The experience of fright appears (when
we philosophise) to be an amorphous
experience behind the experience of


  All I want to say is that it is
misleading to say that the word
“fright” signifies something which goes
along with the ˇexperience of expressing of fright.


  There is here as again the queer case of
that there is a difference between
what we say, when we actually
try to see what happens, & what
we say when we think about it
(giving over the rains to language).


  The ‘far away’ look, the dreamy voice
seem to be only means for conveying
the real inner feeling.


  “Therefore there must be something
else” means nothing unless it expresses
a resolution to exp use a certain
mode of expression.


  Suppose you tried to separate the feeling
which musik gives you from hearing musik.



  Say & mean “long, long ago—”, “lang
ist es her—”& now put instead
of these words new ones with many
more sylables & try if you can
put the same meaning into the words.
put instead of the copula a very
long word say “Kalamazoo”


<Puella>, Poeta “‘masculine’ & ‘feminine’ feeling of ‘attached’ to a.


  Aren't there two (or<…> more) ways to
any event I might describe?


  We say “making this gesture isn't all”.
The first answer is: We are talking about
the experience of making th[e|is] gesture.
Secondly: it is true that different
experiences can be described by
the same gesture; but not in the
sense that one is the pure one
&the others consist ….


  Wie ist es wenn man einmal die
besondere Klangfarbe eines Tones
merkt hört ein andermal nur den Klang als



  “Ich nenne diesen Eindruck ‘blau’”.


  Wie kann man denn die genaue Erfah-
rung in ‘Poeta etc. beschreiben?’


  The philosophical problem is:
“What is it that puzzles me?”
about in this matter?”


  To give names is to lable things;
but how does one lable impressions.

das auge & der wald
Das männliche a & das weibliche a.


  Es läßt sich über die besondere bestimmte Erfah-
rung einiges sagen & außerdem
scheint es etwas, & zwar das wesentlich-
ste, zu geben was sich nicht beschreiben


  Man sagt hier, daß ein bestimmter
Eindruck benannt wird. Und darin
liegt etwas seltsames & problemati-
sches. Denn es ist als wäre der Eindruck

etwas zu äkterisches um ihn zu
benennen. (Den Reichtum einer Frau


  Du sagst Du hast einem ungreifbaren
Eindruck. ˇIch bezweifle nicht, was Du sagst Aber ich frage ob Du damit
etwas gesagt hast. D.h. wozu hast Du
diese Worte geäußert, in welchem Spiel.


  It is as though, if although you can't tell
me exactly what happens inside you,
you can nevertheless tell me
something general about it. By saying
e.g. that you are having an impression
which can't be further described.


  As it were: There is something further
about it, only you can't say it; you
can only make the general statement.
     It is this idea form of expression which plays hell with




  It “There is not only the gesture but
a particular feeling which I can't
describe”: instead of that you might
ha[b|v]e said: “I am trying to point
out a feeling to you” which this would
be a grammatical remark showing
how my information is meant to be
This is almost similar as
though I said “This I call ‘A’ &
I am pointing out a colour) to you not a shape”


  How can we point to the colour
& not to the shape? Or to the
feeling of toothache & not to the
tooth etc.?


  What does one call “describing
a feeling to someone”?


  “Never mind the shape,— look at the colour!”


  “Was there a feeling of pastness
when you said you remembered …?”
‘I know of none’.


  How does one point to a number, draw
attention to a number, mean a number?


  How do I call a taste “lemontaste”?

Is it by having that taste & saying
the words: “I call the taste …”?


  And can I give a name to any one
tasteexperience as without giving
the tastet a common langu-
age?— “I give my feeling a name,
nobody else can know what the
name means.”


  A ¿[¿¿|sc]¿lave has to remind me of
something & isn't to know what
he reminds me of.


  I note down a word ˇin my diary which serves
to bring back a taste.






  “I use the name for the impression
¿directaly¿ & not in such a way
that anyone else can under-
stand it.”


  Buying something from oneself. Going
through the operations of buying.


  My right hand selling to my left




  Eine gute art eine Farbe zu
benennen wäre, in einer entsprechend
gefärbten Tinte den Namen schreiben.


  “I name the feeling”— I dont quite
know how you do this, what use you
are making of the word name


  “I'm giving the feeling, which I have I'm having just
now a name”.— I don't quite know
what you are doing.


  One might say: “What is the use
of talking of our feeling at all. Let

us devise a language which really only
says what can be understood”
Thus I am not to say “I have a
feeling of pastness”: But


   “This pain I call ‘toothache’ & I can
never make him understand what
it means”.


   We are under the impression that we can
point to the pain, as it were unseen by
the other person, & name it.


  For what does it mean that this pain feeling
is the meaning of this name?


  Or, that the pain is the barer of the
     It is the substantive ‘pain’ which
<…> puzzles us. This substantive seems
to produce an ilusion. What would
things look like if we expressed pains
by moaning & holding the painful spot?
  Or that we utter the word pain pointing
to a spot.
    “But that the point is that we should

say ‘pain’ when there really is<…> pain.”
  But how am I to know if there really is
pain? if what I feel really is pain? Or,
if I really have a feeling?---


   Es ist sehr nützlich zu bedenken: Wie würde
ich in einer Gebärdensprache ausdrücken:
“ich hatte keine Schmerzen, aber stellte
mich, als ob ich welche hatte”?


      “Shurely it isn't enough that he moans;
I must be able to describe the
state when he moans & hasn't got pains”


  “He has pains, says he has pains & saying
‘pains’ he means his pains.” How does he
mean his pains by the word ‘pain’ or


  “He sais ‘I see green’ & means the colour
he sees.”— If asked afterwards what
did you mean by ‘green’ he might answer
‘I meant the colour’, pointing to it.



  “In my own [k|c]ase I know that when
I say ‘I have pain’ this utterance
is accompanied by something;— but
it is also accompanied by something
in another man?”
  In as much as his utterance needn't
be accompanied by my pain. I may
say that it isn't accompanied by


  “I know what I mean by ‘toothache’
but the other person can't know it.”


  Als Negation: “The deuce he is….”


  Die Philosophie eines Stammes der
als Negation nur den Ausdruck<…> benützt kennt:
“I'll be damned if…”.


  ¿On a beau dire….¿


  “Man kann nie einen ˇganzen Körper sehen
sondern nur ˇimmer einen Teil seiner Ober-




  < They have the same Nr. if to one 1
there always corresponds one.
If for one of these there is always
one of the others.

“Two rods are equally long if for any
inch of the one there is an inch
of the other”.

“There are these couples, whether I
write them down or not.”



  “Give the impression a name!”
  that seems to have sense.
  “It seems to me that I can mean
the impression”
It seems to me that I can will
the table to appoach.

  “Can one push air?”




