| 1.
The experience of fright appears (when we philosophise) to be an amorphous experience behind the experience of starting. |
|
All I want to say is that it is
misleading to say that the word
“fright” signifies something which goes
along with the ˇexperience of expressing of fright. |
|
There is here as again the queer case of
that there is a difference between
what we say, when we actually
try to see what happens, & what
we say when we think about it
(giving over the rains to
language). |
|
The ‘far away’ look, the dreamy voice
seem to be only means for conveying
the real inner feeling. |
|
“Therefore there must be something
else” means nothing unless it expresses
a resolution to exp use a certain
mode of expression. |
|
Suppose you tried to separate the feeling
which musik
gives you from hearing musik. 2. |
|
Say & mean “long, long
ago–”, “lang
ist es her–”& now put instead
of these words new ones with many
more sylables & try if you can
put the same meaning into the words.
put instead of the copula a very
long word say “Kalamazoo” |
|
⌊Puella⌋, Poeta
“‘masculine’ &
‘feminine’ feeling”
“
|
|
Aren't there two (or◇ more) ways to
any event I might describe? |
|
We say “making this gesture isn't
all”.
The first answer is: We are talking about
the experience of making
th[e|is]
gesture.
Secondly: it is true that different
experiences can be described by
the same gesture; but not in the
sense that one is the pure one
& the others consist …. |
|
Wie ist es wenn man einmal die
besondere Klangfarbe eines Tones
3. |
|
⌊⌊◇◇◇◇◇◇⌋⌋
“Ich nenne diesen Eindruck ‘blau’”. |
|
Wie kann man denn die genaue Erfahrung in
‘Poeta’ etc.
beschreiben? |
|
The philosophical problem is:
“What is it that
puzzles me?”
|
|
To give names is to lable things;
but how does one lable impressions. |
|
Das männliche a & das weibliche a. |
|
Es läßt sich über die
|
|
Man sagt hier, daß ein bestimmter
Eindruck benannt wird.
Und darin liegt etwas seltsames &
problematisches.
Denn es ist als wäre der Eindruck
4
etwas zu äkterisches um ihn zu benennen.
(Den Reichtum einer Frau heiraten.) |
|
Du sagst Du hast einen ungreifbaren Eindruck.
ˇIch bezweifle nicht, was Du sagst Aber ich
frage ob Du damit etwas gesagt hast.
D.h. wozu hast Du diese Worte geäußert, in welchem
Spiel. |
|
It is as though,
|
|
As it were: There is something further about it,
only you can't say it; you can only make the
general statement.
It is this
|
|
|
It “There is not only the gesture but a
particular feeling which I can't describe”: instead
of that you might ha[b|v]e said: “I am
trying to point out a feeling to you”
|
|
How can we point to the colour & not to the shape?
Or to the feeling of toothache & not to the tooth
etc.? |
|
What does one call “describing a feeling to
someone”? |
|
“Never mind the shape, – look at the
colour!” |
|
“Was there a feeling of pastness when you said you remembered
…?”
‘I know of none’. |
|
How does one point to a number, draw attention to a number, mean
a number? |
|
How do I call a taste
“lemon taste”?
6
Is it by having that taste & saying the words: “I
call the taste …”? |
|
And can I give a name to any one
taste experience as without giving the
tastet a common name which aug is to be used in common language? –
“I give my feeling a name, nobody else can know what the
name means.” |
|
A [|sc]lave has to remind me of something
& isn't to know what he reminds me of. |
|
|
|
| 7 |
|
“I use the name for the impression
directaly & not in such a way that anyone
else can understand it.” |
|
Buying something from oneself.
Going through the operations of buying. |
|
My right hand selling to my left hand. |
|
Gefühls- (Gedanken) Übertragung. |
|
Eine gute art eine Farbe zu benennen wäre, in einer
entsprechend gefärbten Tinte den Namen schreiben. |
|
“I name the feeling”– I
dont quite know how you do this, what use you are
making of the
|
|
“I'm giving the feeling, which
|
|
One might say: “What is the use of talking of our
feeling at all.
Let
8 us devise a language which really
only says what can be understood”
Thus I am not to say “I have a feeling of
pastness”: But |
|
“This pain I call ‘toothache’ & I can
never make him understand what it means”. |
|
We are under the impression that we can point to the pain, as it were
unseen by the other person, & name it. |
|
For what does it mean that this
|
|
Or, that the pain is the barer of the name?
It is the substantive ‘pain’ which ◇◇◇ puzzles us. This substantive seems to produce an ilusion. What would things look like if we expressed pains by moaning & holding the painful spot? Or that we utter the word pain pointing to a spot. “But that the point is that we should 9 say ‘pain’ when there
really is◇ pain.”
But how am I to know if there really is pain? if what I feel really is pain? Or, if I really have a feeling?‒ ‒ ‒ |
|
Es ist sehr nützlich zu bedenken: Wie würde ich in einer
Gebärdensprache ausdrücken: “ich hatte keine Schmerzen, aber
stellte mich, als ob ich welche hatte”? |
|
|
“He has pains, says he has pains & saying
‘pains’ he means his pains.”
How does he mean his pains by the word ‘pain’
or ‘toothache’? |
|
“He sais ‘I see green’
& means the colour he sees.” –
If asked afterwards what did you mean by ‘green’ he
might answer ‘I meant the colour’, pointing to it.
10 |
|
“In my own [k|c]ase I know that when I say ‘I
have pain’ this utterance is accompanied by something;– but is it also accompanied by something in another man?”
In as much as his utterance needn't be accompanied by my pain. I may say that it isn't accompanied by anything. |
|
“I know what I mean by ‘toothache’ but
the other person can't know it.” |
|
Als negation: “The deuce he
is ….” |
|
Die Philosophie eines Stammes der als Negation nur den
Ausdruck◇◇◇
|
|
On a beau
dire …. |
|
“Man kann nie einen ˇganzen Körper sehen sondern nur
ˇimmer einen Teil seiner Oberfläche.” |
| 1. |
|
|
“Give the impression a name!”
that seems to have sense. “It seems to me that I can mean the impression” It seems to me that I can will the table to appoach. “Can one push air?” 3. |
|
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We said that what we described as “numeral
equality”, “being 1-1 correlated”,
“having the number n” were widely differing
phenomena.
