it wrongly on some occasion? Mustn't
I say he was mistaken? “Why should
I say this & not rather, he has forgot
the meanings of his words.


  But after all only I can lastly decide
whether what he said, is right. “We can't
assume that he knows what I see
& I don't !” We can abs. do this!

Can a man doubt whether what he
sees is red or green? [Elaborate this]


  “Shurely if he sees knows anything he must know
that he sees!”— It is true that the
game of “showing ˇor telling what one sees” is one
of the most fundamental language
games, which means that what we
in ordinary life call using language
mostly presuposes this game.


  I can for what I see 1 use the
impersonal form of description & the
fact that I say “for what I see”
doesn't say at all that after all
this is only a disguised personal
description! For I just expressed my self myself
in our English. ordinary form of expression.


  Ist ein Würfel ein äußerst regelmäßiger
symmetrischer Körper, oder das Unregel-
mäßige was ich sehe, wenn ich ihn vor einer
Kant Ecke aus sehe? Was soll ich
hervorheben? Soll ich sagen er sei primär
unregelmäßig aber man könne ihn als etwas
Regelmäßiges unregelmäßig projiziert
darstellen, oder er sei primär regelmäßig
sei aber unregelmäßig projiziert gesehen?

What's the difference between me being
angry and some he being angry?

If I wish to write down my experien-
ces the two experiences that
I am angry & that he is angry are
absolutely entirely different (although
the words used to describe them
are very similar. I might therefore
naturally objec[k|t]t to this way of



  “Ein Würfel hat 9 reelle Kanten & 3


  If I write down my own experiences
nothing is more natural than to
refer [by|to] ‘I’ only to my body or L.W.'s body as
opposed to other bodies, but not to to distin-
guish my toothache from his by the
words I & he.

The usual game ˇplayed with the word ‘toothache’
involves the distinction of bodies which
have the toothache.


 Does the solipsist ˇalso say that only he can
play chess?


 But he will say that behind the sentence
‘I see …’ when he says it & it's true there stands
something which does not stand behind
“he sees” or ‘I see’ when the other man sais it


  I'll start with a description of
what ‘I see’ but in impersonal form

‘Ich spreche’ & ‘der Andere spricht’ sind zwei

total verschiedene Erfahrungen.


  Ich sage “Es ist schön”, dann sage ich
“das habe ich gesprochen”. Damit habe ich
weder mir noch dem Andern gesagt wer
es gesprochen hat. Ich habe ¿einen¿ ge-
zeigt[,|.] weil es nicht

“Aber woher weiß ich daß ich
gesprochen haben wenn nicht aus der
eigentümlichen motorischen Erfahrung des ¿Selbst¿


  Das Wort ‘Ich’ bezeichnet keine Person.


  Remember that, whatever the word ‘
I’ means to you, to the other
man it shows drives his attention to a human body & is
of no value otherwise.

Hat es einen Sinn zu
sagen, der Stern bleibt
beim gleichen Punkt?



  I could write say a tex book
on Physics in which every sentence
starts with “I remember”.
  Could one say :Here the sentences
are all directly backed by ˇreal experiences
or by primary reality.
     We must make be mislead in
a queer way!


  “Surely”, I want to say, “if I'm ˇto be really quite frank
I must say that I have something
which nobody has”.— But who's I?—
Hell! I don't express myself properly
but there's something you can't
deny that there is my personal
experience & that this in a most
important sense has no neighbour.—
But you don't mean by that that it happens to be alone but that it's grammatical position is that of having no neighbour.
     “But somehow our language doesn't
B bring it out, that there is something
unique namely real present experience, & do
you just wish to advice me to resign myself
to that?”


  [A philosophical book might be entitled

“the wonders of the jungle”.]

(Funny that in ordinary life we never feel
that we have to ¿resign¿ ourselves to
something by using ordinary language!)


  How is it that the Auszeichnung we I might propose
for those sentences which describe my
own personal experience does do not really quite
satisfy [us|me]?

Partly because of what we call “imagining
that the other person sees (feels pain etc.)”
  D.h. wir sind geneigt dasselbe
Bild für <…> Vorgänge zu verwenden.

Now imagine this: as soon as he ever
has learned enought ˇof language to
1 be able to say so express it he tells us that
he saw blue when he said is not ⇄ red.

This sounds as if then we really ought
to be convinced that he saw blue etc.

The person who paints his memories.


    It reminds ˇone misleadingly of :“as soon as ever

he had learnt enough of their language
the stranger informed his hosts of …

Augustin, about expressing what the
wishes inside him.

Why shouldn't we consider ˇthe case that the
child learns to think & always dreams. Had it had a private language before it learnt ours.
    Only: What do we mean by learning
the language? In what sense can
we be said to teach the child the
natural gesture-language? Or can't
we teach him that?

Can't the child learn to wish for an
apple by learning to draw an apple?


         This hangs together with the
idea that the child remembers
before it sais it does .
      Consider the case of the child
drawing painting its memories.
        It has painted a blue light
instead of a red one.


  Kreis & Elipse. Soll ich sagen :“er
hat der Kreis gestern als Elipse
gesehen”, oder so stellt er den
folgende Tag einen Kreis dar”.


   [Sich daran erinnern das & das gedacht
zu haben. “Ich erinnere mich nicht an
ihn aber ich weiß erinnere mich daß er mir einer dümmlich
Eindruck gemacht hat”]

“He mostly sees red where we see red”

The normal use of the expression “he
sees green where…” ist this: We take
it as the criterium for that my <…> meaning
the same by ‘red’ as the other people we do
that ˇas a rule I he argues with them us in giving
the same names to the colours of
objectss as they we do. If then in a particular
instant he says something is red when we
should say that it's green we say that
he sees it different from us.
   Notice how in such a case we would
behave. We should look for a cause
of his differing judgement & if we had found
one we should certainly be inclined to
say he saw red when we saw green.


  It is further [k|c]lear that even before
even finding such a cause we
might under circumstances be
inclined to say this. But also
that we can't give a strict rule
for ….

N Consider now this case: Someone says
I remember ˇyesterday having seen everything red
green & vice versa.

  Consider this case: someone sais it's green I can't underst.
I see everything red green blue today & vice versa.
We answer: it must look queer! He sais
it does & e.g. goes on to say ho cold
the glowing cole looks & how warm
the clear (blue) sky. I think we should
under these or similar circumst. bi incl. to say that he saw red what
we saw green. And again we should say
that we know that he means by
the words blue & red what we do
as he has always used them as we did had.

On the other hand: Someone tels us
today that yesterday he always saw
everything red, blue and s.o.. We say it must
We say: But you called the glowing
coal red you know & the sky blue. He
answers: That was because I had also

changed the names. We say: But
didn't it feel very queer & he
says: No it seemed all perfectly
ordinary natural. Would we in this case
too say: …?

Suppose Case of contradictory
memory images. Tomorrow he remem-
bers this, the day after tomorrow
something else.


 The whole trend, to show
the expression “letting one look through his soul” is ˇoften misleading.

Back to the example of the or N of afterimages.
We can say that these cases are
not cases of ˇcommunic. of personal exp. if there
were no pers. exp. but only ‘the
outward signs’?

Now I ask what are our criteria
for there being or there having been a pers.
exp. beside the expression? And here
the answer seems to be that for
the outsider //the other man// the criteria
are indeed more outside expressions
but that I myself know whether
I have an experience or not in par-

ticular whether I see red or not.


  But let me ask what is knowing
that I see red like: I mean: look at
something red ‘know that it is red’ &
ask observe //mark// yourself what you're doing. Don't
you mean seeing red & impressing it on
your mind that you are doing so? But
there are, I suppose, several things that
you are doing : You probably say to your-
self the word ‘red’ or ‘this is red’ or some-
thing of the sort, or perhaps glance from
the red object to another red one
which you're taking to be the paradigme
of red & such like. On the other hand you
just intently stare at the red thing.


  In many part of their uses the words expressions
‘visual image’ & ‘picture’ run parallel
but where where they don't the analogy
which does exists tends to delude us.

  The grammar of ‘seeing red’ connected
to the expression of seeing red
closer than one thinks.


 “You talk as though one couldn't can't
see a red patch without if one doesn't can't say

that one does; as As if seeing something
was saying that one sees it”.
 “Seeing something” of course doesn't mean
the same as saying that one sees some-
thing but the senses of their expression are closer related than
it might appear to you.
    We say a blind man doesn't see
anything. But not only do we say so
but he too sais that he does not
see I don't mean “he agrees with us
that he does not see”, “he does not
dispute it”, but rather, he too describes
the facts in this way having learnt
the same language as we have. Now
whome do we call blind, what is our
criterium for blindness? A certain
kind of behaviour. And if a the person
behaves in that particular way we
not only call him blind but teach
him to call himself blind. And in this
sense his behaviour also determines
the meaning of blindness for him.
But now you will say: “Surely
blindness isn't just a behaviour;
it's clear that an man can behave
like a blind man & not be blind. There-
fore ‘blindness’ means something different:
in fact something this behaviour only helps him

to understand what we mean by ‘blind-
ness’. The outward circumstances are
what both we ⇄ I and he know. Whenever
he behaves in a certain way we say ˇthat he
sees nothing & he notices that a certain
private experience of his coincides with
all these cases & thereby [knows|can] so concludes that
we mean this experiences of his by saying
that he sees nothing”.
    The idea is that we teach a man person
the meaning of expressions relating to
personal experiences indirectely.— Such an
indirect mode of teaching we could ima-
gine as follows. ¿No)¿ We <I> teach a child
the names of colours & a game, say, of
bringing objects of a certain colour if when
the ‘name of the colour’ is called out.
I We don't however teach him the colour-
names by pointing to a sample which we both see //which both of us see// which [I|we] & he see
saying ˇe.g. the word ‘red’. but Instead we let
him look at a white wall sheet of paper
through various a pair of spectacles which if we
look through them make us see the
paper red & we say the word ‘red’ whenever
we put these spectacles on his nose.