  For each member of α there is a member
of β.
  The [K|c]lasses α & β fall into couples.
  This similar with a prop of say physics,
e.g. “they join & form couples when they are
brought together”.
  But this is just not what is meant.
We mean something that follows from
what there exists in these [k|c]lasses. And
we have an image of them something
like this

If ˇnow we say for this there is this, for this
there is this etc., this sounds as if we
said something about the dots; like
“this belongs to this etc.” whereas we

are saying words & gestures to put them
into couples. And this of is a way of
finding whether they have the same Nr.
  And now we must say that there are many different phenomena
of of equality of Nr. or of having a certain
Nr. Just as having a length & having
equal lengths. Let me remin[g|d] you
of the problem “are these two rods
now of the same length.” Take the definition
you have to give of this expression
when the rods have to be measured
& on the other hand when you use this
difference. “These bodies have the same
weight” etc. Now consider: “There are as
many granes of sand in this heap as
in the other”. How do we know this?
(This is no psychological question.)
Now suppose we said we test it by
connecting the classes one-one; ¿then¿ the
question is: how shall we know that
we have connected them? For there
are several utterly different criteria.
But further what shall we say in the
cases where no such connection is possi-
ble? <…> What about saying then that
the members of the two similar classes
still fall into couples?? Is this now
an explanation? For when we give it we
thought of it as reducing the statement

of numeric equality to simpler terms.
The falling into couples was an
image which in some cases was most
natural namely in those in which
there was the possibility of joining
terms into couples. But in fact
it wasnt at all the only
aspect of numeric equality. The
term “having the same [n|N]r” in fact
suggests a different aspect. I mean this

Having the same Nr. can be interpreted
as having the same one of these
schemata. Of course this aspect
too is only natural in a very limited [Nr.|number] of cases. <Aspect of stars>.
  The explanation, that two classes
have the same Nr. if they fall into
couples, is really taken from the
a case like

How “The pentagram has twice
as many points than the

pentagon” Demonstration
  Timelessness of the demonstrated

blue & red = purple



  ¿We said¿ that what we described
as “numeral equality”, “being
1-1 correlated”, “having the number
n” were widely differing phenomena.
That therefore it was an ilusion
to think that to say “the classes
fall in pairs” is, generally speaking
an analysis of what we call
numeric equality in simpler terms.
We can if we like put “being numerically
equal” = “falling into pairs” but
the use of the one expression just as of the
other has got to be explained
in the particular case. This we
only forgett. Thinking about a very
special class of examples.
The ideas that if they
ha[b|v]e the right existential
structure they do fall
into cou[l|p]les & this is
demonstrated. The
question how we find out in the
special case that they do have
the right s[p|t]ructures is neglected.
  One could also say that a
length a was twice another one b
if the two a superimposed gave
b. Application for wavelengths.
   This brings me to the topic of

Nr. of outer vert = Nr of
inner vert

   Compare with “the Hand has 5 Fingers.”
  Timelessness. The save hold of
“The number of outer vert. = Nr of inner
    Question which is answered by
this prop timeless. ˇApparent Generality of demonstr.
    The copula has no tenses.
  <…> idea is that the idea of a penta-
gram is bound up with a cardinal
Nr. Now, we could make all sorts of

“It is the essence of these figures
to be capable of being devided connected in
this way”.




  Is the result of the process taken
as a standard or not.

“These two triangles by ¿this¿
nature give the rectangle”.

This aspect might never have struck

a + (<…>) = (<…>+ b) +c
a+(b+1) = (a+b) +1
a + (b+2) = (a+b)+2
  It seems you can't get out. You
must adopt a+(b+c) = (a+b)+c if you
adopt a+(b+1) = (a+b) +1


  But need we really say that
a+(b+2) = (a+b)+2 follows from
a+(b+1) = (a+b)+1?


  The reasoning is:
      a+(b+2) = a+(b+(1+1)) = a+ ((b+1) +1) =
= (a+ (b+1)) +1 = ((a+b) +1) +1 = (a+b) + (1+1)
5+(6+1) = (5+6) +1
5+(6+2) =


  I show you a curve drawn in a penta-
gon which you had never thought of
& I say: I am shoving you that

this curve can be drawn,— or: that there
is such a curve in the pentagon.
  That there are two twos in four.


  Is there really no way out of saying,
say, that a triangle which has
the 3 equal sides has also three
equal angles.


  Does consist of & ?
It depends what kind of dispute
it is. You could say it con-
sisted of & . Is the <…> dispute
one about facts or mode
of description?

This doesnt
show that
a+b fits but
it shows that it looks like it does
“What kind of figure do you
get if you draw the diago-
nals in a Pentagon?”
ˇWhat sort of body do you get if you ---.
What kind of Nr do you get
if you draw 3s in ¿9¿.

  What kind of coulour do you get
if you [wet|mix] red with yellow?

“The figure shows him that a pentagram
fits into a pentagon”.
Is this an experimental result?



  I am now talking ˇalways of a particular
kind of demonstration; what one
might call an visual demonstration.


  In what sense could I say that
I didnt know that the pentagram
fitted the pentagon? Could I
have imagined the opposite?
  Suppose I had imagined the
opposite in some sense then
in the same sense I could
still hold the opposite after
the demonstration.


  We are talking of the star of which
I did not know whether it fitted
the pentagon or not

Then I try & find that they
fit. This is just like making
an experiment.



   “I never knew that I could
see the Pentagon & its diagonals
in this aspect.”

    “Oh, that's how it fits!”



“I dont know whether the dra penta-
gram fits the pentagon. If so the
diagonals of a pentagon must give
a pentagram. Let's try it.”

    Is to see<…> the figure
an experiment? Or to
see side by side the figures
But doesn't it teach us something?

  “It never struck me”


  It seems we are learning by experience
a timeless truth about the shape of a
Pentagon & of a Pentagram.


  “I never knew that one could look at it

that way. I had never seen the pentagram
in the pentagon.”


       It is a new experience to me. But is
it the experience teaching me that the
pentagram fits the pentagon?


  This We feel that the here are two ˇvisual indivi-
dualities which we see in the third [¿indiv¿|picture]
we see p combined & that we see that
they are capable of this particular combi-

The fact is that the combination (not
meaning Relation but Complex) strongly
strikes us.


  “The visual image [¿P¿|p] fits the visual image P.”
The importance of this prop lies in this
that it seems a prop. of experience
& that on the other hand it also is
used as a prop. of geometry i.e. of grammar.


  What is the use of the prop. that p fits P?

“If you draw the diagonals in P you
get p.”
        “If you do this & this & this & this
you get Napoleon.”


  Problem: “Draw that Star which will
fit the Pentagon.” This is a mathe-
matical problem.


  “What do the diagonals of a P look


  We look at a puzzle picture & find a
man in the foliage of a tree. Our
visual impression changes. But
can't mustn't we say that the new experi-
ence would have been impossible
if the old one hadn't been what it
was? Such that we seem bound
to say the new exp. was already
preformed in the old one. Or that
I found something new which was
already in the essence of the
first picture.


  We seem to have demonstrated an
internal property of the old picture.



     <Demonstrating that this is contained>
in this “It is in the nature of this to contain this .”


     if you do this & this etc you get 55


  Die mathematische Frage.
Could the Pythag. be assumed instead
of being deduced?





  “It never struck me that this
was this

Something timeless seems to have
struck us: How can the identity
of these entities strike us

It never struck me that 5 consisted
of 3 + 2


  To see five figures as F. + 2 F. . It 5
is = 2 + 3 it can't mean anything to
see 5 a 2 + 3
You could devid 5 into 2 + 3 but not
into 3 + ¿3¿ as you could 6




  The whole question is really: “can it
strike you what a thing is?”

