from || A rough picture of this we can get if we look at the changes || transformation in || which happen in mathematics.)
     The expression “language game” is supposed to emphasise here || used here to emphasise that the speaking of the language is part of an activity, or || part of a way of living. || of human beings.
     Bring the variety of the language games before your mind by || To get an idea of the enormous variety of language games consider these and other examples || examples, & others:
      commands || commanding || giving commands, and acting according to commands;
      describing an object according to its appearance, or according to || giving a description of an object by describing what it looks like, or by giving its measurements;
      producing an object according to a description (drawing);
      reporting a course of events || an event;
      setting up || making a hypothesis and testing it;
      presentation of || presenting the results of an experiment in tables and diagrams;
      performing in a theatre || acting a play;
      singing a catch;
      guessing riddles || asking riddles and guessing them;
      making a joke, or telling one;
      solving an example || a problem in applied arithmetic;
      translating from one language into another;
      entreating || requesting, thanking, swearing, greeting, praying.
– It is interesting to compare the variety of the instruments of our language and of their applications || the ways they are applied || their various uses – the variety of the parts of speech and of the kinds of || kinds of words & of sentences – with what logicians have said about the structure of our language. (And the author of the Tractatus Logico-philosophicus as well || Including the author of Tract. Log.-phil.¤)

      If we don't see that there is a multitude of language games, we are inclined to ask: “What is a question?” Is it the statement that I don't know so and so, or is it the statement that I wish the other person would tell me …? Or is it the description of my mental state of uncertainty? – And is the cry “help!” a description of that sort || a description? || such a description?
     Think of what widely different things we call “description” || descriptions”: the description of the position of a body by means of its coordinates: the description of the course of || changes in a sensation of pain.
     One can of course put instead of the usual form of the question || Of course one can replace the usual form of a question by that of the || a statement or a description: such as “I want to know whether …”, or “I am in doubt as to whether …” – but one hasn't thereby brought the different language games any nearer to one another.
     The significance of such possibilities || this possibility of transforming, for instance, all declarative sentences || assertions into sentences that begin ¤ with the clause || words “I think” or “I believe” (i.e. so to speak into descriptions of my inner life || mental states) will appear later.

      It is sometimes said || said sometimes: animals don't speak, because they haven't || lack the necessary intellectual capacities. And this means: ‘they don't think, therefore they don't speak’. But the fact is that they just don't speak. Or better || rather: they don't use language. (If we disregard || except the most primitive forms of language.) Commanding || Giving orders, asking questions, recounting || describing, prattling, belong to our natural history just as walking, eating, drinking, playing do. (It makes no difference here whether the speaking is done with the mouth or done with the hand.)

      This is connected with the view that the || fact that we think that the learning of the language consists in naming objects; namely || viz. human beings, forms || shapes, colours, pains || aches, moods, numbers, etc..– As we have said, – naming is something like affixing a nameplate to || putting || fastening a label to a thing. One may call this || And this one might call the || a preparation for the use of a word. But for what is it a preparation?

      “We name things and can now || now we can talk about them. We can || ; refer to them in what we say.” – As though with the act of naming we had already at hand what we go on to do afterwards || all that happens after it were already fixed. As though there were only one thing that is called “speaking about things”. Whereas actually we || we actually do things of the most widely different kinds || the most widely different kinds of things with our sentences. Think only of the interjections. – With || – with their entirely || utterly || very different functions.
     Water!
     Away! || Get out!
     Ouch!
     Help!
     Beautiful! || Lovely!
     No!
Are you still inclined to call these words “giving names to || “names of objects”?

      In the languages (4) and (11) there was no such thing as asking what something || a thing is called. This and its correlate, the ostensive explanation, definition, is, we might say, a separate language game. That means really: we are brought up || taught, trained, to ask “What is that || this called?”, – and then the naming follows || name is given. There || And there is also a language gameof || : inventing a name for something. That is, of saying || I.e., to say, “That's || This is called …” and then using || to use the new name. (In this way, for instance || e.g., children name their dolls and then go on to talk about them. In this connection consider at the same time a very special use || what a very special use we make of a personal name: it is when we use it to call someone.) || … how special that use of a personal name is with which we call the person named.)
     Now you can give an ostensive definition of || we can ostensively define a personal name, a colour word, a || the name of a material, a numeral, the name of a direction || the name of a point of the compass, etc., etc.. The definition of two: “That || This is called ‘two’” – pointing to two nuts – is perfectly exact. – But how can you define “two” in that || this way? The person to whom you are giving || give the definition doesn't || won't know then || then know what it is you want || wish to call “two”; he'll suppose that you are calling || have called this group of nuts “two”. – He may suppose this, – but perhaps he won't suppose it. || . He might also do just the opposite: when I want to assign a name to this group of nuts he might take this for || to be the name

19

¤ of a number. And equally, if I give an ostensive definition of a personal name, he might take this || it to be the name of a colour, the name of a race, even the name of a direction || point of the compass. That is, the ostensive definition can in every case || all cases be interpreted in one way and also in others. || this way or in that way.