That therefore it was an ilusion to think that to say
“the classes fall in pairs” is, generally speaking an
analysis of what we call numeric equality in simpler terms.
We can if we like put “being numerically equal” =
“falling into pairs” but the use of the one
expression just as of the other has got to be explained in the particular
case.
This we only forgett.
Thinking about a very special class of examples.
One could also say that a length a was twice another one b if the two a superimposed gave b. Application for wavelengths. This brings me to the topic of 8 demonstration.
1) Nr. of outer vert = Nr of inner vert 5. Compare with “the Hand has 5 Fingers.” Timelessness. The save hold of “The number of outer vert. = Nr of inner vert” Question which is answered by this prop timeless. ˇApparent Generality of demonstr. The copula has no tenses. ◇◇◇ idea is that the idea of a pentagram is bound up with a cardinal Nr. Now, we could make all sorts of connections. “It is the essence of these figures to be capable of being
9 |
|
Pythagoras Is the result of the process taken as a standard or not. “These two triangles by this nature give the rectangle”. 4 This aspect might never have struck you. 10
a
+ (◇◇◇) = (◇◇◇ + b) + c
It seems you can't get out.
You must adopt a + (b + c) =
(a + b) + c if you adopt
a + (b + 1) = (a + b)
+ 1 a + (b + 1) = (a + b) + 1 a + (b + 2) = (a + b) + 2 |
|
But need we really say that a + (b + 2) =
(a + b) + 2 follows from
a + (b + 1) =
(a + b) + 1? |
|
The reasoning is:
a + (b + 2) = a + (b + (1 + 1)) = a + ((b + 1) + 1) = = (a + (b + 1)) + 1 = ((a + b) + 1) + 1 = (a + b) + (1 + 1) 5 + (6 + 1) = (5 + 6) + 1 5 + (6 + 2) = |
|
I show you a curve drawn in a pentagon which you had never
thought of & I say: I am shoving you that
11. this curve can be
drawn, – or: that there is such a curve in the pentagon.
That there are two twos in four. |
|
Is there really no way out of saying, say, that a triangle which has
the 3 equal sides has also three equal angles. |
|
Does consist of
&
?
It depends what kind of dispute it is.
You could say it consisted of &
.
Is the ◇◇◇ dispute one about facts or mode of
description? Counting5 12
This
doesnt show that a + b fits butit shows that it looks like it does “What kind of figure do you get if you draw the diagonals in a Pentagon?” ˇWhat sort of body do you get if you ‒ ‒ ‒. What kind of Nr do you get if you draw 3s in 9. What kind of coulour do you get if you [wet|mix] red with yellow? “The figure shows him that a pentagram fits into a pentagon”. Is this an experimental result? 13. |
|
I am now talking ˇalways of a particular kind of
demonstration; what one might call an visual demonstration.
|
|
In what sense could I say that I didnt know that the
pentagram fitted the pentagon?
Could I have imagined the opposite?
Suppose I had imagined the opposite in some sense then in the same sense I could still hold the opposite after the demonstration. |
|
|
“I never knew that I could see the Pentagon
& its diagonals in this aspect.” 7 “Oh, that's how it fits!” Two tunes fitting together. 15 |
|
8 “I dont know whether the dra pentagram fits the pentagon. If so the diagonals of a pentagon must give a pentagram. Let's try it.” Is to see◇ the figure an experiment? Or to see side by side the figures ? But doesn't it teach us something? “It never struck me” |
|
It seems we are learning by experience a timeless truth about the shape of
a Pentagon & of a Pentagram. |
|
“I never knew that one could look at it
16 that way.
I had never seen the pentagram in the pentagon.”
|
|
It is a new experience to me.
But is it the experience teaching me that the pentagram fits the
pentagon? |
|
|
“The visual image [P|p] fits
the visual image P.”
The importance of this prop lies in this that
it seems a prop. of experience &
that on the other hand it also is used as a
prop. of geometry
i.e. of grammar. |
|
|
Problem: “Draw that Star which will fit the
Pentagon.”
This is a mathematical problem. |
|
“What do the diagonals of a P look
like?” |
|
We look at a puzzle picture & find a man in the foliage of a
tree.
Our visual impression changes.
But
|
|
We seem to have demonstrated an internal property of the old
picture.
18 |
|
|
|
Die mathematische Frage. Could the Pythag. be assumed instead of being deduced? |
|
|
|
To see five figures as 3
F. + 2 F..
It 5 is =
2 + 3 it
can't mean anything to see 5 as
2 +
3
You could devid 5 into 2 + 3 but not into 3 + 3 as you could 6
20
|
|
The whole question is really: “can it strike you
what a thing is?” 10 It seems you can find out something about the nature of a thing by experience. About its internal nature. It is Thus e.g. a similarity can strike you; the fact that a complex contains a constituent; even 21 identity of shape.
two tunes fitting |
|
“One can see immediately that 4 consists of
2 +
2”.
This is nonsense if 4 = 2
+ 2 |
|
|
~p ~ [~p ∙ ~(~r ∙ ~s)] ∙ ~[~(~t ∙ ~~s ∙ ~t)) ∙ ~p] |
∕∕ |
What do I do when I draw your attention to a fact about,
say, this formula?
It seems I make you see something about its essence.
You get a new experience; but this experience , it seems, teaches you
something about the essence the internal nature of the formula.
It seems to teach you a mathematical (⌊or⌋ logical) truth
& this does not seem to be a rule of grammar but a truth about the
22
nature of things. |
|
If I made an experiment with a certain figure we can ˇ◇◇◇
imagine this or that result.
But if I draw your attention to a feature |
|
It consists of … appears to have 1) a grammatical meaning 2)
a physical meaning & 3) a meaning lying between these
two. |
|
We seem to learn something about the very
sense datum. |
|
|
A certain symbolism will easily go with a certain aspect of looking at a
thing. |
|
“They regard the square as a double right
angle.” |
|
|
|
|
One couldn't call 0˙3̇
a shorthand for
0˙333 ….
Except insofar as 0˙33 … is also a shorthand for
0˙333 …. |
|
“Don't try to find a 4 in the developement
it's hopeless!” –
“Don't multiply
25 × 25
24 again & again in the hope to find
600; it's hopeless!”