It seems you can find out some-
thing about the nature of a thing
by experience. About its internal nature.
    It is
   Thus e.g. a similarity can strike
you; the fact that a complex
contains a constituent; even

identity of shape. two tunes fitting


  “One can see immediately that
4 consists of 2 + 2”. This is nonsense
if 4 = 2 + 2



~ [~p ∙ ~(~r ∙ ~s)] ∙ ~[~(~t ∙ ¿~¿~s ∙~t)) ∙ ~p]

  What do I do when I draw your atten-
tion to a fact
about, say, this for-
mula? It seems I make you see
something about its essence. You get
a new experience; but this experience
, it seems, teaches you something about
the essence the internal nature of the
formula. It seems to teach you
a mathematical (<or> logical) truth
& this does not seem to be a rule
of grammar but a truth about the

nature of things.


  If I made an experiment with a certain
figure we can ˇ<…> imagine this or that result.
But if I draw your attention to a


  It consists of … appears to have 1)
a grammatical meaning 2) a physical
meaning & 3) a meaning lying between
these two.


  We seem to learn something about
the very sensedatum.


  Tribe describ describing as


   A certain symbolism will easily go with
a certain aspect of looking at a


  “They regard the square as a double
right angle.”

consists of &
consists of &
  In one case you say that it

consists if it is devided. In the
other case you ˇseem to say that the
undevided ¿object¿ consists (time-
lessly) if you have seen a
similar object devided.
  Or you say that the object is
devided if you have devided its


  I dispose about 5 soldiers I imagine
them & say: I'll sent ||| to this
place || to that. Have I
thereby devided them into 2 + 3
Soldiers & seen that it's possible.
What if I had imagined
this picture & said
I'll send ||| to this place
& ||| to that?


  What happens if our attention is drawn
to something


  One couldn't call 0'3 a shorthand for
0'333…. Except insofar as 0'33… is also a shorthand
for 0'333….


  “Don't try to find a 4 in the developement
it's hopeless!”— “Don't multiply 25 × 25

again & again in the hope to find 600; it's
   What's it like to try to find a
4 in the developement of 1 : 3?
  And what is it like to find a 4.


   What is the ˇimportance & meaning of the question:
“What is it like?” or “What is the verification?”


  Kein Kalkül ist im “Widerspruch mit
der Logik” d.h. mit gewissen Regeln die
über allen andern stehen. Die Annahme
einer obersten Logik ist es, die die ¿Philosophen¿
hier irreführt.


  What we should call finding a 4 in 1/3
obviously depends upon the operations in
this case.


  What does it mean to imagine
getting a result from a cal[k|c]ulation?
  How far is this imagination to go?


  “There isn't a 4 in the first million
places”— “You've got a quick way of
calculating that!”


  Imagine this operation: A decimal

fraction constructed by multiplying
again & again 25 × 25
: 0'625625625…
Look for an 8 in it!”
    “You know that you will never
find an 8” means:

   “Don't try to devide 2476 without
¿remainder¿ by 3 it's hopeless”.


  In which case is it hopeless to find
a particular result by a calculation?


  Calculating is the process of imagining
a calculation.


  “I can hope to find an 8 in the Product


  To say “it's hopeless to find a certain
result really means: our calculation
has already shown it to be wrong.*


  Or: we have a calculation of which
we make have that opposite result.


  What is the 65th 56th place of 1 : 7?
You can now say ˇit seems what the
1010 place ‘will’ be.



  How can one calculation anticipate
the result of another?

  Or: “Our cal[k|c]ulusation has already decided
against it


  What does it mean: to prophecy what one
will correctly find.


   29 × 34 = 34 × 29

3102 × 2331 2331 × 3102


  Das Bild “Alle” angewandt auf die


  To show mathematically that a 4
can be found is to describe what it is
like to find a 4. And to find a 4 is here
a process in space and time.


    “Find, as the result of a calculation ”&
“Find, otherwise”


  In 1 : 7 gibt es ein endliches Problem & ein




   Two processes of calculation
lead to the same result.


  “What if they at some stage
did not lead to the same
result”—. “That is impossible, we
couldn't imagine their not leading
to the tame result.” But
then the proof of their leading
to the same result showed us
what it was like to lead to the
same result.







  The difficulty consists in this that it
here seems impossible to imagine any-
thing but what really is the case: And

that of course means nothing!
    We don't seem to be able to
imagine finding a 4, because there
is a three there. But then how are
we capable of imagining to find
a 3 as there is a 3 there?


  If I say I can't imagine a 4

to result it means that the
calculation shows me what it
means to imagine a 3 to result
& gives no sense to the prop. “I imagine
a 4 to result”


    x² + ax + b =0 “Solve this equation ˇalgebraically!”


  “Do something that has an analogy
to ….”
   But we can't be sure that
we shall not in the end give up
the idea of something being analogous
to ….


  The existens of a something we call the ‘solution’ seems
to show clearly, that there was
a clear & definite problem.


  Supose we said that a solution is
a solution only insofar as it
could have been described before it was found.


     “Solve x² + 2ab + b² = 0”
“Solve x² + 4x + 5 = 0”



  “We can't imagine that 1:7 should
not repeat itself after the dividend
has [k|c]ome back.”


  We have ¿two ways¿ of calculating
the 1010th place & we can't imagine
that they lead to different results.


  Ist es eine [b|B]estätigung hierfür wenn
die beiden ¿Bemerkungen¿ in einem
bestimmten Fall übereinstimmen?


  Is it different to say “they lead
to the same [R|r]esult” & “they
must lead to the same result”?


  Does it mean anything to “prophecy”
the result of a calculation?


  We say we can't imagine that the two
processes should not lead to the sa
the same result.
     What does it mean, we can't imagine it?





  Must we recognise Periodicity as
a proof that there will be no
6 in the development of 1:7?


  “How does it happen that 3×4 is 4×3?”


  “An dieser Stelle muß eine Primzahl
kommen”— “An dieser Stelle kommt steht eine


    ‘Gibt es einen Zufall in der Mathematik?’


  How does the returning to the
dividend show me the periodicity of
the quotient.


  We seem in one kind of thought to
make jumps in the other to fill in
step by step. And the latter process
seems to justify the former.

You see it just leads to the same



  Denke an den Fall wenn man mehrere
Züge in einem Spiel zusammenzieht &
etwa im Schach gar nicht erst mit
der ersten Position anfängt.


  “Die Form ‘1 2 3 4 5’ paßt auf die Form

  Was für ein Faktum ist das, daß die Reihen-
folge das Resultat nicht ändert.
The process we are going through just
does to lead to the same result;— but
so far as it “leads to the same result we
could imagine it to lead to a different

result. And so far as we couldnt
imagine it to lead to a different
result it doesnt lead to any
result but shows what it's
like to lead to the same
I.e.: If we lost at the Forms
& 12345as equivalent
there ceases to be a question of
whether the two processes lead
to the same or to different
results & the apparent experi-
ment serves only to show
what sort of fact we take
as the standard of our expression.





   “How can you impose two rules on
your arithmetik unless you know
that they must lead to the same

  You wish to say: “These rules by
there very nature, lead to the
same result.” And you would therefore
have recognised something about
the very nature of them.


  Now it is time that you can
make a man look into the case working
of these rules; that is, you can prove something about them.


  “You go through this way of thinking
& then you go through another way
of thinking which independently leads to the same


  123456 123456
       2 2 2


  After you have seen that 1000 : 3 must
lead to 333 is it a confirmation to calculate
it & see what it does? Hadn't you calcula-
ted it by “seeing that it was 333”? And
what does it mean that one calculation
confirms the result of the other?


  If you first see that the two calc.
must lead to the same result
is it a confirmation to find that
they do?