I have various spectacles each of which
when we I look through it makes us me see
the ˇwhite paper in a different colour. These specta-
cles are also distinguished by theirs

outside apearance the red one ˇthat makes me see red has round circular
glasses the green another one eliptical ones
[I|We] now teach the child in this way that
when I see it looking through the
putting the round circular ones on his nose I
say the word ‘red’, etc. when the eliptical
ones ‘ green’ & so forth? This one might
call reacting the child the ˇmeanings of the colour
names in an indirect way because
I one could here in this case say that I
led the child to correlate the
word red with something that I
didn't see but hoped the child
would see if it looked through
the circular glasses. And this way
is indire[k|c]t as opposed to the dire[k|c]t
way of pointing to a red object etc..




 From this it should follow that
we sometimes rightly sometimes wrong-
ly teach a man to say that he is
blind : For what if he saw all the
time but nevertheless behaved ˇexactly like
a blind man?— Or should we say:
“Nature wouldn't play such a trick on
us !”.
    We can see here that we don't quite

understand the real use of the word expression
“to see something” or “to see nothing”.

    And what is so misleading to us
about when we consider this use is
the following: We say “Surely we can
see something without ever saying or
showing that we do & on the other hand
we can say that we see so & so without
seeing it, therefore seeing is the process
& expressing that we see an other, & all
they have to do with each other is that
they sometimes coincide; they have the
same connection as being red & being
sweet. Sometimes what is red is sweet “etc.”.
 Now this is obviously not quite true & not
quite false. It seems we somehow that we
look at the use of these words with
some prejudice.
It is clear that we in our language
use the expression words ‘seeing red’ in such 1
a way that we can say “he A sees … red, but
doesn't show it” on the other hand it is
easy to see that we would have no
use for these words if their application
was severed from the criteria which
of behaviour, that is to say, to the language
game which we play with these words
it is, both, essential that the people
who play it (should) behave in the
particular way we call expressing saying, showing what

they see, & also that they sometimes under certain circumstances they
should ˇmore or less or entirely conceal what they see.
  Balance: The point of the game depends
upon what usually happens.
    Point of a game

  How does he know that he sees has the visual image red i.e. how
does he connect ˇthe word ‘red’ with ‘ a particular
colour? In fact what does the expression
‘a particular’ here mean. What is
the criterium for his connecting it the word
always to the same colour experience? Is it not
often just that he calls it red?

But doesn't then the word “seeing red”
mean to me a particular process certain (private) experience or
(mental) <…> fact in the realm of primary experience , which surely is utterly
different from saying certain words?


    In fact if he spi is to play a lang.-
games the possibility of this will
depend upon his own & the other people's
reactions. For The game depends upon
the agreement of these reactions i.e.
they must call describe the same things ‘red’.
     “But s if he speaks to himself
surely this is different. For then he needn't
consult other people's reactions &
what he calls red is just what just he just gives the name ‘red’ now to the
same colour
as that to which he called

gave it on a previous occasion. on previous occasions. in previous cases. But how does
he know that it is the same colour.
Does he also recognize the sameness ˇof colour
as what he used to call sameness of
colour & so on ad inf.? It is quite true
he uses connects, in agreement with ordinary use,
the word ‘red’ & ˇthe same colour such that he
would not say that he saw how
the colour he had seen before that
that colour is red but that what he
sees now is not red etc.
   It is quite true, he connects the word & the exp..


          The words “‘seeing red’ means a
part experience” are useless unless
we can follow them up by: ‘namely
this → (pointing)’. Or else they may say
experience as opposed to phys. obj., but
then this is grammar.


  (Still contradicting objecting )But I could
use language just for making entries
in my diary & without even having
learnt it I could have invented a name
for the particular a colour sensation say
the name ‘red’ & then used this name
to write down whenever I had that

colour sensation. That means, you
(would) play a private language game
with yourself. But let's see, how
are we to describe this game?

When you say “the expression
‘---’ means to you a certain private
” you are (indeed) supplementing
this ˇstatement by imagining a red colour, ˇor looking
at a red object, or such like (which
supply the ‘ namely this’) but how
do you make use make use of the expression &
the experience you ˇthus connect with it?
For how you say what we call the
meaning of the word lies in the game
we play with it.


 But it seems too me that I either see
red or don't see red. Whether I say express
it or not.
       Picture we use here
     This picture not questioned but its
      Both cases of tautologies.


 “Surely seeing is one thing, & showing that
I see is another thing”.— This certainly
is like saying “skipping is one thing &

jumping another”. But here there is a
suplement to this statement & we
can say
“skipping is this (showing it) & jumping
this (showing it)”. Now how about this
supplement in the first case? “Seeing ˇred is
this (showing it) & showing that we see ˇred, this
(showing it)” The point is just that there
isn't a ‘showing that I see’ except t showing
that I see. “But can't I say: seeing
red is what I'm doing now” (looking at
something red)? And although in a sense
the other man can't directly see what
I'm talking about, I certainly know
that ˇit is it is that I'm talking about. That is although
for him I can't point directly to the my
seeing red, for myself I can point to it,
& in this sense I can give an ostensive
definition of the expression to myself.
← But an ostensive def. is not a ˇmagic act of conjury.
  If I explain to someone to the use
of --- by. [T|G]iving the o. d. simply
consists in ---.
     One might be inclined to say that
castling was not just the act of ….
  But it is the game ˇof wh which it is part….
Then ˇSo what does giving to myself the ostensive def.
of red consist in? I suppose we
should say
I suppose looking —Now how am I to
describe it shall I say seeing red

saying to myself that I do. ‘this is red.’ or I see red.’ The first vers. I don't like
I assume that the others
knows have what the colour very same private impression
which I am having

Or is it
“seeing a certain colour ˇsensation & saying ‘I see
red’”? The first version it seems doesn't account
for that fact won't
do as it isn't essential to us that
when I ˇdo for myself what call ‘seeing red’ that should ˇnecessarily be what
the others understand mean by seeing red.
So I [sh|w]ould rather leave it open
what colour I am concentrating ˇmy attention on.
But then how can I call it a colour?
Isn't it just as uncertain that I
mean by colour ˇwhat he means as that I mean
by red what they mean & doesn't
the same of course holds for applies to ‘seeing’ (for
what ˇhere I mean by the word is not an
activity of the human eye). (The second
version is justified only if I wish to
say that it does not matter here
to which of the colours (say, red, green, blue,
yellow) he gives he assigns the name ‘red’ & so
this means we might have describ
said “he sees a ˇsame colour, say, blue & sais
‘I see red.’”.)

But it's a blatant error to mix up
‘seeing red’ with showing that you see red!
I know what seeing red is & I know
what showing … is. Coudn't we say
that knowing what showing … is, is seeing



   Consider the prop.: He makes sure what it
means to him by …. Would you say the word
had meaning to him if it ‘meant something else’ even
And what is the criterion of the same colour coming twice.
showing now what is knowing what seeing is .
  In knowing what seeing ˇred is you seem
to give yourself a sample you say to yourself ‘seeing red is this’ but you
don't because the usual criteria
for the sameness of the sample
don't apply. I can say I call ‘red’
always the same colour or I whenever
I explain red I point to a sample
of the same colour.


         Isn't If we describe a game which he
plays with himself is it relevant that
he should use the word red to the
same colour in our sense or would we
also call it a lang. game if he used
it anyhow. Then what is the criterium
for using it in the same way? Not ˇmerely the
connection between ‘same’, ’colour’ & ‘red’?


 Which is the same colour as that I
saw? Not the one to which I apply
the words ‘ˇthis is the same colour ’?


   “Let me see if I still know which of these
colours is red? — looking about Yes I know.”
(Here I could
have said “is called red”)


   <So he can make sure he did of what it means ↺in this private way by having a priv. sens.’!> Making sure that you know what ‘seeing

red’ means is good only if you can
make use of this knowledge in a future
case. Now what if I see a colour
again, can I say I knew made sure
I knew what ‘red’ was meant so now I
shall know that I'll recognize
it correctly? In what sense is
having said the words ‘this is red’
before a guarantee that I now
see the same colour when I say
again I see red


  We can indeed imagine a Robinson
using a language for himself but
then he must behave in a certain
way or we shouldn't say that he
plays lang. games with himself.


  The grammar of ‘ˇprivate sense data’


  Das Interessante ist nicht daß ich
nicht auf mein Benehmen achten muß
um zu wissen, daß ich Zahnschm. habe,
sondern, daß mir mein Benehmen gar
nichts sagt.



   “I sent him to the doctor because
he moans” is just as correct as “I
sent him to the d because he has


  “I moan because I have pain”.— Are
you sure that that's why you moan?


 “But d. a. the nucleus of our language
remains untouched whatever we might
imagine our behaviour to be!” The nucleus
is the word & ˇtogether with it's meaning.


  “‘Toothache’ is a word which I use in
a game which I play with other people,
but it has a private meaning to me.”


   “Christen toothache”

Changing the meaning of a word.
Meaning connected with the use of
the ostens. def..

In the use of the word meaning it is essen-

tial that the same meaning is kept in
throughout a game.

Consider a game in which this isn't so.
Would you call this sort of
activity a game?


  “Are you sure that you call ‘toothache’
always the same private experience?”