What's it like to try to find a 4 in the developement of 1 : 3? And what is it like to find a 4. |
|
What is the ˇimportance & meaning of
the question: “What is it like?” or
“What is the verification?” |
|
Kein Kalkül ist im “Widerspruch mit der Logik”
d.h. mit gewissen Regeln die über allen andern
stehen.
Die Annahme einer obersten Logik ist es, die die
Philosophen hier irreführt. |
|
What we should call finding a 4 in 1/3
obviously depends upon the operations in this case. |
|
What does it mean to imagine getting a result from a
cal[k|c]ulation?
How far is this imagination to go? |
|
“There isn't a 4 in the first million
places”– “You've got a quick way of
calculating that!” |
|
Imagine this operation: A decimal
25 fraction constructed by multiplying again
& again 25 ×
25: 0˙625625625 … Look for an 8 in it!” “You know that you will never find an 8” means: “Don't try to devide 2476 without remainder by 3 it's hopeless”. |
|
In which case is it hopeless to find a particular result by a
calculation? |
|
Calculating is the process of imagining a calculation. |
|
“I can hope to find an 8 in the Product
284 × 379.” |
|
To say “it's hopeless to find a certain result
really means: our calculation has already shown it to
be wrong.* |
|
Or: we have a calculation of which we make have that
opposite result. |
|
What is the
26 |
|
How can one calculation anticipate the result of another? |
| *
Or: “Our
cal[k|c]ulusation
has already decided against it. |
|
What does it mean: to prophecy what one will correctly
find. |
|
|
|
Das Bild “Alle” angewandt auf die Unendlichkeit. |
|
To show mathematically that a 4 can be found is to describe what it is
like to find a 4.
And to find a 4 is here a process in space and time. |
|
“Find, as the result of a calculation” &
“Find, otherwise” |
|
In 1 : 7 gibt es ein endliches
Problem & ein unendliches.
27 |
|
❘ ❘ ❘ ❘ ❘ ❘ ❘ ❘ ❘ ❘ ❘ ❘ ❘ 13 : 5 = 2 311 Two processes of calculation lead to the same result. |
|
“What if they at some stage did not lead to the same result”. – “That is impossible, we couldn't imagine their not leading to the tame result.” But then the proof of their leading to the same result showed us what it was like to lead to the same result. |
|
|
12 |
|
The difficulty consists in this that it here seems impossible to
imagine anything but what really is the case: And
that of course means nothing!
We don't seem to be able to imagine finding a 4, because there is a three there. But then how are we capable of imagining to find a 3 as there is a 3 there? |
|
If I say I can't imagine a 4
29 to result it means that the calculation
shows me what it means to imagine a 3 to result & gives no sense
to the prop. “I imagine a 4 to
result” |
|
x² +
ax + b = 0
“Solve this equation ˇalgebraically!”
|
|
“Do something that has an analogy to
….”
But we can't be sure that we shall not in the end give up the idea of something being analogous to …. |
|
The existens of
|
|
Supose we said that a solution is a solution only
insofar as it could have been described
before it was found. |
|
“Solve x² + 2ab + b² = 0” “Solve x² + 4x + 5 = 0” 30 |
|
“We can't imagine that 1 : 7
should not repeat itself after the dividend has [k|c]ome
back.”
|
|
We have two ways of calculating the
10¹⁰th
place & we can't imagine that they lead to different
results. |
|
Ist es eine [b|B]estätigung hierfür wenn die beiden
Bemerkungen in einem bestimmten Fall übereinstimmen?
|
|
Is it different to say “they lead to the same
[R|r]esult” & “they must lead
to the same result”? |
|
Does it mean anything to “prophecy” the result of a
calculation? |
|
We say we can't imagine that the two processes should not
lead to the sa the same result.
What does it mean, we can't imagine it? 31 |
|
|
Must we recognise Periodicity as a proof that there will be no 6 in
the development of 1 : 7?
|
|
“How does it happen that
3 × 4 is
4 × 3?” |
|
“An dieser Stelle muß eine Primzahl kommen” –
“An dieser Stelle
|
|
‘Gibt es einen Zufall in der Mathematik?’
|
|
How does the returning to the dividend show me the periodicity
of the quotient. |
|
|
Denke an den Fall wenn man mehrere Züge in einem Spiel zusammenzieht
& etwa im Schach gar nicht erst mit der ersten Position
anfängt. |
| “Die Form ‘1 2 3 4 5’ paßt auf die Form ” Was für ein Faktum ist das, daß die Reihenfolge das Resultat nicht ändert. The process we are going through just does to lead to the same result; – but so far as it “leads to the same result we could imagine it to lead to a different 33 result.
And so far as we couldnt imagine it to lead to a
different result it doesnt lead to any result but shows
what it's like to lead to the same result.
I.e.: If we look at the Forms & 12345 as equivalent there ceases to be a question of whether the two processes lead to the same or to different results & the apparent experiment serves only to show what sort of fact we take as the standard of our expression. |
|
|
“How can you impose two rules on your
arithmetik unless you know that they must lead to the
same result?”
You wish to say: “These rules by there very nature, lead to the same result.” And you would therefore have recognised something about the very nature of them. |
|
Now it is time that you make a man look into the
case working of these rules; that is, you can prove something
about them. |
|
“You go through this way of thinking & then you go
through another way of thinking which independently leads to the same
result.” |
|
123456 123456
2 2 2 |
|
After you have seen that 1000 : 3 must
lead to 333 is it a confirmation to calculate it & see what it
does?
Hadn't you calculated it by “seeing that it was
333”?
And what does it mean that one calculation confirms the result of the
other? 35
If you first see that the two calc. must lead to the same result is it a confirmation to find that they do? |
|
“If this goes on this way & that goes on that way they
must meet there!” |
|
25 25 25 25 ‒ ‒ ‒ 16 times 16 16 16 16 25 times they must meet at the end. “Are you surprised that they meet? Didn't you know that they had to meet?” |
|
“I wasn't surprised I always followed the
25s while going on with the 16s.”
36 |
|
|
|
Can we try whether it does? |
|
Can we imagine the same calculation to lead
|
|
The question is really whether there can be a “must” in
a prop. about the
37
nature of things. |
|
“In the sense in which they ‘must’
lead, they don't lead we can't say
they do lead. |
|
|
|
Wir nehmen ein falsches Verhältnis von Prozess
& Resultat an.