  “If this goes on this way & that
goes on that way they must
meet there!”


      25 25 25 25 --- 16 times
16 16 16 16 25 times
they must meet at the end.
“Are you surprised that they meet?
Didn't you know that they had to


  “I wasn't surprised I always followed
the 25s while going on with the 16s.”



   Must a series of dots give
the same number counted this →
way & that ←? (There are two cases.)


  Can we I try whether the result is the
same?— It seams, yes.

“Can you imagine the calculation 16×34
to lead to something else …?”— “Can
you imagine these two calculations
leading to different results?”


        1:7=--- “The division must give the same
result as it gave the be-
       Can we try whether
it does?


  Can we imagine the same calculation
to lead twice the second time to a different result?


  The question is really whether there
can be a “must” in a prop. about the

nature of things.


  “In the sense in which they ‘must’
lead, they don't lead we can't say
they do lead.


   “Wenn die Überlegung richtig ist”, so
muß diese Rechnung zu demsel-
ben Resultat führen.


Sie führen unabhängig
zu selben Resul-


  Let's imagine that we possessed
only the second criterion for
determining divisibility!
     But there seems to
be the difference be-
tween “they lead” &
“they must lead”.
d a b b b c = d c b a b



  Wir nehmen ein falsches Verhältnis von
Prozess & Resultat an.
    Denn es heißt nicht daß ein ˇgewisser Pro-
zess zu einem ˇbestimmten Resultat führen muß.


  Denn ein Prozess muß nur dazu führen
daß er geschehen ist.


  We sometimes substitute for the des-
cription of a result
the description of a result.


  Ich kann mir eine Blume auf gewisse
Weise gewachs<…>en denken. Und das Wachstum
ist dann ein Prozess dessen Ende der
Zustand der Blume ist.


  In welchem Sinne ist es möglich
nicht zu wissen wohin ein mathematischer
Vorgang führt. Man könnte antworten
es ist möglich nicht zu wissen, wohin er
führen wird aber nicht, nicht zu wissen
wohin er führt.
       In one sense you can't know the
process without knowing the result, as
th[is|e] result is the end of the process. In

the other you may know a process & not
know the result.


  In mathematics we ¿object¿ to say
these processes have the end in




  A calculation leads to a result ˇmathematically
appart from the fact whether I have
actually performed it.


  ‘If I say this calculation must
lead to this result it has al
already lead to it.’


“I knew it beforehand what it must

lead to.”


  If I say ‘this calculation must
lead to the same result’ by “this
calculation I am referring to ˇwhatever I call a
method of calculating.


   Does calculating that there —isn't
a six … confirm the result that
there couldn't be?


  “You already see what happens, it
must always go on like this.”
Now suppose you actually went on
would this confirm what you saw


  A man says, “I see that the two calculations
ˇso far agree but I don't know why they should
go on agreeing”. In Shall we say that
he doesn't see a truth which the
other sees?— He tries always again & again.
We ask him: “But don't you see that
you must get to the same result again?
  Should we say that he must make go
the long way of experience, where we
go the shorter one of seeing?



  “If the multiplication lead to this
result once, it must lead to it the same result again.”


  “What is the criterium of periodicity?”
Here we are inclined to think that
we have a criterion the reappearance
of the remainder & the actual periodi-
city i.e., the repetition ad inf of the period.


  The infinite & the huge. Absolute idea
of large & small.


“I never looked at it this way, before”



   “These people don't see a simple
truth ….


  They are resolved to write
this: instead


  But not “because it had to lead
thru to the same result”.


  It is a remarkable fact that people
almost always agree how to count.


  Suppose I said this is the 100th
house of this street, although there
before are no only 5 houses built.



    If there are 777 in the first 100
places there are 777 in the infinite



  “I have found 777 somewhere in
π” This leaves


  “The calculation guides you to
the result.”
“You know that the
two rules must always lead you
to the same result.”


  The process of calculation can may
be regarded as a process where
there is no compulsion or being guided
& on the other hand, as a process
where to we move under some strict




  “If I follow this chain of
steps it's bound to lead me


   ““The question are there 777 in π
is allright because surely there either
are 777 in π or there arent”. Queer!
use of p ⌵ ~p.
Images characteristic
for this statement.
    It realy means: “The question is
allright because there is a method
of verifying it althought we can't
use it.”


  “The third place of π is 4
whether I know it or not.”


  “What if we had proved it to be
selfcontradictory that there should
be no 777 ˇin π, mustn't we then say that
there are 777?”


   Our prose expressions in mathematics
are highly metaphorical.


  “Every algebraic equ. has a root”.
Is this to be called a proposition?


  The question corresponding to this
prop. as answer is vague. But once
the prop. this piece of mathematics has
been done we are inclined to call
it the proof that our question had
to be answered is the positive. But,
as one might say, there was much
less in question than there is
now in the answer.— Compare
this with: “[i|I]s 25×25 = 600?”


  Props. which seem only to have sense
if their truth or falsehood is known.


  What kind of prop. will the prop.
be that there can't (or must)
be 777 in π.


  Will it be possible e.g. to calculate
whether any given prop. of digits occurs
or how often it does.


  Relation between proof showing that
777 must be between n & m & actual
Proof that they are at the vth place
(v bein between n & m).



  Negation of a mathematical prop. of
fault in a calculation.

25×25 = 600x

¿<…>x ∙ cos x = sin x¿

  “Are there an infinite Nr of 777 in
  “There arent”.


  “Question” corresponds to “investiga-


  Heptagon must have been an


  “Is 5. a cardinal Nr?”


  There is a contradiction between the
normal use of the word “proposition”



  “Wouldn't one like to know with
real certainty whether the other had has


  Feeling of pastness. “The experiences bound
up with the gesture etc. aren't the
experience of pastness, for they could
be there without the feeling of past-
ness”.— “But, on the other hand, would
it be that experience of pastness without
those experiences bound up with the
gesture?— [w|W]hy should we say that
the characteristic //essential// part is
the part outside those experiences?
Isn't the experience at least partially
described if I have described the gestures


  Auch so: Die Worte “lang ist es her—”
rufen in mir manchmal ein bestimmtes
Gefühl wach[,|.] [m|M]anchmal nicht. Aber wenn
sie es wachrufen so sind sie, ihr <…>
Teil der charakteristischen Erfahrung


  Sprechen mit Andern & mit mir selbst:
“Wenn ich eine gewisse Erfahrung habe, gebe
ich ˇ(nur) das Zeichen +….”



  When one sais “I talk to myself” one
ˇgenerally means just that one speaks & is the
only person listening.


  If I look at something red [to|&]
say &, to myself, this is red, am I
giving myself an information? Am
I communicating a personal experience
to myself. Some philosophising people might be in-
clined to say that this is the only real
case of communication of personal
experience because only I know
what I really mean by ‘red’.


  Remember that in which special cases
only it has sense to inform a<n> other per-
son that the colour he sees now
is red<…>.


  One doesn't say to oneself “[t|T]his is a chair.— Oh


  Wie kann ich denn einer Erfahrung ([z.B.|etwa]
einem Schmerz) einen Namen geben? Ist es
nicht als wollte ich ihm, etwa, einen Hut aufsetzen?