      You may say: “Two” can be defined ostensively only in this way: “This number is called ‘two’”, for || . For the word “number” shows here || here shows in what place in the language – in the grammar – we set || put || what place in our language – in our grammar – we assign to the word; but this means that the word “number” must be explained before that ostensive definition can be understood. – The word “number” in the definition does certainly || indeed indicate this place, – the post to which we assign || which we assign to the word. And we can prevent misunderstandings in this way, by saying, “This colour is called so and so”, “This length is called so and so”, etc.. That is: misunderstandings are often avoided in this way. But can the word “colour”, then, or “length”, be understood only in this way? – Well, we'll || we shall have to explain them. – Explain them by of other words, that is || That is, explain them by means of other words! And what about the last explanation in this chain? (Don't say: “There isn't any ‘last’ explanation”; that || . This is exactly as though you were to say || said, “There isn't any last house in this street: you can always build another one further”.) || .”)
     Whether the word “number” in the ostensive definition of two is necessary || is necessary in the ostensive definition of “two” depends on || upon whether he understands this word differently from the way I wish him to || takes this word in a different sense from the one I wish || misunderstands my definition if I leave out the word. And that || this will depend on the circumstances under which the definition is given and on the person to whom I give it. ¤
     And how he “understands” the explanation appears in how || will appear in the way he makes use of the word explained.

      One might say then: The ostensive definition explains the use – the meaning – of the word if it is already clear in general what kind of role the word is to play in the language. Thus if I know that someone wants to explain a colour word to me, then the explanation “That's || This is called ‘sepia’” will help me to get an understanding of || make me understand the word. – And you can say this if you don't forget || as long as you remember that there are all sorts of questions connected with || all sorts of questions now attach to the word || words “to know” or || and “be clear”.
     You have to know something already in order to be able to || before you can ask what it || something is called. But what do you have to know?
     If you show someone the king in a chess game || set of chess men and say, “That || This is the king of chess”, you do not thereby explain to him the use of this piece, – unless he already knows the rules of the game except for this last point: the form || shape of the king-piece. || king. We can imagine that he has learned the rules of the game without ever having been shown a real chessman. The form || shape of the || a chessman corresponds here to the sound or the shape of a word.
     But we can also imagine someone's having learned the game without ever having learned or formulated rules. He has perhaps first learned very simple games on boards by watching them and has proceeded to more and more complicated ones. To him also you might give the explanation, “That || This is the king”, if, for instance, you are showing him chess pieces || men of an unusual form || shape. And this explanation teaches him the use of the figure || piece only because, as we ¤ might say, the place in which it was put was already prepared. || we had in the game already prepared the place in which it was to be put. Or again: We shall say the explanation teaches him the use, only when the place is already || has already been prepared. And it is so here || prepared in this case not because the person to whom we are giving the explanation already knows rules, but because he has already mastered the game in a different sense. || in a different sense, already mastered a game.
     Consider still another case: I explain the game of chess to someone and begin by showing him a pieceand || , saying, “That || This is the king. – He || It can move in this and this way, etc. etc.”. – In this case we shall say: the words “That || This is the king” (or, “That || This is called ‘king’”) are an explanation || explain the use of the word || words “the king”, only if the person learning || we teach already “knows what a piece in a game is”: when he has already played other games, say, or “has watched the play with understanding” || watched ‘with understanding’ games played by other people, and so forth || the like. And only then will he be able || in a position to ask relevantly, in learning the game, “What's that || this called?” – namely || that is, this piece.
     We may say: it is sensible for someone to ask what the name is only || there is only sense in someone's asking for the name if he knows already || already knows what to do with it. || the name.
     We || For we can imagine also that the person who is asked answers, “decide on the name yourself”, – and then the person who || whoever asked the question would have to make himself responsible for everything || catch on to everything himself || ¤ I have asked, answers, “give it the || a name yourself”, – and then I should have to provide everything myself.