Denn es heißt nicht daß ein ˇgewisser Prozess zu einem ˇbestimmten Resultat führen muß. |
|
Denn ein Prozess muß nur dazu führen daß er
geschehen ist. |
|
|
Ich kann mir eine Blume auf gewisse Weise gewachs◇en
denken.
Und das Wachstum ist dann ein Prozess dessen Ende der
Zustand der Blume ist. |
|
In welchem Sinne ist es möglich nicht zu wissen wohin ein
mathematischer Vorgang führt.
Man könnte antworten es ist möglich nicht zu wissen, wohin er führen
wird aber nicht, nicht zu wissen wohin er führt.
In one sense you can't know the process without knowing the result, as th[is|e] result is the end of the process. In 39 the other you may know a process
& not know the result. |
|
In mathematics we object to say these processes have the
end in com |
|
|
A calculation leads to a result ˇmathematically appart
from the fact whether I have actually performed it. |
|
‘If I say this calculation must lead to this result it
has al already lead to
it.’ |
|
|
If I say ‘this calculation must lead to the same result’
by “this calculation I am referring to
ˇwhatever I call a method of calculating. |
|
Does calculating that there isn't a six … confirm
the result that there couldn't be? |
|
“You already see what happens, it must always go on like
this.”
Now suppose you actually went on would this confirm what you saw
before? |
|
A man says, “I see that the two calculations ˇso far agree
but I don't know why they should go on agreeing”.
In Shall we say that he doesn't see a truth
which the other sees? –
He tries always again & again.
We ask him: “But don't you see that you
must get to the same result again?
Should we say that he must make go the long way of experience, where we go the shorter one of seeing? 41 |
|
“If the multiplication lead to this result once, it
must lead to
|
|
“What is the criterium of
periodicity?”
Here we are inclined to think that we have a criterion the reappearance of
the remainder & the actual periodicity
i.e., the repetition ad inf of the period.
|
|
The infinite & the huge.
Absolute idea of large & small. |
|
|
“These people don't see a simple truth
…. |
|
|
But not “because it had to lead thru to
the same result”. |
|
It is a remarkable fact that people almost always agree how to
count. |
|
Supposing I said this is the 100th house of this street, although
there are no only 5 houses built. 43 |
/ |
• • • Am
I to be guided by this• or by this•?
And how do I know that they will guide me to the same result? We have a general kind of idea of how it goes on; but can't this after all be contradicted by the actual detailed calculation? Isn't there a danger of it going wrong after all? What is the truth which we see (& which is ‘obvious’)? That • This• shows us that this• was justified” But then we leave behind us these justifications. At first imagination accompanies us a (certain) stretch & then even we are left alone. |
|
If there are 777 in the first 100 places there are 777 in the infinite
developement. 44 |
|
|
|
The process of calculation
|
|
|
“If I follow this chain of steps it's bound
to lead me there.” |
|
“The question are there 777 in π is allright
because surely there either are 777 in π or
there arent”.
Queer use of p ⌵ ~p.
Images characteristic for this statement.
It realy means: “The question is allright because there is a method of verifying it althought we can't use it.” |
|
“The third place of π is 4
whether I know it or not.” |
|
“What if we had proved it to be self contradictory
that there should be no 777 ˇin π,
mustn't we then say that there are 777?” |
|
Our prose expressions in mathematics are highly metaphorical.
|
|
“Every algebraic equ. has a
root”.
Is this to be called a proposition?
46
The question corresponding to this prop. as answer is vague. But once the prop. this piece of mathematics has been done we are inclined to call it the proof that our question had to be answered is the positive. But, as one might say, there was much less in the question than there is now in the answer. – Compare this with: “[i|I]s 25 × 25 = 600?” |
|
Props. which seem only to
have sense if their truth or falsehood is known. |
|
What kind of prop. will the
prop. be that there can't (or
must) be 777 in π. |
|
Will it be possible e.g. to calculate whether any
given prop. of digits occurs or how often
it does. |
|
Relation between proof showing that 777 must be between n &
m & actual Proof that they are at the
vth place (v bein between n
& m). 47 |
|
Negation of a mathematical prop. &
fault in a calculation. |
|
|
“Question” corresponds to
“investigation”. |
|
Heptagon must there have been an Investigation. |
|
“Is 5. a cardinal
Nr?” |
|
There is a contradiction between the normal use of the word
“proposition”
“question. 11 |
|
“Wouldn't one like to know with real
certainty whether the other
|
|
Feeling of pastness.
“The experiences bound up with the gesture etc.
aren't the experience of pastness, for they could be there without
the feeling of pastness”. –
“But, on the other hand, would it be that experience
of pastness without those experiences bound up with the
gesture? –
[w|W]hy should we say that the
characteristic // essential // part is the
part outside those experiences?
Isn't the experience at least partially described if I have
described the gestures etc? |
|
Auch so: Die Worte “lang ist es her –”
rufen in mir manchmal ein bestimmtes Gefühl
wach[,|.]
[m|M]anchmal nicht.
Aber wenn sie es wachrufen so sind sie, ihr ◇◇◇ Teil der
charakteristischen Erfahrung |
|
Sprechen mit Andern & mit mir selbst: “Wenn
ich eine gewisse Erfahrung habe, gebe ich ˇ(nur) das Zeichen
✢ ….” 12. |
|
When one sais “I talk to myself”
one ˇgenerally means just that one speaks & is the only
person listening. |
|
If I look at something red [to|&] say &, to myself, this is red, am I giving
myself an information?
Am I communicating a personal experience to myself.
Some philosophising people might be inclined to say that this
is the only real case of communication of personal experience because only I
know what I really mean by ‘red’. |
|
Remember that in which special cases only it has sense to
inform a⌊n⌋ other person that the colour he sees now is red◇. |
|
One doesn't say to oneself “[t|T]his
is a chair. –
Oh really?” |
|
Wie kann ich denn einer Erfahrung
([z.B.|etwa] einem Schmerz) einen
Namen geben?
Ist es nicht als wollte ich ihm, etwa, einen Hut aufsetzen?
|
|
Nehmen wir an man sagte: “Man kann
13 ihm nur indirekt einen Hut
aufsetzen” so würde ich fragen: Glaubst Du daß man je
auf die Idee gekommen wäre davon zu reden wenn man nicht daran gedacht hätte
daß man dem Menschen der Schmerzen hat einen Hut aufsetzen kann?