  ‘I recognize it as being the
same’. And are you also recognizing
the meaning of the word the same,
so you can be sure that “recognizing
it to be the same” now means the
same to you which it did before?

“But ˇin ostensively defining a word
for myself I impress it's meaning on
me so as not to forget it later on”. But
how do you know that this helps. How
do you know ˇlater on whether you remember it
rightly or wrongly

Can you recognize something to be
red which isn't red?

To be sure that so & so is the case
To know: Does ‘p’ follow from ‘I know p’?

<The normal case of being sure,
of a strong conviction.>
 Does it make sense to say, that
what you see is green, & you recognize
it to be red?


  “It seems to me to have sense”
 You are undoubtedly using a picture
therefore it ‘seems to you to make have
sense’. But ask yourself what use
you are making of that picture?
We shall have to talk about sense
& nonsense later.


  What's the use here of being sure
of it if it doesn't follow that
it is so & if your being sure
is the only criterion there is to for
it being so?
That means: This isn't at all a
case of being sure, of conviction.


  The word ‘recognizing ˇas …’ is used where
you can be wrong in recognizing.

—Sometimes these bodies change their
weight & then we look for the cause (of it) ˇof the change
& find ˇ, say, that something's come off the body[,|.]
or that 1 the body has in some way

Sometimes however the weight ˇof a body changes & we
can't account for it the change at all. But we 1
nevertheless don't say that weighing it
had lost its point “because now the
body really doesn't have any one weight”.
Rather we say that the body had
changed somehow that this was the
cause of the change of weight but
that th hitherto we are not have not
found this cause. That is, we shall will
go on playing the game of weighing
& tr we try to find an explanation
for the exceptional behaviour.
  Supposing however which way the rule exc.
became the exception rule & the exception rule became
the rule exc..
We talk of use the ˇformal expression “the weight
of a this body” to designate something
inherent in the body something which
could only be ¿demolished¿ by destroying
part of the body. The same body — the
same weight. (And this is a gramm. prop. )
  Supposing what in fact is the rule
became the exception. Under certain
peculiar circc. indeed a body weighd
kept on weighing the same. Say iron in
the presence of mercury. Must <…> a piece
of cheese on the other hand though
keeping its size, calories weigh

different weights at different times unaccountably.
 Would we still

    on the one hand it seems that if there
wasn't the behaviour of it.
  “So & so has excellent teeth, he never had
to go to the dentist, never complained
about toothache; but as toothache is a
private experience we can't know whether
he hasn't had terrible toothache all his life”.

 What is an assumption that e.g. ‘A
has toothache’? Is it the saying
the words “A has t.”? Or doesn't
it consist in doing … something with
these words?
How does one assume
such & such to be the case?

A game of assumption: ---

Assuming: a state of mind. Assuming:
a gesture.


  “But the point is just that we don't
assume that we have t.. Therefore
even if we have no ground to assuming
that anyone else has t. we may never-
theless know that we have.” But would
we in this case at all talk of a

(particular) behaviour as a symptom
of pains? “Suppose no one knew
pains & I just w except I, & I
just invented a name ‘abracadabra’
for it!”


  Showing his grief, —hiding his grief.


  Certain behaviour ˇunder cert. circumst. we call showing our t.
other behaviourˇ, hiding our t.. Now would
we talk about this behaviour in
this way if people didn't ordinarily behave
in the way they do? Suppose I ˇ& they described
my behaviour without such a word
as pain, would the description be
incomplete? Supposing The question
is : do I consider it incomplete?
If so I will pe distinguish between
two cases of my behaviour & the
others will say that I use
two words alternately for my
behaviour & thereby they will acnowledge
that I have t..


 “But can't he have t. without in
any way showing it? And this shows
that the word ‘t.’ has a meaning
entirely independent of a behaviour
show connected with t..”



 We can't pl “The game which we
play with the word ‘t.’ entirely depends
upon there being a behaviour which we
call the expression of t..


  “We use ‘t.’ as the name of a personal
experience”.— Well lets see how we
use the word!


  “But you know the sensation of t.! So
you can give it a name, say, ‘t.’.”

But what is it like to give a sensation
a name? Say it is pronouncing the name
while one has the sensation & possibly
concentrating on the sensation, — but
what of it? Does this name thereby
get magic powers? And why on earth
do I call these sounds the ‘name’ of
the sensation? I know what I do
with the name of a man or of a [N|n]umber
but what have I b[a|y] th[ese|is] act of
‘definition’ given the name a use?


  “I know what t. is”. But how do
I know that I know it? Because
something comes before my mind? But And
how do I know that that is the right

thing? Because I recognize it? But then
it doesn't matter what it is, as long
as I recognize it as t.! …


 “But when you ask me “do you
know what t. is” I answer
yes after having brought before
my mind a certain sensation.” But
now is this certain sens. characte-
rised? Only by that that it
comes when you say the word ‘t.
’? Or that it comes & you are in
some way satisfied?


 “To give a sensation a name” means
nothing unless I know already
in what sort of a game this
name is going to be used.


 I've described certain behaviour by:
‘it is obvious that he was hiding his
pain’ or: ‘I think he was hiding
his pain’ or ‘I don't know at all whether he was hiding pain’.


  But can't I just assume with
some degree of certainty that he has

<to any part use of ¿the word¿>
pain although I have no reason whatever
for it?
I [k|c]an say “I assume…”, but
if I sent them all to the doctor although
they showed no sign of illness pain, I should
just be called mad.

That we try to account for some-
thing is due to the fact that we
often can account for it. If I
saw no regularity whatever I
should not be inclined to assume say
that there is one which I haven't
or yet discovered. What usually happens
makes me take this point of view.


  The ‘private definition’ is not binding.


   The role of In our priv. lang. game we
had, it seemed, given a name to an
impression, — in order, of course, to use it the
name for this imp. in the future. The
def., that is, should have determined
on future occasions for what impr. to use
the word ‘red’ name & for which not to use it.
Now we said that on certain occ. we
were incl.
we didn't
ˇafter having given the def. we did used th[i|e]s word on others not;
but we refused to described these

occ. only by saying that we had ‘certain
impr.’ that is we didn't describe them
at all. The only thing that characte-
rized them was that we used
such & such words. What seemed in
this lang. game to be a definition
didn't play the role of a def.
at all it did not justify one
subsequent use of the word and
all that remains of
our your one's priv. lang. game is ˇtherefore that
I you sometimes ˇwithout justifying my part. reason write a word the word ‘red’ into my diary — without
any justif. whatever.


   “But surely I feel justified when
normally I use the word ‘red’ although
I don't thing think of a def. while doing ‘so’. Do you mean that
whenever ˇnormally you use the word
‘red’ you have a particular feeling
which you call a feeling of justification. I wonder if that is true. But
true or not ˇanyhow by ‘justific’ I didn't
mean a feeling. But I think I know
what makes you say that or
saying e.g. this chair book is red you
have a feeling of being justified in
using the word. For you might ask:
isn't there there an obvious difference

between the case in which I use apply use
a word in its well known meaning as when I say <…> to someone ’the sky is blue today‘
& the case in which I apply say any
arbitrary word or such an occasion
e.g. ’the sky is moo‘. In this case,
you will say, I either know that
I am [¿1¿|just] fixing giving a meaning to the word ’moo‘
or else I ˇshall feel that I have no
justification whatever to use there is no justification whatever
for using
word. The word is just any word & not
the appropriate word. I quite agree that
there is a difference in experience between
the cases of ’using the name of the colour’,
’giving a ˇnew name to the colour’ & ‘using any some
arbitrary word in the place of the name
of the colour’. But that doesn't
mean that it is correct to say that
I have a feeling of appropriateness
in the first case which is absent in
the other third. “But ‘red’ somehow
seems to us to fit this colour”. We certainly
may be inclined to say this sentence
of certain but it would be
wrong to say that therefore we had a
feeling of fitting whenever ordinarily we
said that something was red.


  “But do you mean that one man couldn't
play a game of chess with himself &

without anyone else knowing that
he did?— What, would you say
he should do in order that we
may say he is playing to be playing
ˇwith himself a private
game of chess?
Any Just anything?— I suppose
Would you just say he must go
through certain private experiences
but that's as good which
I can (only) indirectly describe
by saying that they are the
experiences which he has when
playing ˇa certain game chess (in the ordinary
sense of the word)?
I suppose you would say ˇe.g. that
he imagines a chessboard with the
chessmen on it, then that he imagines
certain mooves etc.. And on being if you were
asked what does it means
to imagine a chessboard, you would
ˇexplain it by pointing to a real chessboard or, the ˇsay to a
picture of one and analogously if
you were asked what does it mean
to imagine casteling etc. ˇthe king of chess, a pawn, a knights moove etc..
But what if you explained: But shal
Or should you have said: He must go through
certain …. But will any what
private experiences are there & will
any of them do in this case? For

instance feeling hot?. But you don't
understand me. No.
ˇ“No! The private
exp. I am talking of must have the multiplicity
of the game of chess: But remember
what we have said of
again does he recognize
two private exp. to be different by
a further priv. exp. & this to be the

same in the different cases? Mustn't
we say in this case that we
can't say anything whatever
about private experiences & are in fact not
even entitled to use the words
experiences at all? What makes
us believe that … we are in, that
we really think of the case in
which we can describe his priv.
exp. describing different kind ways
of playing chess in ones imagination.


    How can we say he may see red
although nobody may be able to
find it out?