      Anyone who comes into a foreign land || country has frequently || will often have to learn the language of the inhabitants there through || by ostensive definitions || explanations which they || people give him; and he has frequently || will often have to guess the interpretation of these explanations, & will guess it often || sometimes correctly, often || sometimes wrongly.
     And now we can say, I think: ¤ Augustine describes the || the child's learning of human || of language || to speak as though the child came || had come to a foreign country and did not understand || without understanding the country's || its language; that is, as though the child already had a language, only not this one. Or, as though the child could already think but could not speak yet || yet speak. And here “think” means || would mean something like: speak to oneself || himself.

      But what if someone objected, || : “It is not || isn't true that someone must have mastered a language game already in order to understand an ostensive definition, but he has only – obviously – || only he's || you must already have mastered a language game in order to understand an ostensive definition, but of course, you've got to know (or guess) what the person explaining || man who gives the explanation is pointing to. Whether, for instance, || : e.g., whether to the form || shape of an || the object, or to its colour, or to the number of the objects, etc., etc..” – And what does “pointing to the form || shape”, “pointing to the colour” etc. consist in, then? Point to a piece of paper. – And now point to its form || shape, – now to its colour, – now to its number (that sounds queer). – Well, how did you do it? – You will say you “meant” something different each time you pointed || each time you pointed you “meant” something different. And if I ask how that takes place || you how that takes place || this is done || how you do this, you will say you directed || concentrated || concentrate your attention on the colour, on the form || shape etc.. But then || now I ask again how that || this takes place. || is done.
     Suppose someone points to a vase and says, “Look at that || this glorious || gorgeous || marvellous blue! – the shape doesn't matter.” – Or, “Look at that || this magnificent || wonderful shape! – the colour is || colour's unimportant.” – Undoubtedly you will do different things || something different in each case if you comply with both these requests || do what he asks you. But do you always do the same thing when you direct your attention to the colour? Imagine various cases – I will suggest some: || e.g. these: –
      “Is this blue the same as that? Do you see a ¤ difference?” –
      You are mixing colours || paints on a palette and you say, “This blue of the sky is hard to find || get.”
      “It's going to be fine, you can see the blue sky already again.”
      “Look what different effects these two blues give.”
      “Do you see the || that blue book over there? Please bring || fetch it.”
      “This blue signal light means …”
      “What is || What's this blue called? – is it “indigo”–?”
Directing the attention to the colour sometimes means shutting out the outlines of the || a shape with one's || your hand, or, not directing one's gaze || looking directly at the contour of the thing; sometimes it means staring at the thing and trying to remember where one has seen this colour before. You direct your attention to the shape of a thing, sometimes by sketching || drawing it, sometimes by squinting || half closing the eyes || screwing up the eyes so as not to see the colour clearly, etc., etc.. I want || wish to say that: this and things like it happen || is the sort of thing that happens while one “directs the || one's || you ‘direct your attention to this and that” || something’. But that || this is not the only thing that allows us to || it isn't just this which makes us say, || that someone is directing his attention to the shape, to the colour, etc.. Just as “making a move in chess” does not || doesn't only consist in the fact that a piece is pushed across the board in such and such a way || pushing a piece from here to there – but also not || nor in the thoughts and feelings that accompany the move in the person making it – but rather in the circumstances that we call “taking part in || playing a chess game || game of chess”, or “solving a chess problem”, and so forth || the like.

      But suppose someone says || said, || : “I always do the same thing when I direct my attention to the || a shape: I follow the contour || outline with my ¤ eyes and feel || with the feeling … || …”. And suppose this person gives to someone else the ostensive definition || explanation, “That || This is called a ‘circle’”, by pointing¤ with all these experiences, to a circular object || to a circular object & having all these experiences: – can't || . Can't the other person still interpret this explanation differently, even though || although he sees that the person giving the explanation || it follows the shape with his eyesand || , even though || if he feels what the person giving the explanation feels? That is || is to say, this “interpretation” can also || may consist in the way in which he makes use of || uses || use he now makes of the word, for instance || e.g. what he points to when he is || in his pointing to such & such an object when given the command, || : “Point to a circle”. – For neither the expression, “meaning the explanation in such and such a way”, nor the expression, “interpreting the explanation in such and such a way”, indicates a definite || particular process which accompanies || accompanying the giving and hearing || receiving of the explanation.