Zu sagen man könne dem Schmerz nur indirekt einen Hut aufsetze macht es
erscheinen als gäbe es dennoch einen direkten Weg der nur tatsächlich
nicht gangbar sei.
◇◇◇◇◇◇ |
|
The difficulty is that we feel that we have said something about the
nature of pain when we say that one person can't have
another person's pain.
Perhaps we shouldn't be inclined to say that we had anything
physiological or even p[h|s]ychological but something
metapsychological metaphysical.
Something about the essence, nature, of pain as opposed to its causal
connections to other phenomena. |
|
Es scheint uns etwa als wäre es zwar nicht falsch sondern unsinnig zu
sagen “ich fühle seine Schmerzen”, aber als wäre dies so
infolge der Natur
14 des Schmerzes, der Person
etc..
Als wäre also jene Aussage letzten Endes doch eine Aussage über die Natur
der Dinge.
Wir sprechen also etwa von einer Asymmetrie unserer Ausdrucksweise & fassen diese auf als ein [s|S]piegelbild des Wesens der Dinge. |
|
Intangibility of impressions.
(Anguish)
Some we should say were more tangible than
others.
Seeing more tangible than a faint pain; & this more tangible
than a vague fear, longing etc.
In what way are these intangible experiences less easy to communicate tha to describe than the mo ‘simpler’ ones? In what way do we use the phrase: “This experience is difficult to describe.” And can ˇit be even impossible to describe certain an experience⌊s⌋be ever indes? |
|
des Was für einen Sinn hat es zu sagen diese Erfahrung ist nicht beschreibbar? Wir möchten sagen: sie ist zu complex, zu subtil. |
|
“Diese Erfahrung ist nicht mitteilbar, aber ich kenne
sie, – weil ich sie habe.” 15 |
|
“Es gibt die Erfahrung, & die Beschreibung der
Erfahrung. –”
Daher kann es nicht gleichgültig sein, ob der Andere die selbe Erfahrung
hat,, wie ich, oder nicht; – & daher
|
|
Kann man sagen: “[i|I]n
“Ich spreche über meine Erfahrung, sozusagen, in ihrer Anwesenheit” // in ihrem Beisein // . |
|
Wie wenn jemand sagen würde: “Es gibt nicht nur die
Beschreibung des Tisches sondern auch den Tisch.” |
|
“Es gibt nicht nur das Wort ‘Zahnschmerz’,
es gibt auch
16 |
|
Es scheint, daß, da ich etwa eine Erfahrung nicht beschreiben kann, sie
aber habe, daß ich sie daher genauer kennen kann, als irgend ein
Anderer.
Aber was heißt, es die Erfahrung kennen, wenn es nicht heißt,
sie beschreiben & nicht heißt, sie haben.
Gibt es eine Kenntnis der Erfahrung, die wir nicht mitteilen können? |
|
Hat es Sinn zu sagen “ich kenne diese Erfahrung besser // genauer // als irgend ein Anderer sie kennen
kann”?”.
Gibt es Erfahrungen die der Andere ebensogut kennen kann wie ich
& solche, die er nicht so gut kennen
kann?–
Heißt das: er kann diese selbe ˇkomplizierte Erfahrung nicht
haben? –
Es heißt wohl: “Er kann sie haben, aber wir können
|
|
Es gibt ja auch den Fall, in dem wir ein Gesichtsbild genauer durch
ein gemaltes Bild als durch
17 Worte
beschreiben können. |
|
Wie ist es damit: “Man kann eine [f|F]igur
genauer mit Hilfe von [m|M]aßzahlen als ohne diese
beschreiben”. |
|
Aber die Erfahrung, die ich habe scheint im gewissen
Sinne eine Beschreibung dieser Erfahrung, im gewissen
Sinne,c zu ersetzen.
“Sie ist ihre eigene Beschreibung”. |
|
Vermischen wir hier nicht zwei Dinge: die Zusammengesetztheit
der Erfahrung &, was man ihren ursprünglichen
|
|
Es ist die Auffassung, daß von der ursprünglichen Erfahrung
etwas nur ein Teil
|
|
Aber können wir nicht wirklich sagen, wir hätten in dem Andern durch
unsere Beschreibung ein Bild hervorgebracht aber wir können nicht
wissen ob dieses Bild nun
18 genau das
gleiche ist, wie das unsere?
Denken wir hier an den Gebrauch des Wortes
gleich in ˇsolchen Sätzen
wie: “Diese Kreise sind dem Augenschein nach
ganz gleich.” |
|
Hierher gehört auch, daß wir gewöhnlich unser Gesichtsbild nicht als etwas
in uns empfinden wie etwa einen Schmerz im Auge daß wir aber wenn wir
philosophieren geneigt sind diesem Vergleich Bild
gemaß zu denken. |
|
“The
‘if’-sensation’”.
Compare with the ‘table-sensation’.
There is the question “Whats the
tablesensation like” & the answer is a
picture of a table.
In what sense is the if sensation analogous to the
table sensation?
Is there a description of this sensation & what do we call a
description of it.
Putting the gestures instead of the sensation means
really just pr giving the nearest rough
description there is of
|
|
Example [“I have a peculiar feeling of pastness in my wrist”] 19.
6) “We shall never know whether he meant this or
that”.
[B|C] died after the training in that room.
We say: “Perhaps he would have
reakted like B when taken into the
daylight.
But we shall never know.
α) We should say this question was decided if he arose from his grave & we then made the experiment with him. Or his ghost appeared to us in a spiritualist séanse & told us that he has a certain experience. β) We dont accept any evidence. But what if we didn't accept the evidence in 5 either & said somet (something like) “We can't be sure that [it|he] is the identical man who was trained in the room”, or: “he is the identical man but we can't know whether he would have behaved like this in the past time when he was trained. 7) We introduce a ˇnew notation for the expression: “If [A|P] happens then always (as a rule) [B|Q] happens. P didnt happen this time & so Q didn't happen” We say instead: “If P had happened Q would◇ have happened”. E.g. “If the gunpowder is dry ˇunder these circumstances a spark of this strength explodes it. It wouldn't dry this time & under the same circumstances didn't explode” We say instead “If the gunpowder had been dry this time it would have exploded”. The point of this notation is that it nears the form of this preposition very much to the form: “The gunpowder 20. was dry this time so it
exploded”
I mean the new form doesn't stress the fact that
it did not explode but, we might say, paints a vivid picture of it exploding
this time.