  Nehmen wir an man sagte: “Man kann

ihm nur indirekt einen Hut aufsetzen” so würde
ich fragen: Glaubst Du daß man je auf die
Idee gekommen wäre davon zu reden wenn
man nicht daran gedacht hätte daß
man dem Menschen der Schmerzen hat einen
Hut aufsetzen kann? Zu sagen man
könne dem Schmerz nur indirekt einen Hut
aufsetze macht es erscheinen als gäbe es
dennoch einen direkter Weg der nur tatsäch-
lich nicht gangbar sei. <…>


  The difficulty is that we feel that we
have said something about the nature
of pain when we say that one person
can't have another person's pain.
Perhaps we shouldn't be inclined
to say that we had anything
physiological or even p[h|s]ychological
but something metapsychological
metaphysical. Something about
the essence, nature, of pain as
opposed to its causal connections to
other phenomena.


  Es scheint uns etwa als wäre es zwar
nicht falsch sondern unsinnig zu
sagen “ich fühle seine Schmerzen”, aber
als wäre dies so infolge der Natur

des Schmerzes, der Person etc.. Als
wäre also jene Aussage letzten
Endes doch eine Aussage über
die Natur der Dinge.
  Wir sprechen also etwa von
einer Asymmetrie
unserer Ausdrucks-
weise & fassen diese auf als ein
[s|S]piegelbild des Wesens der Dinge.


  Intangibility of impressions. (Anguish)
Some we should <…> were more ¿tangible¿
than others. Seeing more tangible
than a faint pain; & this more tangi-
ble than a vague fear, longing etc.
     In what way are these intangi-
ble experiences less easy to communicate
tha to describe than the mo ‘simpler’ ones?
   In what way do we use the —phrase:
“This experience is difficult to describe.”
  And can ˇit be even impossible to describe certain an experience<s>be ever ¿in-


   Was für einen Sinn hat es zu sagen
diese Erfahrung ist nicht beschreib-
bar? Wir möchten sagen: sie ist zu com-
plex, zu subtil. -


  “Diese Erfahrung ist nicht mitteilbar, aber
ich kenne sie,— weil ich sie habe.”



  “Es gibt die Erfahrung, & die Beschreibung
der Erfahrung.— Daher kann es nicht
gleichgültig sein, ob der Andere die selbe
Erfahrung hat,, wie ich, oder nicht;— &
daher kann es muß es wenn ich mit mir selbst rede
auf diese meine Erfahrung ankommen. Es muß
dabei eine entscheidende Rolle spielen
daß ich diese Erfahrung kenne (während ich
mit der des Andern nicht direkt vertraut bin).”


  Kann man sagen: “[i|I]n dem das was ich über
die Erfahrung des Andern sage, spielt seine
Erfahrung (selbst) nicht hinein. In dem das was
ich über meine Erfahrung sage spielt sie diese Erfahrung
selbst hinein.”?
  “Ich spreche über meine Erfahrung,
sozusagen, in ihrer Anwesenheit” //in ihrem


  Wie wenn jemand sagen würde: “Es gibt nicht
nur die Beschreibung des Tisches sondern
auch den Tisch.”


  “Es gibt nicht nur das Wort ‘Zahnschmerz’,
es gibt auch such a thing as etwas wie den Zahnschmerz
selbst.” //… es gibt auch Zahnschmerzen.”//



  Es scheint, daß, da ich etwa
eine Erfahrung nicht beschreiben
kann, sie aber habe, daß ich
sie daher genauer kennen kann,
als irgend ein Anderer. Aber was
heißt, es die Erfahrung kennen,
wenn es nicht heißt, sie beschreiben
& nicht heißt, sie haben.
    Gibt es eine Kenntnis der Erfah-
rung, die wir nicht mitteilen können?


  Hat es Sinn zu sagen “ich kenne diese
Erfahrung besser //genauer// als irgend ein
Anderer sie kennen kann”?. Gibt es Erfah-
rungen die der Andere ebensogut kennen
kann wie ich & solche, die er nicht so gut
kennen kann? Heißt das: er kann diese
selbe ˇkomplizierte Erfahrung nicht haben?— Es heißt wohl:
“Er kann sie haben, aber wir können nie nicht
wissen, daß er gerade genau diese gehabt hat”.
Z.B. <…> scheint es als könnten wir
sagen: “Wir können in einem Sinn wissen daß
er gerade diese [E|e]infärbige, glatte, [R|r]ote Fläche
sieht, aber nicht, daß er genau dieses Flimmern
sieht. Weil sich das genaue Gesichtsbild
beim des Flimmerns nicht beschreiben läßt.


  Es gibt ja auch den Fall, in dem wir ein Gesichts-
bild genauer durch ein gemaltes Bild als durch

Worte beschreiben können.


  Wie ist es damit: “Man kann eine [f|F]igur genauer
mit Hilfe von [m|M]aßzahlen als ohne diese be-


  Aber die Erfahrung, die ich habe scheint im gewissen Sinne
eine Beschreibung dieser Erfahrung, im gewissen
c zu ersetzen. “Sie ist ihre eigene Beschreibung”.


   Vermischen wir hier nicht zwei Dinge: die Zusam-
mengesetztheit der Erfahrung &, was man
ihren ursprünglichen Geschmack Ton flavour nennen könnte?
Ihre eigentliche natürliche Farbe


  Es ist die Auffassung, daß von der ursprüng-
lichen Erfahrung etwas nur ein Teil
bei in der Mitteilung erhalten bleibt, & etwas
anderes ˇvon ihr verloren geht. Nämlich eben ‘ihr timbre’,
oder wie man es nennen möchte. Es kommt
Einem hier so vor als könnte man, sozusa-
gen nur die ˇfarblose Zeichnung vermitteln & der Andere
setzte in sie seine Farben ein. Aber das ist
natürlich (eine) Täuschung.


  Aber können wir nicht wirklich sagen, wir
hätten in dem Andern durch unsere Beschrei-
bung ein Bild hervorgebracht aber wir
können nicht wissen ob dieses Bild nun

genau das gleiche ist, wie das unsere?
Denken wir hier an den Gebrauch
des Wortes gleich in ˇsolchen Sätze wie: “Diese
Kreise sind dem Augenschein nach
ganz gleich.”


  Hierher gehört auch, daß wir gewöhnlich
unser Gesichtsbild nicht als etwas in
uns empfinden wie etwa einen Schmerz im Auge
daß wir aber wenn wir philosophieren
geneigt sind diesem Vergleich Bild gemaß
zu denken.


  The ‘if-sensation’. Compare with the ‘table-sen-
sation’. There is the question “Whats the table
sensation like” & the answer is a picture of a
table. In what sense is the ifsensation
analogous to the tablesensation? Is there
a description of this sensation & what do we
call a description of it
. Putting the gestures in-
stead of the sensation means really just
pr giving the nearest rough description there
is of this the Experience



[“I have a peculiar feeling of pastness in my wrist”.]