If we go through with this idea
of the a private experience which we don't
know we can't talk of a certain
private experience either, because

this expression is taken from the
case in which what we don't know
is something like say, whether
if he says he uses red he
sees red & not perhaps blue green or yellow.
  in which it attends to a certain
class of experiences which we know
though we don't know which one
of it's members he has. Rather
the <…> private experiences impressions
ˇwhich we imagine as the background to the foreground of our actions dissolves into a mist
which we wished to refer to talk about
& imagined to be back of our action
dissolve into a mist w
  Rather the private experiences
which we imagined as an unknown x a, y, z etc.
behind our acti actions, loose their
individualities &
dissolve into a
mist & into nothing.


  One might suggest—: The word
‘t’ on the one hand for
a behaviour & on the other hand
for a private experience. The connec-
tion is that when a man has
the priv. exp. he tends to behave
in the particular way.


  But why should you talk of
a priv. exp. & not 100 priv. experiences,
as you don't know whether there is any
red or whether there are 100?


  What is so confusing here is
to talk of the meaning of the
word instead of of the use.
  The idea of different kinds of objects.


  Why should you know better what
experiencing is like with the other
person than what seeing red is like?
  If you were very careful you
would say “a certain … something”.


  What does it consist in is ˇit that happen[i|s]ng when in one
case I say “I have toothache see red & mean
it, isn't I am not lying, & I know what I'm
& on the other hand I say
the words but know that they are not
true, or say them not knowing what exactly
they mean etc.?


 The criteria for it being the truth
have to be laid down beforehand
in common language are laid down in language (rules, charts etc.). “But how am
I to know how in the particular
case to apply them?— For if as far as For, being laid down… For in so far as they

are laid down in common lang.
they join the rest of what is
thus laid down are become just part of the common lang. game i.e. they don't help me in any particular case.
<They join in with all the rest of … not helping me & don't help me in
my particular priv.
| They join the rest of the rules of common lang. .>
Is there
such a thing as justifying what
in the particular case I do just
by what <…> then ¿further¿ is the
case ˇan not by ¿rule¿? Can I say : I am now
justified in using the sentence ˇjust by what is now the case…?
    Nor can I say does it help me to say I am justified
“when I feel justified”. For about
feeling justified the same things can
be said as about feeling t..


  My criteria for having t are the same as saying I have t is no other than for the others saying I have t,
for I can't say that feeling,
or having, t. is my criterion
for having a right to say it.


   Examine: ‘These two operations bring
about the same pain’. The pain
which they all bring about I
shall call t..
    <What does this shew??> <Now I might explain>
<Did I give the name ‘t.’ to a behaviour >
<Did I call a behaviour “having toothache”?>
<Did I call a behaviour “having the same pain”?>
<But showing t. can never be
<Ich glaube ich wollte zeigen, daß ‘t.’ hier nicht als Name eines
Benehmens gebraucht ist gegeben wird & daß man auch nicht auf eine Erfahrung
hinten dem Benehmen zeigt.

   I must assume an expression
which [I|is] not lying.
Now do I say that there [was|is]

not the experience of t. but only
the behaviour ?!?


  When I say that moaning is the
expression of t. then under certain
circs. the idea possibility of
it being the expression without
the feeling behind it mustn't
enter my game.


 Es ist Unsinn zu sagen: der
Ausdruck kann immer lügen .


  The language games with expressions
of feelings are (private experiences)
are based on ˇgames with expressions of
which we don't say that they may


  “But was I when a baby toaght
that toothache meant my expression
of toothache?”— I was told that
a certain behaviour was called
expression of toothache.


 “But isn't it possible that a child
should behave just as a normal
child when it has t. & not have t.?”


 But does if we speek of the baby,
‘having t.’ mean the same as
‘behaving such & such’?


 We say “poor thing, it moans”.

“Can't I in the child too, separate
the moaning from the pain. Can't
I say that I pity it because
it has pain not because it moans?

You ought I suppose to say
what you pity it because you
believe that it has pains. But
what is believing that it has
pains like, as opposed to believing just seeing
that it moans? It doesn't
here consist in believing that
he doesn't chec t. but in
a different experience.


   “Something clicked in my brain mind when
I came to this colour”. ˇ(This is a gesture) But did
you know from the clicking that
it was red. Supposing looking at
this colour your eyes opened wider
& you gave a jerk, — was it by ˇits producing this
reaction that you recognized

the colour is being red? < I saw a particular colour concentrated on it & the word red came without tention. > Indeed this
is the phenomenon we call recog-
nition but we call it that because
it happens under circumstances
where we have other criteria for
saying that we've recognized the


  “But surely there is a case in
which I'm justified to say “I see red”,
where I'm not lying, & one where I'm
not justified in saying this so!” Of course
I can be justified by the ostensive def.
or by asking the others “now isn't this
red?” & they answer that it is. But you
didn't mean this justification, but one
that which justifies me ˇprivately whatever others will say.


  “But do you mean to say that the
truth or falshood of my saying
‘I see red’ does not consist in there
being red before my minds eye in one
case & not in the other; but that
it depends on such things as ⌇ whether
I say it in this or that tone of
voice with a certain tention or without?” ⌇
So that roughly speaking
the sentence is true if it <…>


  If I say “I see red” without
reason, how can I distinguish
between saying it with truth &
saying it as a lie?


   It is important here that that I exclude the case that there
is no case there is no such case as ˇof saying the untruth by mistake.


 Hier haben wir keinen Vergleich des Satzes
mit der Wirklichkeit! (Kollationen)


  Don't I know, when I say “I
see red” & I am lying, that I am
lying?— When do I translate
my experience into the words expressing
my knowledge? One might say: knowing
that I am lying doesn't mean
saying that I do but being
ready to say it.


  I could say: Lying is characterised
by a peculiar an experience of tention. What is it
like to know that I don't see red
& to say that I do?

“Well it is simply not seeing red
& saying “I see red”! There is nothing

problematic about in this, as seeing
& saying something are utterly

“What I now call …”


  [We never dispute the opinions of common sense
but we question the expression of common sense]

  Suppose I said “I see red” & was
lying for I ˇactually saw red — but had made
a slip of the tongue.
    But which lie was it I had said,
or (rather) thought? Of course I
may say later “I wanted to say
“I see green” but did anything correspond
to these words while I said “I see red”?”

  But suppose that he felt that he
was lying but never said so, — was
did he know that he was lying or


   “Did he know that he was doing, what
we call lying?” “Did he know that
he was doing what on other occasions
he called lying?”


  What is his criterion for saying

— wanting to speak the truth, — that
he is was lying? Is there a


 Do Are these two sentences ˇto say the
same thing: “He sa[i|y]s he sees red
& realy sees red” & he sa[i|y]s he sees
red with conviction and has the experience of not lying?


  “So you think seeing red consists
in saying ‘I see red’ in a certain
tone of voice?”— No, but saying
“I see red” & seeing it might be saying
it in a certain particular tone of

  How do I imagine myself seeing
red? Don't I imagine red?// Isn't
it by imagining red?!// But how do I
imagine myself addressing a meeting?


  Imagine a Robinson lying to
himself.— Why is this difficult to
imagine? Look
    Look at something red & say to yourself “I see green” a) meaning
by ‘green’ what usually you mean
by ‘red’ (i.e. speaking the truth) b)



 But one might call it lying to
onesself if one e.g. turns ones watch
forward to make oneself believe
get up earlyer.

 Falsifying an account. I add up numbers
arrive at 2730 then rub out 3 &
put a 5 instead.


 When in this <…> we talk of
lying it ought always to mean
lying to onesself subjectively lying
& by subjectively lying to the other
person & not to onesself.

  If I see green without saying
where I see green , in what way
can these words be said to describe what I see?

 One could imagine someone constantly
lying subjectively but not objective-


 Imagine this case: Someone has a particular way if lying, he…
   He allways , [lying|lies], calling red ‘green’ &
green ‘red’, but as a matter of fact
what he says agrees with the usage
of the other people & so his lying is
never noticed. //taken notice of.//


 Supposing one said: [t|T]o see red means
to see that which makes me inclined
to describe it by saying ‘…’.
  “To know that I am lying means
to have that an experience which
I should describe by the words ‘…’.”

[Our language on the one hand has
very much more possibilities of ex-
pression than logicians admit dream of imagine &
on the other hand the uses of
it's these modes of expressions are very much
more limited than logicians they imagine.]


 What makes lying “I see red” ˇinto lying?
The subjective private experience of not
seeing red or the su private experience
of feeling a certain tention?


  Is it wrong to say that lying in
such & such cases consists in
saying so & so & feeling a tention?
    Man könnte sehr wohl sagen
daß manchmal die Lüge dadurch
characterisiert ist daß ich mir
bewußt bin daß es sich anderes

verhält, & manchmal nicht [in|so], sondern
dadurch, daß ich die Spannung des
schlechten Gewissens spüre; etc..

Wenn ich nun sage “der lügt, der sagt
‘ich sehe rot’ & sieht grün”, so stimmt
das nicht, denn ich mußte sagen “der
lügt der sagt ‘ich sehe rot’ & weißt (oder
glaubt) er sieht grün”.

    “Der lügt, der sagt “ich sehe rot” & sieht
die Farbe, die er selbst mit dem Worte
grün bezeichnen würde.” Aber das
heißt doch (wohl) wahrheitsgemäß
so bezeichnen würde. Oder können wir
sagen, “für sich so bezeichnen würde”?
     Daher ja die Idee daß man lügen
kann sondern man laut das eine &
leise das andre sagt & was man laut
sagt ist ˇhier die Lüge.

  “Der weiß, welche Farbe er sieht, der es
irgendwie ausdrücken könnte.” Was ist das
criterium dafür daß, er das es könnte?

Was soll es dann heißen : einer Farbenein-
druck wahrheitsgemäß mit ‘rot’ bezeichnen?
Paßt das Wort dem einen Eindruck besser
als dem anderen?