We could imagine a ˇtwo forms of expression in a
picture language which was corresponding to the two kinds of
notations in the word language.
The second notation would consist in actually painting a picture of the
explosion.
The second notation will be particularly appropriate
ˇe.g. if we wish to give a person a shock by
making him vividly imagine
8) Someone might say to us: “But are you sure that the second sentence means just what the first one means & not ◇◇◇ just something similar or ˇthat & something else as well? (Moore) I should say: I'm talking of the case where it means just this, if it's used in & this seems to me an important case (which you causede by saying what you have said). But of course I don't say that it isn't used in other ways as well & then we'll have to talk about these other cases separately. 9) Someone says –“lowering ones voice some 21
times means
¤
¤ that you
whish to draw special attention to what you now say
¤• in other cases you
lower your voice to show
¤• that what you say is less
important than the rest.
10) We say “We doncan't know whether this spark would have been sufficient to ignite that mixture; because we can't reproduce the exact mixture not having the exact ingredients or not having a balance to weigh them etc etc. But suppose we could reproduce all the circumstances & someone said “we can't know whether it would have exploded”
22.
inclined to say “This makes no sense!”
And this means that we are at a loss not knowing what reasoning, what
actions go with this expression.
Moreover we believe that he made up a sentence analogous to sentences used
in certain lang. games but not
noticing that he took the point awayt.
In which case do we say that a sentence has point? That comes to asking in which case do we call something a language game. I can only answer. Look at the family of language games that will show you whatever can be shown about the matter. 12) “We can never know what he really sees, for he has his own visual image & I have mine”. & we can't say |
|
12) (The private visual image.)
B is trained to describe his afterimage when he has looked say into
a bright red light.
He is made to look into the light, & then to shut his eyes
& he is then asked “What do you
see?”.
This question before was put to him only if he looked at physical
objects.
We suppose he reacts by a description of what he sees with closed
eyes. –
But halt!
This description of the training seems wrong for what if
23 I had had to describe my
own, not B's, training. ⌊⌊
◇◇◇ ⌋⌋
Would I then also have said: “I reacted to the question by
… ” & not rather: “When I had
clo closed my eyes I saw an image & described
it”.
If I say “I saw an image & described it I say this as
opposed to the case
24. |
|
13) ˇWe imagine that The expression
“I can't see what you see” has been given sense
by explaining it to mean: “I can't see what
you see being in a different position relative to the object we are looking
at”, or “ … having not as good eyes as
you”, or “ … having found as in … that
B sees something which we don't though we look at the same
Object.
etc.
I can't see your afterimage might be explained to mean I
can't see what you see if I close my eyes meaning when
you say you see a red circle I see a yellow one.
14) Identity of physical objects, of shapes, colours, dreams, toothache. 15) (The
16) (I can't know whether he sees anything 25
at all or
only behaves as I do when I see something.)
There seems to be an undoubted asymetry in the use of the
word “
a) There is a mistake in this ◇◇◇: I know what I see because I see it”. What does it mean to know that. b) It is truet to say that my reason for saying that I see is not the observation of my behaviour. But this is a gramm.prop. c) It seems to be an imperfection that I can only know ‒ ‒ ‒. But this is just the way we use the word ‒ ‒ ‒. – Could we then … if we could? Certainly. |
|
Does the person Should we say that the
person … who has not learnt the language
know◇s wh that he sees red but
can't express it? –
Or should we say: “he knows what he sees but
can't express it”? –
So, besides seeing it, he also knows what he
sees?
Imagine we described a totally different experiment; say this, that I sting someone with a needle & observe wheter he
26
This case is quite straightforward & there
|
|
If I say “I tell myself that I see red, I tell myself what I
see” it seems that after having told myself I now know better what
I see, am better acquainted with it, than before.
(Now in a sense this may be so …) |
|
“When he said asked me what colours I saw,
I guessed what he meant wished wanted to know & told him.”◇◇◇ |
|
“It is not enough to distinguish between the cases in which
B or I sais that I see red & do see
red & the case in whichc I say this but don't
see red; but we must distinguish between the cases in which I say I
see red, see red, say I see red & mean to describe
what I see & the cases in which I don't mean
this. 27 |
|
Consider the case in which I dont say what I see
in words but by pointing to a sample.
Here again I distinguish now between the cases in which I ‘just
react by pointing’ & the case in which I see
& point. |
|
Now suppose I asked: “how do I know that I see
& that I see red?
“[i|I].e. how do I know
that I do what you call seeing ˇ(& seeing
red)?”
For we use the word ‘seeing’ &
‘red’
|
|
Don't you say: “We not In
order to be a description of our personal experience
it ˇwhat we say must not just be
|
|
Nehmen wir Suppose:⌊,⌋
[W|w]e play the game 2 & B tells calls out the
word “red”.
Suppose A now asks B: “do you only say
‘red’ or did you really see it?”. |
|
“Surely there are two phenomena: one, just speaking,
the other, seeing & speaking accordingly.
Answer: Certainly we speak of these two cases but we shall
here have so show how
28 these expressions are used; or, in other
words, how they are taught.
For the mere facts that we posess a picture of them
does not help us as we must describe
We have therefore to explain under what conditions we say: “I say ‘red’ but don't see red” or “I say ‘red’ & see red”, or “I say ◇◇◇ red said ‘red’ but didn't see red” etc. etc.. Imagine that saying red was often are followed by some agreable event. We found that the child enjoyed that event & often instead of ‘green’ said ‘red’. We would use this rea[k|c]tion to play another lang. game with the child. We would say “you cheat, its red” Now again we are dependent upon the subsequent reaction of the child. Such games are actually played with children: Telling a person the untruth & enjoying his surprise at finding out what really happened. |
|
But couldn't we imagine some kind of perversity in a child which
made it say red when it saw green & v&
v& & at the 29
same time this not being discovered because
it happened to see red ˇin those cases when we say green?