      There are certainly || indeed what one can || we may call || might be called “characteristic experiences” for || of pointing to the shape (for instance) || (e.g.) to the shape || to a shape, e.g.¤ For example || instance, tracing the contour with one's finger || Tracing the outline with one's finger, for instance, or with one's gaze || eyes, in pointing. – But little as this happens in all cases in which I “mean the shape”, – equally little is it true that any other any other characteristic process occurs || just as this doesn't happen in all cases in which I ‘mean the shape’, – similarly there isn't any other characteristic process either occuring || no other characteristic process occurs in all these cases. But also, || even if something of the sort || such process did recur || occur in all of them, it would still depend on || upon the circumstances – i.e. on || upon what happened before and after the pointing – whether we should || would say, || : “He pointed to the shape and not to the colour”.
     For the words || expressions “pointing to the shape”, “meaning the shape” etc. are not used like these || as these || these others are || like these:– “pointing to the book”, “pointing to the letter ‘B’ and not to the letter ‘u’” etc.. – For think only of || Just think how differently we learn the use of the words || expressions: “pointing to

¤ this thing”, “pointing to that thing”, and on the other hand “pointing to the colour and not to the shape”, “meaning the colour”, etc., etc..
     As I say || As I have said, in certain cases, particularly in pointing ‘to the shape’, or ‘to the number’, there are characteristic experiences and ways of pointing, – “characteristic” because they frequently, not always, || (not always) recur || occur where shape or number is “meant”. But do you also know a characteristic experience for pointing to a figure || piece in a game as piece in a game || chessman as a chessman? – And yet one || you may say, || : “I mean this piece in the game || chessman is called ‘king’, not this particular piece || block of wood that I'm pointing to.”
     And we do here, what we do in 1000 || a host of similar cases: Because || as we can't || aren't able to mention || point out some one bodily action that || which we call “pointing to the shape” (as opposed, e.g., to the colour) we say that a mental activity corresponds to these words.
     Where our language leads us to expect a body || look for a physical thing, and there isn't any || a body || thing, there, || ; there we are inclined to say, is a mind. || put a spirit.

      “What is the relation between names and what they name || the named?” – Well, what is it? Look at the || our language game (4), or at some other language game; you can see there || that's where you'll see what this relation consists in. This relation may, among various other things, || Among various things, this relation may consist also in the fact that hearing the name calls up an image of the thing named in our minds || in our minds an image of the thing¤, and it sometimes consists among other things also in the fact that the name is written on the thing named, or that it || the name is uttered when the thing named is pointed to.
     But what does the word “this” name || is the word “this” a name of in the language game (11), or ¤ the word “that” in the ostensive explanation “that || in the ostensive explanation “this is called …”? Well, if you don't want to introduce || give rise to || produce confusion it is best not to say that these words name anything. – And, curiously enough, it was once said of the word “this” that it is the real name. Everything else that we call “name” is so || being a name only in an inexact, approximate sense.
     This curious view has its origin in a tendency to sublimate – as we might call it – the logic of our language. The proper answer to it is: We || we call widely different things “names”; the word “name” characterises many different sorts || kinds of use of a word || uses of words, related to one another || each other in many different ways; – but among these kinds of use || uses is not that of the word “this”.
      It is true that we often, for instance || e.g. in giving an ostensive definition, point to the || a thing named and in doing so pronounce the || its name. And similarly we pronounce, || – for instance || e.g. in an ostensive definition, || – the word “this” as we point || in pointing to the || a thing. And the word “this” and a name can often have the same syntax || stand in the same context: we say “Fetch this”, and also “Fetch Paul”. – But it is precisely one of the characteristic features of a name that its meaning || it is explained by the demonstrative “That || This is N” (or “That || This is called ‘N’”). But do we also explain, “That is called ‘this’”, or perhaps even “This is called ‘this’”? || “This is called ‘this’”?