  Man könnte hier auch sagen
man solle ˇgar nicht von subjectiver Wahr-
heit der Farben sprechen. Die Wahrheit
des Satzes “Ich habe Zahnschmerzen” habe
nur objektiv beurteilt zu werden.

  “Das Wahre Wort kommt anders als
das falsche.”

 Man kann sagen: “Alle diese Worte
sind in derselben Weise gekommen.”


  Das Wort welches Du sprichst ist
eine Reaktion. Die Reaktion die
wir in dem Satz übersehen “er sieht
…”.— Aber ist es nicht wahr daß
der Andere nicht wissen braucht, daß
meine Reaktion in dieser & dieser
Weise vor sich geht? Er meint, ich
sage ihm geradeheraus was ich
sehe & es ist nicht so, sondern ich
erfinde eine Lüge.


    “Er weiß nicht was ich sehe, bis
ich es ihm sage; ich weiß es schon
vorher // ehe er es erfährt//.” Könnte
es auch umgekehrt sein?



  Ich habe jetzt lange mit einem Bleistift
geschrieben : wußte ich in diesem Satz daß die Schrift
grau & das Papier weiß ist?
  Wußte ich das, ? oder wußte ich bloß,
daß es ist wie es ist?


  “Ich weiß, daß ich ˇes ihm nicht geradeheraus
gesagt habe.”— “Ja, aber war nicht vor
dieser ‘Reaktion’ schon etwas da, näm
lich eben das Erlebnis, daß ich es ihm
nicht geradeheraus gesagt habe?”


 “Können wir nicht doch sagen, daß etwas
jedem sichtbar , (äußerlich), geschah geschieht & etwas ˇweiteres
nur mir wahrnehmbar erkennbar, ‘in mir’?”

“How am I justified in saying to myself that
ˇI see this apple as red”. You are not
justified.— But isn't it true that
when I say the truth I am
justified & when Iˇ'm lying I'm not justified.


  How is a ly possible in a case
where there is no justification?


  Supposing one said, lying (here) consists
in applying one word to the colour

& not another? A misleading word
instead of a not misleading one?


  I am justif. if the word comes
in one way, & not justif. if it
comes in an other way. —But in
which way?— If it comes in the
straightforward way I'm justified
But which is the straightforward
way?— I know but can't explain
as the paradigm of it is in
me.— But as far as it's in you
it serves no purpose in the
future application of the word.
(priv. ostens. def.


 How do I know that it comes
in the straightforward way?
What the str. way is must be fixed
by a paradigm.


  “Why on earth should it be wrong
to use a word not in the simple
(‘straightforward’) way?” Couldn't it not
even be my duty to use the word
which doesn't come straightforwardly?
Imagine the case where we had
laid down a code in which ‘red’
meant green.



  “I said the word with a bad conscience.”


  What troubles me are the prop. in which
an action is described accompanied by
a ‘state of mind’.

  “Lying when you say “I see red” con-
sists in saying these words &
having a private experience which
I call un ‘feeling unjustified ’, or
‘seeing green’ etc.”— “But suppose
that I call the feeling of being
justified “feeling unjustified”!?”— This Nor this
last sentence though it sounds
absurd had sense.

  “What you say comes to this: that
when you I truely say that ‘I see red’
you are I am not justified in saying this
by the a fact that you I see red”.— No
I should say ---


  “You either have a feeling of being
unjustified or you don't!”

  “But surely there is a case in
which I say ‘I see red’ & am
telling the (subjective) truth &
one in which I tell a ly!”— Yes,
that is, we distinguish between
telling the a case of telling the truth & not telling a case of not telling
the truth.— But what does lying
in this such a case, consist in? We may
thy all sorts of explanations:
“It consists in saying … & seeing green”,
“It consists in saying … & knowing that
I see …”, “It consists in saying
… & feeling that I'm not justified in
saying this” & others. Now ˇlet me ask : do
all these expl. come to the same
or do they describe different facts?
We might may can say : if they describe different
cases facts the differences are quite unimpor-
tant to us (here) don't matter to us here. For our purpose they
can ˇall be said to describe the same
fact case. (We might have said lying
consists in saying “I see red” & having
stomach ache but as stomac ache
is a priv. sens. why not rather con-
sider the priv. sens. of just seeing green a
colour other than red?) We may say
therefore that these explanations
for our purpose were no expla-
nations at all
. They left us just

where we were before, and they only (seem)
(so) confirm affirm say that the cases of lying
& saying the truth are distinguished
by ˇthe private experiences accompanying the
sentence. So let' us say ask ˇput our questions like this: lying or our case
consists in saying “I see red” & seeing
green , : What does seeing green consist
in? As an answer we immediately give
ourselves a sample of green ‘for green’. But is it
essential that this sample should
be what the others also call
green? No it might be what they call
yellow or blue or red etc.. But wou are
you inclined to say “it might be
what they call hot, cold or <…>”?
Then ˇafter all you arec thinking of games played
with the others though you left
a certain latitude ….

  When we talk of the private experiencec
which the others don't know we
originally ⇄ don't mean to talk of
a shapeless nothing but of a variable with
certain definite value.

  It is said sometimes that if I
& someone else are looking at some
objects I can never know what colours
the other really sees. But with what

right do we here speak of use ‘colour’
& seeing Some philosophers like
(e.g. Driesch) would here be inclined
to think that they can solve
the puzzle
the situation
by using the senseless
phrase “We can't know what they ˇother
” Compare Driesch :
 But the word ‘to have’ could here
only help us if it had no meaning
at all & then it couldn't help us.

But as long as ‘to have’ here
have any meaning at all it can't
help us & when it has no meaning
at all ˇI think it can't help us either.

  “We distinguish between … & …“ that
means : We some times sometimes use
the expression “I lied when I said
that I saw green” sometimes as opposed to “I
told the truth when I said ‘…’”. But
isn't this enough?— “But under what
do you use the
expression ‘…’”? But must I necessarily
stopp giving you circumstances
with when I have given you a
sample? Why not when I have given
you a word, a verbal expression?
Is the use of such an expression
necessarily indefinite as compared

with the use of a sample — ( can't a
sample be used, compared with objects, in many
different ways?


 The word lying is taught us in
a part way in which it was fastened
to a gr certain behaviour to the use
of a certain expression under certain
circumstances. Then we use it saying
that we have been lying when we our
have noticed it behaviour was not
the one like the one which first constituted
the meaning.
   Isn't in the same way we were
thought the word ‘red’ in a game
say like No1 & then we use it when
the conditions are different (compare
the past in the description of a
dream) (end of course it isn't just the word ‘red’ we use but
the whole imagery connected with it)

  “But you talk as though there
was only the word ‘red’ expr. ‘I see red’ but not
an impression corresponding to it.
On the contrary I too distinguish
don't say that when a man
says … he also has the impression

 But is all that happens that
you say ‘I see red’? Isn't
there something else being the
case, happening, when you say this
& it is true? But if you ask
isn't there something else happening,
you don't mean just anything
else e.g. that it's raining. So
after all you'll have to give
descriptions of what it is that happens you mean is happening
& insofar as you give a description
of it you must know what ˇit is that happens
& it is not an the x. And keeping it partly
unknown doesn't help you either.
On the other hand there is no
reason why you should und always
stopp with giving a sample &
not with giving a word an expression. (in this
sense one can say that an expression
acts as a picture) as much as a picture as a sample)

 The philosophical puzzle seems
insoluble if we are franc to with ourselves,
& is, ¿insoluble¿. That is 1 That is untill ˇthat is we change
our question.

  ‘Expression ˇcan always ˇbe lying’… How can we
say this of the expression to which

we fasten our words?

  “But I always know whether I'm lying
or not!” — you are first ˇnow obsessed with the
the use of
the word
‘lying’. As a rule In general you talk without
thinking of lying & of whether you ly
or not.


 But (then) I'm always either lying or
not lying! (Whether I ˇalways know it or not)


   [Is there always a link between reality
& our expressions?]

  Suppose a child learnt the word
‘toothache’ as an equivalent for it's moa-
ning & noticed that whenever it said
the word or moaned the grown-ups treated
it particularly well. The child then
uses moaning or the word ‘t.’ as a means
to bring about the desired effect : is the
child lying?


  You say : A grown-up “Surely I can
moan with toothache & I can moan
without toothache, so why shouldn't
the child be able it be so with
the child? Of course I only see

& hear the childs behaviour but
from my own experience I know whatc
toothache is (like) // I know toothache apart from behaviour// & I am led
to believe that the others ˇsometimes have
the pains I have”.— The first sentence
allready is misleading : It isn't the
question wheter I can moan
with & without toothache, but
the point is that I distinguish
‘moaning with toothache’ & ‘moaning
without toothache’ & now we
can't go on to say that of course
in the child we make the same
distinction. In fact we don't. We
teach the child t[he|o] use the
words “I have toothache” to replace
its moans, & this was how I myself too
was taught the expression. ˇHow do I know that I have learnt the word t. to mean what they wanted me to express? ˇI ought to say I believe I have t.?
  Now one can moan because one has
pains or, or e.g., one can moan on the
stage. How do I know that the
child, small as it is, doesn't already
act & in this case I teach it to
mean by ‘toothache’ something I
don't want intend it to mean?

  I have taught the child to
use the expression ‘I have toothache’

under certain circumstances ˇand now it uses these words under these circumstances.— But
what are these circumstances? Shall
we I say answer “the circumstances under which
it moaned”, and what are these?
    But now I also teach the
child to moan on the stage! That
is to say I ˇeven teach him it to use
this expression in a different game.
I also teach it to read out the
sentence ‘I have toothache’ out from
a book, when it hasn't toothache.
 In fact I could teach it to
lie, as a separate language game.
(In fact we often play this kind of
game with children)

  “But doesn't what you say come to
this that it doesn't matter what
the persons feel as long as only
they behave a particular way?”