But if here we talk of perversity we
The idea is, that he finds out (& we do) when later on he lerns how the word ‘perverse’ is used &
Imagine this case: The child looks at the lights: sais the name of then right colour to himself in an asside & then loud the wrong word. It chuckles while doing so. This is, one may say, a rudimentary form of cheating. One might even say: “This child is going to be a liar”. But if it had not said the asside but only imagined itself pointing to one colour on the chart & then said the wrong word, – was this cheating too? Can a child cheat like a banker without the knowledge of the banker? |
|
“I can assure you that before when I said ‘I see
red’ I saw black 30 |
|
“He tells us his private experience, that experience which nobody
but he knows anything about”. |
|
“Surely his memory is worth more than our
direkt criteria, as only he could know what he
saw.” |
|
◇◇◇ But let us see;– [w|W]e sometimes say ouside philosophy such things as “of course only he knows how he feels” or “I can't know what you feel”. Now how do we apply such a statement? Mostly it is an expression of helplessness like “I don't know what to do”. But this helplessness is not due to an unfortunate metaphysical ◇◇◇ fact, ‘the privacy of personal experience’, or it would worry us the
|
|
We also say ˇto the Doctor “Surely I must know
whether I have pains or not!”
How do we use this statement? |
|
“Allright if we can't
talk in this way about someone else I can certainly say of myself that
I either saw red
31
◇◇◇ at that time or
|
|
Now is it the same case are these different cases:
A blind man sees everything just as we do but he acts as a blind man
does & on the other hand he sees nothing & acts as a blind
man does.
At first sight we should say: here we have obviously two clearly
different cases athough we admit ˇthat we
can't know which we have before us.
I should say: You We obviously
use two different pictures which
|
|
By the way, – would you say that he
32 |
|
“Surely he knew that he saw red but he
[k|c]ouldn't say so!” –
Does that mean “Surely he saw knew that
the [co|sa]w
the colour which we call ‘red’ … ”
& if not– or would you say it means “he
knew that he saw this colour” (pointing to a red
pa⌊t⌋ch)”.
But did he while he knew it point to this patch? |
|
Use of: “He knows what colour he
sees”.
“I knew what colour I saw”
etc. |
|
“Nachdunkeln der Erinnerung” does
this expression make sense & in what cases. And isn't ont the other hand the picture which we use quite clear in all cases? |
|
The case of old people usually
a) They say or paint that such & such things have happened although other records always contradict them b) The memories agree with the records. [I|O]nly in this case shall we say that they remember …. |
|
Suppose they paint the scenes they
33 say they remember & paint the faces
very dark;– shall we say that they saw them that dark or that the
colour had become darker in their memory? |
|
How do we know what colour a person sees?
By the sample he points to?
And how do we know wheth what relation the sample is
ˇmeant to have to the original?
Now are we to say “we never know …”?
Or had we better cut out these “we never know
… ” ˇout of our language &
[k|c]onsider how as a matter of fact we are wont to use the word
“to know”? |
|
What if someone asked: “How do
|
|
Is it ever true that when I call a colour ‘red’ I
|
|
To use the memory of what happened
34 when we were taught language is
allright as long as we don't think
that this memory teaches us something essentially private. |
|
|
“Though he [k|c]an't say what it is he sees
while he is learning № 1, he'll tell us afterwards what
he saw.
We mix this case up with the one: “When his
gag will have been removed he'll tell us what he
saw”. |
|
What does it mean ‘to tell someone what
[we|one] sees’?
Or (perhaps), ‘to show someone what one
sees’? |
|
When we say “he'll tell us what he
saw we have an idea that then we'll know
what he really saw in a direkt way
(“at least if he isn't
lying”) |
|
“He is in a better position to say what he sees than we
are.” –
That depends. – |
|
If we say “he'll tell us what he saw”, it is
as though he would now make a
35 use of
language which we had never taught him. |
|
It is as if now whe we got an insight into
something which before we had only seen from the outside. |
|
Inside & outside! |
|
“Our
|
|
Where is
|
|
How, if we said, ˇas we sometimes might be inclined:
“We can only hope that this– indirect way of
communication really succe[d|e]ds.
|
|
We ˇso long see the facts about the usage of our words crookedly
|
|
As long as you use the picture indirect-direct in this case you
can't trust yourself
36 about
judging the grammatical situation rightly otherwise.
|
|
Is telling what one sees something like turning one's
inside out?
And learning to say what one sees, learning to let others see inside
us? |
|
“We teach him to make us see what he sees”.
He seems in an indirect way to show us the object which he sees,
the object which is before his minds eye.
“We can't look at it, it is in him.”
|
|
The idea of the private object of vision.
Apearance, sense datum. |
|
The visual field.
([n|N]ot to be confused with visual space.) |
|
Telling someone what one sees seems like showing him, if indirectly, the
object which is before ones mind's
eye. |
|
The idea of the object before one's mind's eye is
37 really
used is ˇan indirect one. |
|
Whence the idea of the privacy of sensedata? |
|
But do you really wish to say that they are not
private ( that one person can see the picture before the
other persons eye?” |
|
Surely ˇyou wouldn't think that telling someone
what one sees
|
|
“He'll tell us later what it was he saw” means
that we'll get to know in a (comparatively) direct
ˇ& a sure way what he saw as opposed to the guesses we could
make before. |
|
We don't reallize that the answer he gives us now is
only part of a game like № 1 only more complicated.
38 |
|
We dont deny that he can remember a
having dream⌊t⌋ so
& so before he was born.
Denying this to us would be like denying that he can say he remembers
having dreamt so & so before he was born.
I.e. we don't deny that he can make this move but we say that the move alone or together with all the sensations feelings etc he might have while he is making it does not tell us
We might e.g. never try to connect up a statement of this sort with anything past (in an other sense). We might treat it as an interesting phenomenon & possibly connect it up with the persons writing in a Freudian way or on the other hand we may look for some phenomena in the brain of the embryo which might be called dreams etc. etc.. Or we may just say: “old people are liable to say such things” & leave it at that. |
|
Suppose now someone remembered that the yesterday he called
red ‘green’ & vice versa but that this
didn't [p|a]ppear as he also saw green what today he
sees red & vice versa.
Now here is a case in which we might be inclined to say that we
39 learn from him today something about the
working of his mind yesterday, that yesterday we judged by the outside while
today we are allowed to look ˇ◇◇◇ at the inside of what
happened.