      This is connected with the view || idea of naming as, so to speak, an occult process || an occult process, as it were. Naming || The naming appears as || like || seems || seems to us like || seems to us to be a strange connection of a word with the || between a word and an object. – ¤ And this || a strange connection does really take place || really is made, || – namely when the philosopher, in order to bring out || see what the connection is between a name and the || a thing named, stares at an object before himand at the same time repeats || , at the same time repeating || , repeating a name – or it may be the word “this” – over and over again. For the philosophical problems arise when language idles. And then we may imagine well enough || even imagine || indeed it's easy to imagine that naming is some remarkable || queer mental act, as it were a kind of christening || a kind of christening, as it were, of the object. And similarly we may || we may then also say the word “this” as it were to the object || to the object, as it were, address || addressing it, || – a strange use of this word, that || which probably occurs only when we are doing || engaged in philosophy || which is made only when we are philosophising || which, I think, is never made outside philosophy. –

      But what gives people the idea of wanting to make just this word || why should one wish to regard just this word as a name, when it so obviously isn't a name? – Just that || For this very reason; for they || we are inclined to make an objection || object || raise an objection to what is generally called “name” || calling “a name” what is generally called so; and the || this objection can be put in this way || expressed by saying: that the name really ought to indicate || stand for something simple. And for this one might give the following reasons || this can be defended as follows:– A proper name in the ordinary sense would be || is, for instance || e.g., the word “Nothung || Excalibur”. The sword Nothung consists || consisted of various parts put together in a particular || certain way. If they are put together differently || in a different way || not put together in this way then Nothung doesn't exist. Now the sentence “Nothung has a sharp edge” obviously has meaning || sense, whether Nothung is still whole or has been smashed to bits. Yet if “Nothung” is the name of an object, then this object doesn't exist any more when Nothung has been smashed; and since the name wouldn't have any object corresponding to it then, it wouldn't have || then has no object corresponding to it, it hasn't any meaning. But then in the sentence, “Nothung has a sharp edge”, there would be || is a word that has no || without a meaning, and so || therefore the sentence || “Nothung has a sharp edge” would be ¤ nonsense. But the sentence || to say this does have meaning, and so the words of which it consists must always correspond to something || to the words of which it consists something must always correspond. So that || Therefore in the || an analysis of the meaning || sense ◇◇◇ the word “Nothung” must disappear, and in its place || instead of it must come words || words must appear that name || which stand for || denote something simple || simple objects. And these || These words we may reasonably call the real names.

      Let us discuss one point of this argument first of all || first of all discuss this point of the argument: namely that the word has no meaning when nothing corresponds to it. – It is important to state || note that the word “meaning” is used ungrammatically if one uses it || when used to indicate the thing which “corresponds” || ‘corresponds’ to the word || the word ‘stands for’. This amounts to || is confusing the meaning of the name with the bearer of the name. If Paul dies, || is dead, then we say the bearer of the name is dead, but no one says || we don't say the meaning of the name is dead. And it would be nonsensical || nonsense || nonsensical to speak that way || say such a thing || this, for if the name had ceased to have meaning, then it would have no meaning to say, “Paul has died || is dead”.

      In (19) we introduced proper names into our language (11). Now suppose the tool with the name (α) is || were || had been broken. A doesn't know this, and gives B the sign (α): has this sign a meaning now, or has it none || hasn't it? – What is || What's B supposed to do when he receives this sign? – We have made no agreement about this. You might ask, what will he do? Well, perhaps he will stand there perplexed, or show A the pieces. You might say here, || : (α) has become meaningless; and this expression would indicate that there is now no further use for the sign (α) in our language game (unless we (were to) give it a new one). (α) might || may also become meaningless through the fact that || ifwe, for any reason whatever, || , for some reason or other, we scratched a different mark on the tool and didn't use the sign (α) in the game any more || scratch a sign || mark on the tool and no longer use the sign (α). – But we can also imagine ¤ an agreement according to which, when a tool is broken and A gives || shows B the sign of this tool, B has to shake his head as an answer to him. – Thisgives, we might say, || , we might say, gives the command (α) a place in the language game, even when || if this || the tool no longer exists. And we can now || now we may say that the sign (α) has a meaning even when its bearer ceases || has ceased to exist.

      We may For || We may – for a large class of cases in which the word “meaning” is used– || , though not for all cases of its use, – explain this word thus: The || the meaning of a word is its use in the language.
     And we often || sometimes explain the meaning of a name by pointing to the bearer of it. || its bearer.

      “But, in that game, do names || signs that have never been used for a tool have meaning as well || too || have meaning also which have never been used for a tool?” Let's suppose that “X” is such a sign || mark || sign and A gives || shows this sign || it to B. – Well, such a sign might be included in the language game, and B might be supposed, say, to answer it || Such signs || Signs of this sort may also be embodied in our language game, and B expected to answer them also by shaking his head. One might || may e.g. imagine this as || to be a way the two of them had of amusing themselves. || of making their work more pleasant.