  “But “Do you mean that you can
define pain in terms of behaviour?”
 But is this what we do if we teach
the child to use the expression
‘I have toothache’? Did I say define : “Toothache
is such & such a behaviour”? This would
obviously be entirely against This
obv. contradicts
the normal use of
th[is|e] word! “But can't you, on the other hand,

at least to yourself give an
ostensive def. of ‘toothache’.” Pointing
to the place of your pain & say
“this is …”? “Can't I give a name
to the pain I've got? Queer idea
to give one pain a name! What's it
do with a name? Or what do I do
with it? What I do with the name
of a person whom I call by the
name. I mean to say What connection
is the name ˇto have with the pain. So far
the only connection ˇso far is this that
you had toothache pointed to
your cheek & said pronounced the word ‘moo’.
“So what?” Remember what we
said about priv. ost. def.

 “But aren't you neglecting some-
thing — the experience or whatever you
might call it —? Almost the world
behind the mere words?”

   But here solipsism teaches can teach us a
lesson; It is the thought which
It is that thought which is on the way to destroy this wrong
error. For if the world is idea it isn't
any persons idea. (Solipsism stops
short of saying this & says that it is
my idea). But then how could

I desc say what the world was is
if I the realm of ideas has no neighbour. What
I do comes to defining the word world.
  ‘I neglect that which goes without


  “What is seen , I see” (pointing to my
) I point at my visual geometrical eye,
saying this. Or I point with
closed eyes & tuch my breast &
feel it. In no case do I make
a connection between what is seen
& a person.


 Back to ‘neglecting’! It seems
that I neglect life. But not
life physiologically understood but
life as consciousness. And consciousness
not physiologically understood; but
or, understood from the outside,
but consciousness as the very essence
of experience, & the appearance of the world,
the world.

Couldn't I say : if I had to add
the world to my language it would
have to be one sign for the whole of
language which sign could therefore be
left out.


  Isn't what you reproach me of
as though you said: “In your
language you're only speaking !”


 How am I to describe the way
the child learns the word ‘toothache’ —
like this? The child sometimes
has t. it moans ˇ& holds its cheek, the grownup[p|s] say
“…” etc.. Or : The child sometimes
moans & holds its cheek, — the grown—
ups …”? Does the first description
say something superfluous ˇor false or does the
second leave out something essential?
Both descriptions are correct


  “But it seems as if you were neglecting
something.” But what more can
I do than distinguish the cases of
saying ‘I have t.’ when I ˇreally have t., &
the case of saying ˇthe words without having ˇthe t.?
 I am also further ready to talk of any
x behind my words so long as
it keeps its identity.


  ---But why should I say
I have t. in his tooth”. I would
insist on his tooth being extracted. Who

is supposed to cry ˇout if it is?


  What does it mean distributing primary
experience over all subjects? Imagine
that they have all real toothaches
in their teeth. The one which now only
have. I now describe certain facts.
(Not metaphysical ones but facts
about the connection coincidence of certain experiences.)


   He gets a blow ˇ& cries,— I think: “no wonder
for it really hurts”. But wouldn't I
say to myself : Queer that he cries for
I feel the pain all right,— but he?!


 What does it consist in that I
have pain, I feel myself crying,
I hear that I am crying, my mouth


 It seems there is a phenomenon which
in general I refer to as ‘my toothache’
which, experience teaches me, is ˇalways connected
with one particular person (not ‘I’ but) L.W..
I now imagine facts other than they are
& connect up this phenomenon to
all sorts of persons so as to make
it not at all tempting to call this
phenomenon ‘my toothache’.

 Isn't it a particular phenomenon
to hear myself speak (not, ‘to
hear L.W. speak’). ---

  “I see so & so” does not mean
“The person so & so ˇe.g. L.W. sees so & so”.


 A ˇlang. game in which everybody calls
out what he sees but without
saying “I see …”. Could anybody
say that what Th I call out is in-
complete because I have left out
to mention the person?!


 A language game in which everybody (& I too)
call out what I see without
mentioning me.


  The allways know what I see. If
they don't seem to, I misunderstand
what they say.


  I am tempted to say: “It seems ˇat least a
fact of experience that at the
source of the visual field there is
mostly a small man with gray [t|f]lanel
trousers in fact L.W. .”— If Someone
might answer me to this: It is true

you you almost always ware gray
flannel trousers & often look at them.


    “Ich bin doch be[f|v]orzugt. Ich bin
der Mittelpunkt der Welt.” Denken
wir uns ich sähe mich in einem Spiegel
das sagen & auf mich zeigen! Wäre es noch richtig?
      When I say that I play a unique
role I really mean the geometrical eye.


  On the other hand if I describe
the usual appearance of my body
around the geometrical eye this
is on the same level as saying
that I see in the middle of the visual
field there is in general a brown
table & at the edges a white wall
(as I generally sit in my room).
     Now suppose I described this in
the form : The visual world in general
is like this :(follows the description). Would
this be wrong?—
Why should it be wrong?! But the question is, what game is to be played I intend to
be playing
with this sentence, e.g.,
who is ˇallowed to say it & what are the reaction
to this statement are to be, // and how in what way
are the people who hear it those to whom it is said to react // to

to this statement it //? I should like
to say, that it's I who is to
say it, but not L.W., but th
e person at the source of the vis. field.
But this I seem not to be able
to explain to anyone but me. anyone. (Queer
state of affairs) The game played
might be the one ˇwhich is in general played
with “I see so & so”.

 Can't I say something to nobody,
neither to anybody else nor to
myself? What is the criterium
of saying it to myself?

If I see a fire he runs to extinguish


  At intervals I paint what I see. But
can't someone else paint it for me? Or
the picture be presented to me some-
how, already finished?


 What, if I see before me a picture
of the room as I am seeing the room?
 Is this a lang. game?


  I want to say : “the visual world is like
this …”,— but why say anything?


  // but why say anything?//


  Der Solipsismus // Die Auffassung
des Solipsismus // erstreckt sich nicht auf
Spiele. Der Andere kann so gut
Schachspielen, wie ich kann Schachspielen so gut wie ich.

  I.e., when we play a lang. game we
are on the same level.


   “I am in the lucky position of being in the
source of the visual world field. It is I who
see it.” I have a comfortable feeling
while saying this although the statement
isn't one of the class of statement which
in general give me this kind of feeling. I
said it as though I had said I am the
wealthiest person man in the place have more
money than anyone else


  But the point is that I don't establish
a relation between a person & what is seen.
All I do is that alternately I point in
front of me & to myself.

But sure what I now see, this room this view of my room,
plays a unique role, it is the visual

   (Der Solipsist flattert & flattert in der Fliegen-
glocke, schlägt sich an an den Wanden,
flattert weiter. ¿stößt¿ sich an den Wanden, flattert weiter. Wie ist er zur Ruhe zu



 You use “--- description : this is what I know
see”. Leave out the “see”, leave
out the “now”, leave out the “this” & ˇleave out the “I”.


 “(Description) : this is the visual world”.
But why do you say visual & why
do you say that it's the world?


  “A red patch is (now) at the center”.
All others must say “I see …”. But
is this distinction necessary, as I
know anyhow who's saying it, I whether
I or one of the others?


  But the real question ˇfor me is here : How
am I defined? Who is it, that is favoured?
I But may I lift up my head to
indicate who it is?
    — Supposing I constantly change
& my surrounding does : is there still
some continuity namely by it being
me & my surrounding that were changing?! change?!

(Isn't this similar to thinking that
when things in space spacial things have changed
entirely there's still one thing that

remains the same, namely space.) (Space
confused with room)

But is my hand favoured as compared
to someone else's hand I see? ˇThis is ridiculous.
Then either nobody is favoured or
I am, that is then person L.W. whose
hand lifted.


 All right, — when I, L.W., see what's seen!


  Where is my toothache? I.e. how is its
place determined?


  “What I now see justif. me in saying
that I see red”. And what do you
now see? If the answer is “this”
it is no answer I give to myself.
The answer may be “this” but you <…>
answer I don't tell myself what it is I see.

 I don't see what I see more definitely
if at the same time I see my finger pointing
to it. (The question <…> to have been
what are you now looking at).
 I don't tell myself what it is I see
by looking at seeing my finger pointing to what
Suppose I said : “What I now see
justif. me in saying “I see red” because
it is the same colour as this sample”,

this is a justific. only if I use the
word expression “the same colour” in a fixed
way. That is when we judge how
this word is used or the ordinary
grounds of behaviour etc.


 Is the criterion for my playing
a private game of chess my
being however strongly inclined to
say that I am playing one )?


  How does one feel whether I am
strongly inclined?


  What would I say if I cam
in my priv. judgements came
into contradiction with all
other people. I.e. if I could not
longer play a lang. game with
them. Or if all the facts round
me became extraordinary? Would I stick to my judgements?


  Suppose someone asked me “What
does it mean to play a private
game of chess with oneself” &
I answered : “Anything, because
if I <…> said that I was playing
a game of chess I would be so

convinced sure that I was that I would
stick to what I said whatever anyone
else anyhow say.”
< Under what circ. would we say that he did what we
call portraying & under what circ. that he called something
portraying which we didn't call that? Suppose here we
said : Well I can never know what he does <…>
would this be anything than resignation? >


  Suppose someone painted pictures
of the landscape which surrounds it,
he sometimes paints the leaves of trees
orange sometimes blue, sometimes
the clear sky red etc. Under what cir-
cumstances would we agree with him that
he was portraying the landscape?