6) “We shall never know whether he meant this
or that”. [B|C] died after the training in that
room. We say: “Perhaps he would have
reakted like B when taken into the daylight.
But we shall never know.
    α) We should say this question was decided
if he arose from his grave & we then made
the experiment with him. Or his ghost appeared
to us in a spiritualist s'anse & told
us that he has a certain experience.
   β) We dont accept any evidence.
But what if we didn't accept the evidence
in 5 either & said somet (something like) “We can't
be sure that [it|he] is the identical man
who was trained in the room”, or: “he is
the identical man but we can't know whether
he would have behaved like this in the
past time when he was trained.
7) We introduce a ˇnew notation for the
expression: “If [A|P] happens then always (as a rule)
[B|Q] happens. P didnt happen this time & so Q didn't
happen” We say instead: “If P had happened
Q would<…> have happened”. E.g. “If the gunpowder
is dry ˇunder these circumstances a spark of this strength explodes it. It
wouldn't dry this time & under the same circumstances didn't explode” We say
instead “If the gunpowder had been dry this time
it would have exploded”. The point of this
notation is that it nears the form of this
preposition very much to the form: “The ¿gunpowder¿

was dry this time so it exploded” I mean
the new ¿form¿ doesn't stress the fact
that it did not explode but, we
might say, points a vivid picture of
it exploding this time. We could imagine
a ˇtwo forms of expression in a picture language which was corresponding
to the two kinds of notations in the word
language. The second notation would
consist in actually painting a picture
of the explosion.
The second notation
will be particularly appropriate ˇe.g. if
we wish to give a person a shock by
making him vividly imagine what that which would
have hapened, stressing only slightly that
it hasn't didn't happened.
   Someone might say to us: “But are
you sure that the second sentence means
just what the first one means & not <…>
just something similar or ˇthat & something else
as well? (Moore) I should say: I'm talking
of the case where it means just this,
if it's used in & this seems to me
an important case (which you ¿causede¿
by saying what you have said). But
of course I don't say that it
isn't used in other ways as well & then
we'll have to talk about these
other cases separately.
   Someone says —“lowering ones voice some

times means that you whish to draw
special attention to what you now say in
other cases you lower your voice to show
that what you say is less important than
the rest
  We It must be clear that our examples are
not preparations to the <…> analysis
of the actual meaning of the expression
so & so Aut (Niquod) but giving them effects
that “analysis”.
  11Hab Have we now shown that to
say ˇin 5 “We can't know whether he would have behaved
…” makes no sense? We should say
the sentence to say this sentence under these circumstances ˇhas
lost its the point which it would have had
under other circs. but this doesnt mean that we
can't give it another point.
  10) We say “We don't can know whether this spark
would have been sufficient to ignite that mixture;
because we can't reproduce the exact mixture
not having the exact ingredients or not having a
balance to weigh them etc etc. But suppose
we could reproduce all the circumstances & someone
said “we can't know whether it would have
exploded” as we can't know whether & being asked why he said because under these
it would have exploded then.”
This answer would set our head whirling. We should
feel he wasn't playing the same game with
that expression as we do. We should be

inclined to say “This makes no sense!”
And this means that we are at a loss
not knowing what reasoning, what actions
go with this expression. Moreover we believe
that he made up a sentence analogous
to sentences used in certain lang.
games but not noticing that he
took the point awayt.
  In which case do we say that a
sentence has point? That comes to
asking in which case do we call
something a language game. I
can only answer. Look at the family
of language games that will show
you whatever can be shown about
the matter.

  12) “We can never know what he really sees,
for he has his own visual image & I have
mine”. & we can't say


  12) (The private visual image.) B is trained to
describe his afterimage when he has looked
say into a bright red light. He is made to
look into the light, & then to shut his eyes
& he is then asked “What do you see?”. This
question before was put to him only if he
looked at physical objects. We suppose he
reacts by a description of what he sees with
closed eyes.— But halt! This description
of the training seems wrong for what if

I had had to describe my own, not B's, training.
< <…> > Would I then also have said: “I reacted
to the question by …” & not rather: “When
I had clo closed my eyes I saw an image &
described it”. If I say “I saw an image
& described it I say this as opposed to the
case where in which I described gave a description without
seeing an image. (I might have lied or not.)
Now we could ˇof course also distinguish these cases
if B describes an afterimage. But we dont wish
to distinguish them but we only ˇto consider now
cases in which the mechanism of lying plays any
part. For [I|i]f you say “I always know whether
I am lying but not whether the other ma
person is”, I say: in the case I'm considering
I can't be said to know that I'm not
lying, or let us say not saying the ˇuntruth,
because the dilema saying the truth or the
untruth is in this case unknown to me. Think of the fact Remember that when I'm asked
“what do you see here” I don't always ask
myself: “Now shall I say the truth or not
something else?” If you say “but surely if
you ˇin fact speak the truth then you did see some-
thing & you saw what you said you saw”
I answer: How can I know that I see what I
say I see? Do I have a criterion one tha for the ¿colour¿ I see actually being red?



   13) ˇWe imagine that The expression “I can't see what you see”
has been given sense by explaining it
to mean: “I can't see what you see being
in a different position relative to the object
we are looking at”, or “… having not as
good eyes as you”, or “… having found
as in … that B sees something which
we don't thought we look at the same Object.
etc. I can't see your afterimage might
be explained to mean I can't see what
you see if I close my eyes meaning
when you say you see a red circle I see
a yellow one.
  14) Identity of physical objects, of shapes,
colours, dreams, toothache.
  15) (The thing object we see) The physical Object &
its appearance. Form of expression: different
views of the same phys. object are different
objects seen. We ask “What do you see”
& he can either answer “a chair”, or
„this” (& draw the particular view of the
chair). So we are now inclined to say
that each man sees a different object
& one which no other person sees, for
even if they look at the same chair from
the same spot it may appear different
to them & the objects before the other
minds eye I can't look at.

  16) (I can't know whether he sees anything

at all or only behaves as I do when I see
something.) There seems to be an undoubted
asymetry in the use of the word “I to see” (& all
words relating to personal experience). One
can is inclined to state this in the way that “I know when
I see something by just seeing it, without hearing
what I say or observing the rest of my behaviour
whereas I know that he sees & what he sees
only by observing his behaviour, i.e. indirectly”.
  a) There is a mistake in this <…>: I know what
I see because I see it”. What does it mean to
know that.
  b) It is truet to say that my reason for saying
that I see is not the observation of my
behaviour. But this is a gramm.prop.
  c) It seems to be an imperfection that I
can only know ---. But this is just
the way we use the word ---.— Could we then
… if we could? Certainly.


  Does the person Should we say that the person… who has not learnt the language
know<…>s wh that he sees red but can't express

it?— Or should we say: “he knows what he sees
but can't express it”?— So, besides seeing it, he
also knows what he sees?
      Imagine we described a totally different
experiment; say this, that I sting someone with
a needle & observe wheter he cries out or not makes a sound or not. Then
surely it would interest us if the subject <…>

whenever we often when we stung him saw, say, a red [|c]ircle. And
we would distinguish the case when he
cried out & saw a circle from the case
when he cried out & didn't see one.
     This case is quite straightforward & there is
no problem about it. seems
to be nothing problematic in it.


  If I say “I tell myself that I
see red, I tell myself what I see”
it seems that after having told
myself I now know better what I
see, am better acquainted with it,
than before. (Now in a sense this may
be so …)


  “When he said asked me what colours I
saw, I guessed what he meant wished wanted to know & told


  “It is not enough to distinguish
between the cases in which B or I sais that
I see red & do see red & the case in which
I say this but don't see red; but we
must distinguish between the cases in
which I say I see red, see red, say I
see red & mean to describe what I see
& the cases in which I don't mean this.



  Consider the case in which I dont
say what I see in words but by pointing to a
sample. Here again I distinguish now
between the cases in which I ‘just react
by pointing’ & the case in which
I see & point.


  Now suppose I asked: “¿how¿ do
I know that I see & that I see red? “[i|I].e. how do I know
that I do what you call seeing ˇ(& seeing red)?” For we use
the word ‘seeing’ & ‘red’ between us. in a game we
play with one another.