      We said that the sentence, “Nothung has a sharp edge”, has meaning || sense even if || when Nothung has already been broken to pieces. Now that || this is so because in this language game a name is also used in the absence of its bearer. But we can imagine a language game with names (i.e. || that is, with signs that || which we should certainly || certainly should also call “names”) in which names are used only in the presence of their bearers. Suppose, say, that we were watching a surface on which coloured spots were || are moving || move about (as on the screen of || in a cinema). There are three such spots, which slowly change their shapes and positions. Suppose I had || have named them “P”, “Q” and “R” by giving ostensive definitions. Our ¤ language describes the changes of these three, and I say to you || we use sentences like, || : “Do you see how P is contracting now and is approaching R?”. – Now in this language these || the names are supposed to be used as synonyms for the demonstrative pronoun “this” together with the pointing to a coloured spot || (plus pointing to a coloured spot). If || Thus if one of the three spots disappears, then I can't say “P has disappeared” – any more than I should say “this has disappeared” – but we might say rather, “The || the letter ‘P’ drops out of use || is out.”¤
     In this language we || you may || can say, a name loses its meaning if || when its bearer ceases to exist, and the words || signs “P”, “Q” and “R” always have something corresponding to them || there is something which correspond to the words “P”, “Q” and “R” as long as they have any meaning – use in the language game – at all. (For in the sentence, “‘P’ drops out of use” || drops out” || is out”, the sign “‘P’” || ‘P’ occurs, but not “P”; and I assume that we do not || don't speak about past occurrences || events, or || or else here || use another || some other mode of expression for it || for them.) In this language game, then, a name cannot || can't cease to have a bearer; only this isn't any advantage || an asset of the language game, || ; for even when it hasn't a bearer a name may have a purpose, use, i.e. meaning || a name can have a purpose, use, i.e. meaning without having a bearer. (Thus || And thusthe name “Odysseus” has meaning for instance.) || , e.g., the name “Odysseus” has meaning.)

      But our || this language game can, I think, show us a reason why one may want || might wish to make the demonstrative pronoun || say that the demonstrative pronoun is a name: for the demonstrative “this” can never be without a meaning || bearer. One might say, || : “So long as there is a this, then the word ‘this’ has meaning, no matter whether this is simple or complex.” – But in fact that || this does not make it a name. On the contrary, – for we don't use a name by making a demonstrative gesture, but only explain it || a name isn't used with a demonstrative gesture, but only explained by it.

      What is the position with regard to whether names really stand || Now what about this matter of names really standing for what is || something simple? –
     Socrates (in the Theaetetus):
     These primary elements were also what Russell's “individuals” were || are also Russell's “individuals”, and my “objects” (Tractatus Logico-philosophicus).

      But what are the simple components || elements of which reality is made up || composed? – What are the simple components || elements of a chair? – The pieces of wood out of which it is put together? Or the molecules? Or the electrons? “Simple” means: not composite || complex. And then || thus it all depends on: in what sense “composite || complex”? It is senseless || makes no sense to talk about the “simple components of a chair” without qualification. Or: Does my visual image || sense datum || the visual appearance I get of this tree, or of this chair, consist of parts? and || And what are its simple components? Being of different colours is one || a kind of complexity; another is, for instance || e.g., the composition of this broken contour || line out of straight bits. And you might || may call this curve a complex || a curve compound of || say that this curve was made up of an ascending and a descending part || branch.
     If I say to someone without further explanation, || : “What I now see before me is complex”, then he will ¤ quite correct || right in asking, || rightly ask you: “What do you mean by ‘complex’? That || This can || may mean all sorts of things.” – The question, “Is what you see complex?”, does have meaning if it is already clear what sort of complexity – i.e., what particular kind of use of this word – is supposed to be in question || we are referring to || is in question. If it had been settled || laid down, for instance || e.g., that the visual image || appearance of a tree shall || is to be called complex if you see not only a trunk but also branches, then the question, “Is the visual appearance of this tree simple or complex?”, and the question, “What are its simple components?”, would have a clear use || sense, a clear use. And the answer to the second question, of course, || is, of course, not, “The || : “the branches” (this would be an answer to the grammatical question “What does one call ‘simple components’ here || do you call here ‘simple components’?”) but rather a description of the individual branches.