   We call something a calculation
if, for instance, it leads to a house being built.


   But can't he play a game with
the colournames against whatever any-
body else sais? But why should we
call it a game with the colournames.
“But if I played it I would stick
to saying that I was playing a game
with the colournames.” But is that all
I can say about it; is all that I can
say for its being this kind of game that
I stick to calling it so?

↺ We call something a lang. game if
it plays a particular role in our

human life.


 Under what circumstances would do
I say I am entitled to say that
I'm seeing red. The answer is showing
a sample i.e. giving the rule. But
if now I came into obvious constant contra-
diction with what anybody else said,
should I not say that I am
applying the rule in a way which
prevents me from playing their
game. <…> That is : is all that
is necessary that the rule I
give should be the rule they
give or isn't besides this an agree-
ment in the application necessary?


  If thehe has the having the same painsmeans
the same as “he sais saying that he one has
the same pains” then “I have the
same pain” means the same as “I say
that I have the same pains” & the
exclamation ‘oh!’ means “I say ‘oh!’”.


  Roughly speaking : The word expression of ’I have t.‘ stands
for a moan but it does not mean
’I moan’


  “t., seeing etc. I only know from myself & not from
the other.”
    “I never know that he has t., I only know
when I have it.”
     “I can only believe that he has it, that
he has what I have.”
   “Has ‘t.’ then a different meaning in my case & in
   “Isn't it possible that everybody should have
t. ˇbut without expressing it?”
   “If it is possible that sometimes one can have
‘t.’ without expressing, it is possible that
always <…> this should be so.”
    “If my personal experience is all I know
how can I even assume that there is any
other besides?”
     “Does ‘t.’ in the other mean behaviour?”
     “I ˇonly know what I mean by ‘t.’.”
     “I was thought the word ‘t.’ in connection
with my behaviour but interpreted it to
mean my pain”.
   “Only my ‘t.’ is real t.”.
 “What justifies me in saying that the other has t.
in his behaviour, what just. in saying that I have
is the experience of t..”
    “Is there only the expression of t. & not the t.?”

 “I know what it means to say that
the other has ‘t.’ even if I have no
means to find out whether he has.”


  “Only he knows whether he has t., we can
never know.”
   “Does the I enter into the personal
experience or not?”

are speaking the truth

   We aren't lying if a fact corresponds
to the sentence. This is no expla-
nation at all but a mere repe-
tition unless we can supplement
it by ‘namely this↗’ & a demon-
stration & the whole expla-
nation lies just in this demon-
The whole problem here only arose
through the fact that in this case the de-
monstration is of a different kind,

indirect that the demonstration of ‘I see red’, ‘I have t.’ seems
to be demonstr. in a different sense than the term of ‘<…>’ If say we must assume an
expression which can't lie this
can't be explained by saying, that
really pain corresponds to this


   “But aren't you saying, that

all that happens is the moaning &
that there is nothing behind it?”—
 I am saying that there is nothing behind the moaning.


  “Do you deny that the moaning is
the expression of something”. No, that
is I too should call moaning a
n expression (or even an expression of something
though this is misleading). But the word
expression here only characterizes the
lang. game played with it. I react


       “So, you don't really have pain, you
just moan?!”— There seems to be a description
of my behaviour & also, in the same
sense a description of my experience
my pain! The one so to speak the description
of an external the other often internal
fact. This correspond to the idea
that it in the sense in which I can
give a part of my body a name.
I can give a name to a private
experience. (only indirectly)
  And I am drawing your attention
to this that the lang. games are

very much more different than you
think it


 You couldn't call moaning
a description! But this shows
you how far the prop. “I have t.”
is from a ‘description’, & how far
teaching the use of the word t. is
from teaching the word tooth.


 One could from the beginning teach
the child the expression “I think
he has toothache” ˇinstead of “he has t.” with the correspon-
ding doubtful uncertain tone of voice. This
ˇmode of expr. could be described by saying that we
can only believe that the owner has t..
  But why not in the childs own
case? Because there the tone
of voice is simply determined by


   In “I have t.” the expression of
pain is brought to the same form
as a description “I have a match-
used <…> 5 shillings”.


 We teach the child to say “I
have been lying” when it has be-
haved in a certain way. <ˇ Imagine here a typical case of a ly > Also this
expression goes along with a

particular situation, facial expressions,
say of shame, tones of reproach etc.
     But doesn't the child know
that it is lying before ever I teach
him the word verbal expression? ˇIs this a metaphysical question or a question about facts? It doesn't know
it as words. And why should it know
it at all?— “But do you assume
that it has only the facial
expression of shame, e.g., without the
feeling of shame? Mustn't you describe
the inside situation as well as the
outside one?”— But what if I said
that by facial expr. of shame I
meant what you mean by the fac. exp.
& the feeling, unless I explicitly
distinguish between genuine, & faked simulated fac.
expressions? It is, I think, misleading
to describe the genuine expression
as a sum of the expression & something
else, though it is just as misleading
to say that the genuine expression
is nothing but besides a particular behaviour. //is a part. behav. & nothing besides.//
We just mistake misunderstand / get the function of our
words expressions // of language // if we by //://

We teach the child the use of
the word “to speak”. =Later it uses
the expression “I speak spoke to myself”.=
We then say “We never know whether ˇ& what
a person speaks to himself”.

The Surely the ˇdescr. of the facial expr. can be
meant (used) is used as a description of
feelings & can be meant used otherwise.
In a story we often We constantly
used such expressions as “When he
heard that he made pulled a long face” &
don't add that the expression was
genuine. In other cases we describe
the acting of a person in the same
words or again we wish to leave it
open whether the question was genuine
or not. To say that a description
of feelings of expressions used as a
description of feelings is indirect we describe the feeling indirectly by the descr. of expressions is

Imagine a lang. in which toothache
is called “moaning” & the difference
between just moaning & moaning with
pain is expressed by the moaning ¿or¿
dryc tone in which the word is pronounced.
  People would not say in this lang.
that it became clear later on that

A didn't really have pain, but they would
perhaps in an angry tone say that at
first he moaned & then he suddenly laughed.

Supposed Suppose he sais to himself “ I
lie”, how do we know whether he means
it? what is to show that he means it?
But we shwould any day time describe
this lying by saying: “He said… &
told himself at the same time that he
was lying”. Is this too an indirect
description of lying?


    But couldn't one say that if I
speak of a man's angry voice meaning
that he was angry & again of his angry
voice not meaning that he was angry
in the first case the meaning of the descrip-
tion of his voice was much further reaching
than in the second case? I will admit
that our description in the first case
doesn't admit anything & is as complete
as though we had said that he really
was angry,— but somehow the meaning of
the expression then goes beyond reaches below the surface.


 But how does it do that? The answer
to this would be an explanation
of the use two uses of the expression. But
how could this explanation reach

under the surface? It is an expla-
nation about symbols signs & it states
the in which cases it these signs symbols are
used. But how does it characterize
these the cases? Can it in the end do
more than distinguish two expressions?
I.e. describe a game with two expressions?
     “Then is there nothing under the
surface?!” But I said that I was
going to distinguish two expressions,
one for the ‘surface’ & one for ‘what is
below the surface’ only remember that
these expressions themselves corres-
pond just to a picture, not to its
. It is just as misleading to
say that there is nothing but just surface
ˇ& nothing underneath it as that there is something below the
surface & not that there isn't just the surface.
Because once the picture we use make use of the
picture of the ‘surface’ it is most
natural to use it such as to
express the distinction as that between
something on & something below the surface.
express with it the distinction as
on & below the surface.

 But // Because we naturally use
the this picture to express the distinction
as that between ‘on the surface’ & ‘below
the surface’ // But we misapply [it|the picture]
if we ask whether both cases are or
aren't on the surface.



  Now in order that with its normal
meaning we should teach a child the ex-
pression “I have lied” the child must be-
have in the normal way . E.g. it must under
certain circs. ‘admit’ that it lied, it must
do so with a certain facial expression
etc. etc. etc.. We may not always find out
whether he lied or not but if we never
found out the word would have a different
meaning. “But once he has learnt the word
he can't be in doubt whether he is lying or
Consider the case of the person
who finds that his subjective lies are <…>
jugded by the ordinary criteria, <…> truths.
He sais that he has been to school feeling
that it's a ly but the teacher ˇthe boys confirms
that he has been etc. etc.. You might say:
“But surely he can't be doubt that he
said a subjective ly”. But suppose he
said “I've been to school”

     This ˇof course is like saying that he can't
be in doubt ˇabout whether he has toothache
or whether he sees red etc. On the
one hand : doubting whether I have
the experience <…> is not like doubting
whether someone else has it. Remember
what we said about the assymetry
of the game No 1. On the other hand

one can't say that “surely I
must know what ˇit is I see” for
unless to know what I see is
to mean to see whatever I see. <…>
The question is what are we
to call “knowing what ˇit is I see”, “not
being in doubt about what it is I see”.
Under what circumstances are
we to say that a person is in no
doubt ˇor in doubt about this? (Such cases as
being in no doubt about whether
this looks red to the normal eye
& analogous one ˇof course don't interest us
here.) I suppose that to the
knowledge of what it is I see must
be the knowledge that it is so & so
I see. ‘So & so’ standing for some
expression verbal or otherwise. (But
remember that I don't give myself
an information by pointing to something
I see with my finger & saying to
myself I see this.) ‘So & so’ in fact
stands for an expression a word of a
lang. game. And doubting what it is
I see will be is doubting what lang.
game to play
ˇe.g. what to call what I
see. But there may be very different
cases of this. I may just ‘have forgotten
the name of the colour’. This means

that I can find it out by asking someone
what is this colour (pointing) called.
But this isn't an interesting case.