  Don't you say: “We not In order to
be a description of our personal experi-
ence it ˇwhat we say must not just be the our reaction
but ˇmust be justified”? by what I ¿see¿? But
does the justification need another justifi-


  Nehmen wir Suppose, We play the game 2
& B tells calls out the word “red”. Suppose
A now asks B: “do you only say ‘red’ or did
you really see it?”.


  “Surely there are two phenomena: one, just speaking,
the other, seeing & speaking accordingly.
Answer: Certainly we speak of these two cases
but we shall here have so show how

these expressions are used; or, in other
words, how they are taught. For the
mere facts that we posess a
picture of them does not help us
as we must describe how in what way this picture
is used. More especially as we are
inclined to assure a use difference
from the actual one.
    We have therefore to explain under
what conditions we say: “I see ‘red’ but
don't see red” or “I saw ‘red’ & see red”, or
“I say <…> red said ‘red’ but didn't see red” etc. etc..
    Imagine that saying red was often are
followed by some agreable event. We found
that the child enjoyed that event & often
instead of ‘green’ said ‘red’. We would use
this rea[k|c]tion to play another lang.
game with the child. We would say
“you cheat, its red” Now again we are
dependent upon the subsequent reaction of the child.
  Such games are actually played
with children: Telling a person the untruth
& enjoying his surprise at finding out
what really happened.


     But couldn't we imagine some kind
of perversity in a child which made it
say red when it saw green & v& v& & at the

same time this not being discovered because
it happened to see red ˇin these cases when we say green?
But if here we talk of perversity we
could might also assure that we all were
perverse. For how are we or B even to
find out that he is perverse?
    The idea is, that he finds out (& we do) when
later on he lerns how the word ‘perverse’ is
used & now then he remembers that he was
that way all along.
     Imagine this case: The child looks
at the lights: sais the name of then right
colour to himself in an asside & then loud
the wrong word. It chuckles while doing
so. This is, one may say, a rudimentary
form of cheating. One might even say:
“This child is going to be a liar”. But
if it had not said the asside but
only imagined itself pointing to one colour
on the chart & then said the wrong word,—
was this cheating too?
     Can a child cheat like a banker without the knowledge of the banker?


  “I can assure you that before when I
said ‘I see red’ I saw black



    “He tells us his private experience,
that experience which nobody but he
knows anything about”.


  “Surely his memory is worth more than
our direkt criteria, as only he could
know what he saw.”

  But let us see;— [w|W]e sometimes say
ouside philosophy such things as
“of course only he knows how he feels” or “I can't know what you feel”.
Now how do we apply such a state-
ment? Mostly it is an expression of
helplessness like “I don't know what
to do”. But this helplessness is not due to an unfortunate metaphysical
<…> fact, ‘the privacy of personal ex-
perience’, or it would worry us the always constantly.
Our expression is comparable to this:
“What's done can't be undone!”.


  We also say ˇto the Doctor “Surely I must know whether
I have pains or not!” How do we use
this statement?


  “Allright if we can't talk in this way
about someone else I can certainly
say of myself that I either saw red

<…> at that time or didn't had some other experience”. I may
not remember now, but at the
time I saw one thing or the other!”
This is like saying “one of these
two pictures must have fitted”. And
my answer is not that ˇperhaps neither of them
fits but that I'm not yet clear
about what ‘fitting’ in this case means.


  Now is it the same case are these
different cases: A blind man sees
everything just as we do but he acts
as a blind man does & on the other
hand he sees nothing & acts as
a blind man does. At first sight we
should say: here we have obviously two
clearly different cases athough we
admit ˇthat we can't know which we have
before us. I should say: You We obvious-
ly use two different pictures which
one we could describe like this: …. But
we use both the pictures in such same a way
that the two games ‘come to the same’.


  By the way,— would you say that he
surely certainly knew that he was blind if he
was so? Why do you feel more reluctant
about this statement?



    “Surely he knew that he saw red
but he [k|c]ouldn't say so!”— Does that
mean “Surely he saw knew that the [co|sa]w the colour
which we call ‘red’ …” & if not— or
would you say it means “he knew
that he saw this colour” (pointing to a
red pa<t>ch). But did he while he knew
it point to this patch?


  Use of: “He knows what colour he sees”.
“I knew what colour I saw” etc.


  “Nachdunkeln der Erinnerung” does this
expression make sense & in what cases.
And isn't ont the other hand the
picture which we use quite clear in
all cases?


  The case of old people usually having getting
memories of the time in which they learnt
to speak & understand speech:
     a) They say or paint that such &
such things have happened although
other records always contradict them
    b) The memories agree with the
records. [I|O]nly in this case shall we
say that they remember .


  Suppose they paint the scenes they

say they remember & paint the faces
very dark;— shall we say that they
saw them that dark or that the
colour had become darker in their memo-


  How do we know what colour a
person sees? By the sample he points
to? And how do we know wheth
what relation the sample is ˇmeant to have
to the original? Now are we to say
“we never know …”? Or had we better
cut out these “we never know …” ˇout of our
language & [k|c]onsider how as a matter
of fact we are wont to use the
word “to know”?


  What if someone asked: “How do we I know
that what I call ˇseeing red is ˇnot an entirely different
experience every time?”? & that I am not deluded
into thinking that it is the same or nearly
the same?”? Here again the answer “I
can't know & the subsequent removal of the question.


  Is it even true that when I call a
colour ‘red’ I serve myself of memory?? make use of memory??


  To use the memory of what happened

when we were taught language is allright
as long as we don't think that
this memory teaches us something
essentially private.


  “A rod has one length or another
how ever we find it out.” Here again
the picture


  “Though he [k|c]an't say what it is he
sees while he is learning No 1, he'll
tell us afterwards what he saw.
We mix this case up with the one:
“When his ¿gag¿ will have been removed
he'll tell us what he saw”.


  What does it mean ‘to tell someone what
[we|one] sees’? Or (perhaps), ‘to show someone what one sees’?


  When we say “he'll tell us what
he saw we have an idea that
then we'll know what he really saw
in a direkt way (“at least if he isn't lying”)


  “He is in a better position to say what he
sees than we are.”— That depends.—


  If we say “he'll tell us what he saw”, it
is as though he would now make a

use of language which we had never taught


  It is as if now whe we got an insight
into something which before we had only
seen from the outside.


  Inside & outside!


  “Our teaching training connects the word ‘red’
(or is meant to connect it) with a parti-
cular impression of his (a private impression
an impression in him). He then communicates
this impression— indirectly, of course—
through the medium of speech.”


  Where is the our idea of “direct & indirect com-
munication taken from?


  How, if we said, ˇas we sometimes might be inclined: “We can only hope that
this— indirect way of communication really


  We ˇso long see the facts about the usage of our
words crookedly as so long as we are still
tempted ˇhere to talk of direct & indirect.


  As long as you use the picture indirect-
direct in this case you can't trust yourself

about judging the grammatical situation
rightly otherwise.


  In telling what one sees something
turning one's inside out? And learning
to say what one sees, learning to let
others see inside us?


  “We teach him to make us see what he
sees”. He seems in an indirect way to
show us the object which he sees, the object
which is before his minds eye. “We can't
look at it, it is in him.”


  The idea of the private object of vision.
Apearance, sensedatum.