It is as though we looked back but now got a glance at something that was
|
|
If I say what it is I see how do I compare what I say with what I see in
order to know whether I say the truth?
Lying about what I see, you might say, is knowing what I see & saying something else. Supposing I said it just consists of saying to myself ‘this is red’ & aloud ‘this is green’ |
|
Compare lying & telling the truth in the case of telling what
colour you see with the case of describing a picture which you saw or
telling the right number of things you had to count. |
|
Collating what you say & what you see. |
|
Is there always a collating? 40 |
|
Or could you call it giving a picture of the colour I see if I say the
word red?
unless it be a
picture by it's connection with a sample. |
|
But isn't it ˇgiving a picture if I point to a
sample? |
|
“What I show reveals what I see”; – in
what sense does it do that?
The idea is that now you can so to speak look inside me.
Whereas I only reveal to you what I see in a game of revealing &
hi[dd|di]ng which is altogether plaied with
signs of one category ◇◇◇
“[d|D]irect – indirect”.
|
|
We are thinking of a game in which there is an inside in the normal
sense. |
|
We must get clear about how the metaphor of revealing (outside
& inside) is actually applied by us; otherwise we shall be
tempted to look for an inside behind that which in our metaphor is the
inside. |
|
We are used to describing the case by means of a picture which say
41 contains 3 steps.
But ˇwhen we think about language we forget how this
picture is actually applied in practical cases.
We then are often tempted to apply it as it wasn't
meant orriginally & lack are puzzled about a third
step in the facts. |
|
“I see a particular
|
|
“If he had learnt to show me (or tell me) what he sees, he
could now show me.”
Certainly, – but what is it like to show me what he sees?
It is pointing to something under particular circumstances.
Or is it something else (dont be misled by the
idea of indirectness)
You compare it with such a statement as: “if he had learnt to open up
|
|
But what about the criterium whether there
is anything inside or not?
Here we say “I know that there is something
42 inside in my case.
And this is how I know of the ‘inside’ at all first
hand”. // And this is how I have first
hand knowledge of the inside at all.” //
“This is how I know about an inside & am
led to suppose it in the other person too.”•⌊⌊•↺Further we are not inclined to say that only hitherto we have not known the mind of an other person but that the idea of this knowlede is bound up with the idea of myself.⌋⌋ |
|
“So if I say ‘he has toothache’ I am supposing
that he has what I have if I have toothache.”
Suppose I said: “If I say ‘I
suppose’ he has toothache I am supposing that he
has what I have if I have toothache”, – this
would be like saying “If I say ‘this cushion is
red’ I mean that it has the same colour which the sofa has if it is
red”.
But this wasn't what
|
|
But if you look closer you will see that this is an entire
misrepresentation of the use of the word
“toothache” 43 |
| Can two people have the same afterimage? |
|
Spr
Language game ‘Description of
|
|
Can two people persons have the same picture before their
mind's eye. |
|
In which case would we say that they had two images exactly alike but not
identical? |
|
The fact that two ideas seem here inseparably bound up suggests to us that
we are dealing with one idea only & not with two & that by a
queer trick our language suggests a totally different
strukture of grammar than the one actually
used.
For we have the sentence that only I can know directely my
experience & only indirectely the experience of the
other person.
Thisus
language suggests 4 possible com[p|b]inations but rules out
2.
It is as though I had used the 4 letters
44 a b c d to denote two objects only but
by my notation somehow suggesting the pre that I am
talking of 4. |
|
It seems as though I w[a|i]shed to say that I ˇto
me L.W. something applied
which does not apply to other people.
That is, there seems to be an assymmetry. I express things assymmetri[l|c]ally & could express them symmetrically; only then one would see what facts prompt us to the assymmetrical expression. |
|
I do this by spreading the ˇuse of the word I over all
hu[p|m]an bodies as opposed to
L.W.
allone. |
|
I want to bring describe a situation in which I should
not be tempted to say that I assumed or believed that the other had what I
have.
Or, in other words I a situation in which we would not of
my cons[t|c]iousness & his
consciousness.
And in which the idea would not 45 occur to
us that we could only be conscious of our own consciousness. |
|
The idea of the ego inhabiting a body to be abolished. |
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If what any consciousness ✓ spreads over all human bodies then
their wont be any temptation to
use the word ‘ego’ |
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Let's assume that hearing was done by no organ of the body we
know of |
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Let us imagine the following arrangement: If it is absurd to say that I only know that I see & but not that the others do, – isn't this at any rate less absurd than to say the opposite? |
|
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The idea of the constituent of a fact &:
“Is my person (or a person) a constituent of the
fact that I see or not”.
This expresses a question concerning the symbolism just as if it were a
question about the nature. |
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“Es denkt”.
Ist dieser Satz wahr & “ich denke”
falsch? |
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Lang.game: I
paint, for myself, what I see.
The picture doesn't contain me.
|
|
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A board game in which only one man plays with is said to play
the other to ‘answer’.
|
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What if the other person always correctely described what I
saw, & imagined, would I not say he knows what I
see? –
“But what if he describes
13
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1) Ms-148, pages 4r-4v contain a number of figures and tables which are not included in the transcription.
2) Ms-148, page 7r contains a number of geometrical proof drawings which are not included in the transcription.
3) Ms-148, page 10r contains a number of technical figures as well as a multiplication formula which are not included in the transcription.
4) Ms-148, page 11v contains additional drawings and formulas which are not included in the transcription.
5) Ms-148, page 12v contains one additonal figure which doesn't seem related to the surrounding text and is not included in the transcription.
6) Ms-148, page 13r contains a number of figures which are not included in the transcription.
7) Ms-148, page 14r contains a number of figures which are not included in the transcription.
8) Ms-148, page 14v contains figures and calculations which are not included in the transcription.
9) Ms-148, page 16v contains a figure which doesn't seem related to the surrounding text and is not included in the transcription.
10) Ms-148, page 17r contains a figure which doesn't seem related to the surrounding text and is not included in the transcription.
11) Ms-148, page 20v contains further calculations which don't seem related to the surrounding text.
12) Ms-148, page 21r contains additional calculation and figure scribbles which are not included in the transcription.
13) Continuation in Ms-149,1r.
To cite this element you can use the following URL:
BOXVIEW: http://wittgensteinsource.org/BTE/Ms-148_d