      But isn'ta chess board, for instance, || , say, a chess board obviously and without qualification complex? – You are probably || I suppose you're thinking of its being made up || composed of 32 white and 32 black squares; || : – but mightn't you sayfor instance also || , e.g., that it is made up of the colours white, black and the pattern of the || a net of squares? And so, if there are entirely different ways of looking at it, do you still want to say that the chess board is “complex” || ‘complex’ without qualification? The mistake of asking, outside of a particular game, || : “Is this object complex?”, is similar to that which a small boy once made who had to say || to decide whether the verb in this and that sentence was || verbs in such & such sentences were used in the active or in the passive form, and who then reflected || pondered the question || now tried to puzzle out whether for instance the verb “to sleep” || the verb “to sleep”, for instance, meant something active or something passive.
     The word “complex” (and so the word “simple” also) is one that we use || used by us in innumerable different ways, connected in various ways with one another || each other. (Is the colour of this square in || of the chess board simple, or does it consist of pure white and pure yellow? And is the white simple, or is it made up || composed of the colours of the rainbow? – Is this stretch || line of 2 cm simple, or does it consist of two part stretches || parts of 1 cm each? But why not of a piece 3 cm long || of 3 cm, and a piece of 1 cm added on in a negative sense?)

      To the philosophical question, || : “Is the visual image of this tree complex, and what are its components?”, the right answer is, || : “That depends on || upon what you understand by ‘complex’”. (And this, of course, is not answering the question, but rejecting it.)

      Let us apply the method of chapter || № (4) to the account in the Theaetetus: Let || let us consider a language game for which this account really holds. || is the correct account. The language then serves || Let the language serve to describe combinations of ¤ coloured spots || patches on a surface. The spots || patches are squares and make || form a complex like a chess board. There are red, green, white and black squares. The words of the language are (correspondingly): “r”, “g”, “w”, “b”, and a sentence is a string || row of these words. They describe an arrangement of coloured squares in the order etc..
The sentence “ r r b g g g r w w” describes then, for instance, an arrangement of this sort: Here the sentence is a complex of names, to which a complex of elements corresponds. The primary elements are the coloured squares: – “but are these simple?” – I can't think of anything that it would be more natural to || don't know what I could more naturally call “simple” || the “simple elements”, in this language game. In other circumstances, however, I should || would call a coloured square “complex”, – composed, say, of two rectangles, or of the elements colour and shape. But the concept of complexity || ‘complex’ might also be extended so || in such a way that the smaller surface is said to be “composed” of a larger surface and one subtracted from it. Compare the || the “composition” || ‘composition’ of forces, the “division” || ‘division’ of a line by a point outside it; these expressions show that in || under certain circumstances we are inclined to take || regard the smaller thing as a || the result of the “composition” || ‘composition’ of || combining what is larger and the larger || larger things, and the larger thing as the result of the || a division of what is smaller. || a smaller thing.
     But I don't know whether I should say that the figure which our sentence describes consists of four elements or of nine. Well, does ¤ that sentence consist of four letters or of nine? – And what are its elements: the letter types or the letters? And isn't it quite indifferent || all the same which we say, if only we avoid misunderstandings in the particular case? || in the particular case we avoid misunderstandings?

      But what does it mean, that we can't explain (i.e. describe) these elements but only name them? That || This might mean, say, that the description of a complex, if this complex consisted || consists, in a limiting case, || (in a limiting case) of only one element || square, is simply the name of the coloured square. || This might mean, say, that when a complex consists, in a limiting case, of only one square, then its description is simply the name of the || that coloured square.
     We || One might say here – although this easily leads to all sorts of philosophical superstitions – that a sign “r”, or “b || b” etc., may sometimes be a word and sometimes a sentence. But whether it “ || ‘is a word or a sentence” || ’ depends on the situation in which it is uttered or written. If e.g. A has to describe for B complexes of coloured squares and if he uses here the word “r” alone || by itself, then we may say that the word is here a description – a sentence. But if he memorises, say, || e.g. he is memorising the words and their meanings || what they mean, or if he is teaching another || someone else the use of the words and utters them in connection with ostensive teaching || while giving || with the appropriate gesture, then we shall not say that they are sentences here. In this situation the word “r”, for instance, is not a description; you name || are naming an element with it, || : – but it would be strange to say on that account || that's why it would be strange to say here that the element can only be named. Naming and describing, in fact, are not on the same level: naming is a preparation for describing. When you have named something you || Naming || With || In naming something you || we have not || haven't || haven't yet made a move in the language game, – any more than you have || you've made a move in a chess game || chess by setting a piece || putting a piece on the board. We may say: with the naming of a thing || by giving a thing a name nothing has || nothing's yet been done. It hasn't even || yet a name, – except in the game. That || This is also what Frege meant by saying that a word has meaning only in its connection with || the context of a sentence.