  The visual field. ([n|N]ot to be confused with visual


  Telling someone what one sees seems
like showing him, if indirectly, the object
which is before ones mind's eye.


  The idea of the object before one's mind's eye
is absolutely bound (firmly) tied up with the
idea that of a comparisson of such
objects in different persons which
compared to which the comparison

really used is ˇan indirect one.


  Whence the idea of the privacy of sensedata?


  But do you really wish to say that they
are not private ( that one person can
see the picture before the other persons


  Surely ˇyou wouldn't think that telling someone what one sees is could be a
more direct way of communicating than
showing him by pointing to a sample!


  “He'll tell us later what it was he saw”
means that we'll get to know in a (compara-
tively) direct ˇ& a sure way what he saw as opposed
to the guesses we could make before.


  We don't reallize that the answer he
gives us now is only part of a game like No 1
only more complicated.



  We dont deny that he can remember a having
dream<t> so & so before he was born. Denying
this to us would be like denying that
he can say he remembers having dreamt
so & so before he was born.
    I.e. we don't deny that he can
make this move but we say that
the move alone or together with all
the sensations feelings etc he might
have while he is making it does not
tell us what game it is a move of. to what game the move belongs.
    We might e.g. never try to connect up
a statement of this sort with anything
past (in an other sense). We might treat
it as an interesting phenomenon &
possibly connect it up with the persons ¿writing¿
in a Freudian way or on the other hand
we may look for some phenomena in the
brain of the embryo which might be
called dreams etc. etc.. Or we may just
say: “old people are liable to say such
things” & leave it at that.


  Suppose now someone remembered that
the yesterday he called red ‘green’ & vice
versa but that this didn't [p|a]ppear as he
also saw green what today he sees red
& vice versa. Now here is a case in which
we might be inclined to say that we

learn from him today something about
the working of his mind yesterday, that
yesterday we judged by the outside while
today we are allowed to look ˇ<…> at the
inside of what happened. It is as though
we looked back but now got a glance
at something that was closed to us covered up yester-


  If I say what it is I see how do
I compare what I say with what I
see in order to know whether I say
the truth?
  Lying about what I see, you might say,
is knowing what I see & saying something
else. Supposing I said it just consists
of saying to myself ‘this is red’ & aloud
‘this is green’


  Compare lying & telling the truth in the
case of telling what colour you see
with the case of describing a picture which
you saw or telling the right number
of things you had to count.


  Collating what you say & what you see.


  Is there always a collating?



  Or could you call it giving a picture of
the colour I see if I say the word
red? unless it be a picture by it's
connection with a sample.


  But isn't it ˇgiving a picture if I point to
a sample?


  “What I show reveals what I see”;—
in what sense does it do that? The
idea is that now you can so to speak
look inside me. Whereas I only reveal
to you what I see in a game of
revealing & hi[dd|di]ng which is altogether
plaied with signs of one category


  We are thinking of a game in which
there is an inside in the normal sense.


   We must get clear about how the
metaphor of revealing (outside & inside)
is actually applied by us; otherwise
we shall be tempted to look for
an inside behind that which in our
metaphor is the inside.


  We are used to describing the case
by mean of a picture which say

contains 3 steps. But ˇwhen we think about language we forget how
this picture is actually applied in
practical cases. We then are often
tempted to apply it as it wasn't
meant orriginally & lack are puzzled
about a third step in the facts.


  “I see a particular sensedatum image thing & say
a particular thing”. This is allright
if I real[l|i]se the way in which I specify
what I see & what I say.


  “If he had learnt to show me (or tell me)
what he sees, he could now show me.”
Certainly,— but what is it like to
show me what he sees? It is pointing
to something under particular circum-
stances. Or is it something else (dont
be misled by the idea of ¿indirectness¿)
  You compare it with such a statement
as: “if he had learnt to open
up he could now open up & show
me what's inside I could now see what's inside. I say yes, but
remember what opening up in this
case is like.


  But what about the criterium ¿whether¿
there is anything inside or not? Here we
say “I know that there is something

inside in my case. And this is how
I know of the ‘inside’ at all first
hand”. //And this is how I have first
hand knowledge of the inside at
all.” // “This is how I know about an
inside & am led to suppose is in the other person too.”
<↺Further we are not inclined to say that only hitherto we have not known the mind of an other person but that the idea of this knowlede is bound up with the idea of myself.>


  “So if I say ‘he has toothache’ I am
supposing that he has what I
have if I have toothache.” Suppose I
said: “If I say ‘I suppose’ he has
toothache I am supposing that he
has what I have if I have tooth-
ache”,— this would be like saying
“If I say ‘this cushion is red’ I mean
that it has the same colour which
the sofa has if it is red”. But
this wasn't what I intended was meant to
say with the first sentence. I
wished to say that talking about
his toothache at all was based
upon a supposition, a supposition which
ˇby its very nature essence could not be veryfied.


  But if you look closer you will see
that this is an entire misrepresenta-
tion of the use of the word “toothache”



  Can two people have the same


  Spr Languagegame ‘Description of imaginings the picture before ones mind's eye.’


  Can two people persons have the
same picture before their mind's eye.


  In which case would we say that
they had two images exactly alike but
not identical?


  The fact that two ideas seem here
inseparably bound up suggests to
us that we are dealing with one idea
only & not with two & that by a
queer trick our language suggests a
totally different strukture of grammar
than the one actually used. For
we have the sentence that only I
can know directely my experience &
only indirectely the experience of
the other person. Thisus language suggests 4 possible
com[p|b]inations but rules out 2. It is
as though I had used the 4 letters

a b c d to denote two objects only
but by my notation somehow
suggesting the pre that I am tal-
king of 4.


  It seems as though I w[a|i]shed to
say that I ˇto me L.W. something applied
which does not apply to other
people. That is, there seems to be an

I express things assymmetri[l|c]ally & could
express them symmetrically; only then one
would see what facts prompt us to
the assymmetrical expression.


  I do this by spreading the ˇuse of the word I
over all ¿hu[p|m]an¿ bodies as opposed to
L.W. allone.


  I want to bring describe a situation
in which I should not be tempted to
say that I assumed or believed that
the other had what I have. Or, in other
words I a situation in which we would
not of my cons[t|c]iousness & his conscious-
. And in which the idea would not

occur to us that we could only be
conscious of our own consciousness.


  The idea of the ego inhabiting a
body to be abolished.


  If what any consciousness √ spreads over
all human bodies then their wont be
any temptation to use the word ‘ego’


  Let's assume that hearing was
done by no organ of the body we know


  Let us imagine the following arrangement:

  If it is absurd to say that I only
know that I see & but not that the
others do,— isn't this at any rate less
absurd than to say the opposite?


   Ist eine Philosophie undenkbar die das
diametrale Gegenteil des Solipsismus ist?



   The idea of the constituent of a
fact &: “Is my person (or a person) a
constituent of the fact that
I see or not”. This expresses a question
concerning the symbolism just as
if it were a question about ¿the¿ nature.


  “Es denkt”. Ist dieser Satz wahr & “ich
denke” falsch?


  Lang.game: I paint, for myself, what I
see. The picture doesn't contain me.

A board game exactly like
in fact chess but the
board has a square
which must never be
used. This may be


  A board game in which only one man
plays with is said to play the other
to ‘answer’.


  What if the other person always
correctely described what I saw,
& imagined, would I not say he knows
what I see?— “But what if he describes