 Doubting e.g. whether to say “I see
red” or “I see green”. “But this is
a simple doubt about the <…>
of a colour & ˇit can be settled by asking
someone what this colour (pointing) is called”.
But are all such doubts doubts
about what people
removable by this
question (or which comes to the same by giving a definition “I shall
call this colour so & so”)?


  “What colour do you see?”— “I don't know —
is it red, or isn't it red; I don't know what colour it is I see.”— “What on earth do
you mean
What do you mean? Is the
colour constantly changing, or do do
you see it so very <…> practically black?” Now Could I say ˇthen : “don't you
see what you see ?” I this obviously would
make no sense.


 Colour: black red & white blue <…>.


 “What colour do you call: a, e, i, o or u?”— “I
don't know which colour I see?”

“Primary colours are those used in flags”

  It is queer that one never uses
brown on a flag & says it is a blend
of yellow, black & red although nobody
can really produce a proper brown
by mixing these colours.


  Is there a reason for not admitting
brown as a primary colour?
    Is it not enough that we <…>
to group it with red, blue, green, etc.?


  One sometimes thinks the reason is that we see transitions from brown to ˇpure yellow, red, black; but so we do in the case of red etc.


    Imagine all objects around us where
<…>, I mean of the appearance
of a white surface paper or which the sun
is shining, you would see ˇthe surface covered with tiny spots
of red blue green yellow


  Shall we say that a pointillist sees
the objects as he paints them?


  It seems as though, however the
outward circs. change, once the

word is fastened to a particular personal
experience, it now refrains it's meaning; and
that therefore I can now use it with
sense whatever may happen.

     To say that I can't doubt whether
[to say|I see] red is in a sense absurd as
the game I play with the expression
“I see red” doesn't contain a doubt
of this form.
     It seems,— whatever the circumstances
I always know not whether to apply
the word or not. It seems, at first
it was a move in a special game, but
then it becomes independent of this
   (This reminds one of the way the idea
of length seems to become emancipated
from any particular method of meaning it.)


   We are tempted to say: “damn it all,
a rod has a particular length however
I express it.
And one could go on
to say that if I see a rod I always
see ˇ(know) how long it is although I can't say
how many feet, meters etc. — But suppose
I just say : I always know whether its <…> looks
tiny or big!

  We learn the word ‘red’ under part.
circs. Certain object are usually
red & keep their colour, most people
agree with us in our colour judge-
ments. Suppose all this changes :
I see blood unaccountably sometimes
one sometimes another colour & the
people around me all make different
statements. But couldn't I in
all these cases retain the my meaning
of ‘red’, ‘blue’, etc. I although I couldn't
make myself understood to anyone?
  Samples e.g. would all constantly
change their colour — ‘or <…>
changing the meaning
does it only seem
so to me?’ “Now am I mad or have
I really called this ‘red’ yesterday?”


  The situation in which we are inclined
to say “I must have gone mad!”

  “But we could always call a colour-
impression ‘red’ & stick to it this appli-


   Die Atmosphäre man die dieses Prob-
leme umgibt ist schrecklich. Dichte
Nebel der Sprache sind um den proble-
matischen Punkt gelagert. Es ist bei nahe
unmöglich dazu zu kennen zu ihm vor-


  Suppose I said had before
me drawings of what I &
other people now see & I said
of the drawing of what I see “there
is something unique about this


   If I can speak about ‘what is
seen’, why shouldn't anyone else
speak about it?— But I have a feeling
that only I can; if I assume that
others also speak about what
normally I should call my visual
image there seems to me to be something

wrong with this assumption.
   If ‘what I see’ has nothing
to do with a particular person
why should I feel that there's
something wrong in assuming that
anybody might talk about it i.e.
mean it when he speaks? Then of
course I can't tell them what
I see nor they me what they
see any more than I can tell
myself what I see.
   But they could make <…>
as to what might happen in future
in our visual field.
     In the normal game I
say : “I don't know what they
see, — but in the game I'm con-
cidering they would as much
know what I see as my hand
can wri[g|t]e down what my mouth
can say.
    And their ˇdifferent conjecture would
be like conjectures made by
myself at different times.
   Can my mouth tell my hand
what I see in order that my hand
should be able to write it down?



    Do I by painting what I see
tell myself what I see?


     “This picture is <…> unique, for it
represents what is really seen”.
   What justification do I have to
say this // What is my justification
for saying this?//


  I see two spotts on this wall
& lift two fingers. Do I tell
myself that I see two spots?
But on the other hand couldn't
this be the sign that for my
seeing two spots?!

Ist das Bild ausgezeichnet oder
zeichne ich es aus?


  “Today he points to me, & yesterday
he pointed to me also.”


  The meaning of : “He points [to|at] me.


   “I see that he points at A”
   “I see that he points at me”


 You seem to be able to give
yourself a sort of ostensive explana

tion of what the word expression “What
is seen” refers to.

   Imagine a game: a group of people
tell each other
A tells B what B
sees B tells A what A sees
person tells the other what he
(the other) sees if he has guessed
it rightly he is rewarded. If A hasn't
guessed correctly what B sees
B corrects him & says what it is
he sees. This game could be like
is more instructive if we imagine
the persons not to say what is
seen but to paint it or ˇto make
models of it. — Now let me imagine
that I am one of them. pl. the
    Wouldn't I be tempted to say
: “The game is asymmetrical, for only
what I say I see corresponds to
a visual image.


  The [P|p]roblem lies thus : This ↗) is
what is seen; & this is also what
I see.


 Frage Dich : Kann das ↗) nur ich sehen,
aber kann es auch ein Andres sehen?

Warum nur ich?


  Für mich existiert kein Unterschied
zwischen ich & das↗; & das Wort “ich”
ist für mich kein Signal, das einen Ort
oder eine Person hervorhebt bezeichnet //eines Orts oder einer Person//.


  Ich versuche das ganz Problem
auf das <…> nicht verstehen <…> der Funktion
des Wortes ‘Ich’ & ‘↗’ zu reduzieren


  When I stare am at a coloured object
& say “this is red” I seem to know
exactly to what I give the name
red. As it were to that which I am
drinking in.

It is as though there was a magic power
in the words “this is…”.


 I can bring myself to say : There
is no toothache there ↗ (in the
man's cheek who says he has tooth-
ache ). And what would be the expression
for this in ordinary language?
Wouldn't it be my saying “I have
no toothache there”?


  “But who says this?”— “I!” And who says

this?— “I!”---


 Suppose I give this rule: “Whenever
I said ‘I have t.’, I shall
from now on say ‘there is t.’”.


  I tell the waiter bring me always
clear soup & thick soup to the
others. He tries to remember my face.
    Suppose I change my face (body)
every day entirely, how is he to know
which is me. But it's a question
of the existence of the game. “If
all chessmen were alike how
should one know which is the king?”
   Now it seems that, although
he couldn't know which is me, I
still could would know it.
    Suppose now I said : “it wasn't
so & so, it was I asked for
clear soup”, — couldn't I be wrong?
Certainly. I.e. I may think that
I asked him, but didn't. Now are
there two mistakes I can make :
one, thinking that I asked him,
the other, thinking that I asked
him? I say: “I remember having asked
him you yesterday”, he replies: “You weren't
there ˇat all yesterday”. Now I could say either

“Well then I suppose I remember
wrongly” or: “I was here only I
looked like himc yesterday”.


   It seems that I can trace
my identity quite independent of
the identity of my body. And the
idea is suggested that I trace
the identity of something ¿dwelling¿
in a body the identity of my mind.



  “If anybody asks me to describe what
I see
, I describe what's seen.”


  What we call a description of
my sense datum, of what's seen, indepen-
dent of what is the case in the physical world,
is ˇstill a description for the other person.


 If I speak of a description of my sense
datum I don't mean to give a parti-
cular person as it's possessor.
   (No more do I want to speak about
a particular person when I moan with


   It must be a serious & deep-
seated desease of language (one
might also say ‘of thought’) which
makes me say : “Of course this ↗)
is what's really seen”.


“property of space”



   I can tell you the fact
because I know that p is the
case. But It has sense to say
“it rained & I knew it” but not
“I had toothache & knew that I had.
“I know that I have toothache”
means nothing or the same as
“I have toothache”.
    This, however, is a remark about the
use of the word “I”, whoever uses it.


  Examine the prop. sentence statement :“There is some-
thing there”, referring to the visual
sensation I am now having.

  Aren't we inclined to think that this
is a statement making sense & being
true? And on the other hand, isn't it a
pseudo statement?
   But what (what entity) do you
mean (refer to), when you say that
sentence?— Aren't we here up against
the old difficulty that it seems to
us that meaning something was a
special state ˇor activity of mind? For it is

true that saying these words
I am in a special state of mind,
I stare at something, — but this just
doesn't constitute meaning.


 Compare with this such a state-
ment as :“surely of course I know what I
am referring to by the word toothache”.


 Think of the state frame mental state of mind in which
you say to yourself that p∙~p
must does make sense & by repeating
a statement of this form you are <…>,
as it were, ˇby introspection trying to find out
what it means.

The state phenomenon of staring is closely bound
up with the whole puzzle of solipsism.


   “If I am asked ‘what do you see?’, I
describe the visual world.” — Couldn't
I say instead of this “…I am
describing what's is there↗” ˇ(pointing before me)?

But now consider the case of
someone having a picture before him
of the part of his room he ˇis seeing & that he's
saying:“ this in the picture is like
this (a part of his visual field, as he
is looking at his room).”