      What is meant by saying of the elements that we can ascribe neither being nor not-being to them || that we can ascribe neither being nor not-being to the elements? – One || We might say something like this: If everything that we call being or not-being consists in the fact that connections hold or do not hold || connections holding or not holding between the elements, then there is no sense in speaking of the being (not-being) of an element; just as, if everything that we call “destroying” consists in the separating of elements || tearing elements apart || apart elements, it has no sense to speak of destroying an element.
     But we should like || we || our wish to say: you || we can't ascribe || attribute being to || predicate being of an element, because if it were not || didn't exist, then you couldn't even name it || it couldn't even be named, and so you could say nothing about || therefore nothing could be said of it. – Let us || Let's consider an analogous case, though, which will make the || this matter || thing clearer: || . There is one thing of which you can't say either that it is 1 m long or that it is not 1 m long, and that is the standard meter in Paris. – But we have not || haven't attributed any peculiar property to the standard meter, of course, || , of course, by saying this we haven't attributed any curious property to the standard meter, but have only indicated its peculiar role in the game || process || procedures of measuring with the meter-rule. – Let us || Let's suppose || imagine samples of colours preserved in Paris in a similar way to the standard meter || the way the standard meter is. Then || And || : and we explain e.g. that “sepia” means the colour of the standard sepia that is preserved there in || under a vacuum. Then it will have no sense to say of this sample either that it has this colour or that it hasn't it.

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     We may express this in this way || This may be expressed thus: This || the sample is a part || an instrument of the language with || by means of which we make statements about colours. It is not something described in this game, || It is, in this game, || In this game it is not something which is described, but a means of describing || description. – And the same thing holds of an element in the language game in № (57) when, in naming it || assigning a name to it, we utter || say the word “R”: We || we have thereby given to this thing || object a role in our language game, it is now a means of description. And the statement, || : “If it were not || didn't exist, then it could have no name”, now says as much and as little as, || : “If this thing didn't exist, then we couldn't use it in our game.” – What, apparently || as might seem must exist, belongs to the || is an instrument of language. It plays in our game the role of a paradigm || the role of a paradigm in our game || the role of a paradigm: || ; of that with which a comparison is made. || the role of a standard with which something's compared. And to state this may be to make || making an important statement. But it is nevertheless a statement concerning our language– || , our mode || method of describing.

      In the description of the language game in № (57) I said that the words “r”, “g” etc., corresponded || correspond to the colours of the squares. But what does this correspondence consist in; || what's this correspondence; ¤ how far || in what sense can one say that certain colours of the squares correspond to these signs? The || For the explanation in (57) only made a connection between these signs and certain words in our ordinary language (the names of colours). – Well, it was assumed that the use of the signs was taught otherwise || differently in the actual game, namely || – by pointing to paradigms. Quite, || ; – but what does it mean to say that in the practice of the language certain elements correspond to the signs? – Does it consist in the fact || this, that whoever is || the person describing the complex of coloured squares always says “r” where there is a red

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¤ square, “b” where there is a black square, etc.? But what if he makes a mistake in his description and wrongly says “r” where there is a black square; what is || what's then the criterion that shows that this was a || here for this being a mistake? – Or does “r”'s indicating || standing for a red square consist in the fact, || “‘r’ stands for” a red square || a red square” mean that the people who use the language always have a red square before their minds when they use the sign “r”?
     In order to || To see more clearly we have here, as in innumerable || a great number of similar cases, to || should here, as in a great number of similar cases, keep the details || detail of the processes || what really happens in detail before our eyes || look at what really happens in detail, to observe from close at hand what happens. || ; as it were, from close by.
     If I am inclined to assume || take the view that a mouse comes into existence || is produced || springs, by spontaneous generation, out of || from grey scraps || rags and dust, then it will be well to examine these scraps || rags carefully to see how a mouse could conceal || have concealed itself in them, how it could come || have got there etc.. If, however, I am convinced that a mouse cannot || can't just come into being out of || be generated from these things, then this examination may be superfluous.
     What it is, however, that hinders in philosophy such an examination of the details, is something we have yet to come to understand. || But we have yet got to see what it is that, in doing philosophy, makes it so difficult to scrutinize these details. || But we have yet got to see what it is that sets itself against our scrutinizing these details, when we are doing philosophy.