1

    Wenn wir uns fragen; worin besteht
der Eindruck, den uns ein Wort macht,
so denken wir zuletzt daran das, was wir
sehen, wenn wir das Wort anschauen. Wir
nehmen an das Bild des Wortes selbst
sei ziemlich nebensächlich & der Eindruck
liege irgendwie hinter dem Wortgestalt Wortbild. Und diesen
Fehler machen wir immer wieder. Aber die
Gestalt eines Wortes, das wir — wie alle
Wörter der gewöhnlicher Sprache — unzähli-
ge male gesehen haben, macht uns einen
tiefen Eindruck. Denke nur an die Schwie-
rigkeiten, die wir empfinden wenn die Recht-
schreibung geändert wird. Solche Änderungen sind als Sakrileg empfunden ¿worden.¿ Freilich nur
gewisse Zeichen machen uns einen tiefen
Eindruck, andere nicht. Ein neu erfun-
denes Zeichen etwa “ ⌵” für oder kann
ohne in uns etwas aufzuregen durch
ein beliebiges anderes ersetzt werden.
Denke daran daß das geschriebene gesehene
Wort uns in ähnlicher Weise vertraut
ist wie das gehörte. Denke an Esperanto & wie seltsam es uns anmutet einen Ausdruck der Herzlichkeit in dieser Kunstsprache <…> übersetzt zu hören. Wir könnten ja auch nicht der Händedruck willkürlich durch ein anderes Zeichen des Abschieds ersetzen. Das hängt damit zusammen, daß wir bei der

2
uns das Gefühl der Trauer als etwas
hinter den Empfindungen des Weinens,
schweren Atmens etc. etc. vorstellen
& diese geneigt sind als etwas Nebensäch-
liches zu vernachlässigen.
    Auch hängt das mit der Frage zusammen
ob der Eindruck ˇder Ausdruck des Gesichtes
gesehen
wird oder hinter dem gesehenen
gefühlt. Denke an
& …




     

    Wenn wir in gewöhnlicher Schrift einen
englischen Satz lesen, so fühlen können wir
dabei eine wohlbekannte Erfahrung
Empfindung oder Erfahrung haben.
    Was heißt das: “Wir haben da eine
ganz bestimmte Erfahrung”?!! in wiefern bestimmt?
    Lies einen Reihe gewöhnlicher ˇetwa englischer
Sätze in gewöhnlicher Schrift. Du wirst dann
die Erfahrung des Lesens empfinden, näm-
lich eine fortlaufende, ˇquasi gleichbleibende, Erfah-
rung


     

    Worin besteht die Ausdruck eines Gesichts,
eines Worts.


     

    Ein ‘bestimmter’ Eindruck, im Gegensatz
wozu?

    ‘Das Gesicht hat einen bestimmten

3
Ausdruck; — im Gegensatz wozu?
    Man kann die Aufmerksamkeit auf
den Ausdruck des Gesichts heften.
Was heißt das[,|?] Was tut man da? Es
ist ähnlich [wie|als] wenn man es plastisch
sähe.


     

    Ist der Ausdruck zum rein [v|V]isuellen
addiert? — Nun, weißt [d|D]u daß er addiert
ist? — Also ist der Fall verschieden
von dem im welchen ich etwas sehe &
zugleich Schmerzen im Magen empfinde.


     

    “Wenn Du diesen Strich machst, so
ändert das den Ausdruck des Gesichts
ganz”.
    “Wenn Du diesen Strich ziehst so ändert
sich der Ausdruck dieser Tiere ganz”.


     
Nehmen wir an ich sage: der Eindruck
(Ausdruck) ist durch unsere Attitude
zu dem Bild bestimmt. Wechselt diese
durch einen ˇneuen Strich so ˇsagen wir es wechselt der Ausdruck.
    Was aber an dieser Erklärung wesent-
lich ist sehen wir daran daß wir verschiedene
Annahmen mache können. Wir können z.B.
annehmen unser Gesicht mache immer ein
gezeichnetes Gesicht nach. Aber es genügt
auch wenn wir annehmen, daß ein neuer

4
Strich die die Art & Weise ˇetwa der Weg [Ä|ä]ndert wie unser
Auge immer wieder über die Zeichnung
gleitet.


     

    “Ein Punkt an diesen Ort ändert den
Ausdruck, aber ein Punkt hier ändert
ihn nicht.”


     
“Früher war der Ausdruck freundlich, jetzt
ist er traurig”. Heißt das: ‘ich weiß daß
ein trauriger Mensch so aussieht &
ein freundlicher so”?


     
Man könnte sagen: durch diesen [P|S]trich
wird unsere Erfahrung beim Sehen des
Bildes in einer anderen Weise geändert
als durch einer ‘nichtssagenden’ Strich
& diese Anderung ist ähnlich der
welche geschieht wenn durch den
Strich die räumliche Erscheinung der
Zeichnung geändert wird.


     
Es ist das Wort ‘bestimmt’, welches
wir verstehen müssen.



     
Ich lese etwa eine Reihe gewöhnlicher
Sätze & beobachte mich dabei selbst.
selbst
Ich merke, ich tue “etwas ganz
bestimmtes”, d.h. immer ungefähr das Gleiche.

5

    Es ist, als sagte ich: Wenn ich schreibe
tue ich immer ungefähr das Gleiche. D.h.
ich bewege meine Hand immer in ungefähr
der gleichen Weise.


     

    Vergleiche die Familie de[r|s]<sen> Sch was man
‘Schrift Schreiben’ nennt mit der Familie ‘Lesen’.


     

    Wir fühlen das Gleichbleiben der
Erfahrung.



     
Änderung der Interpunktion verglichen
mit einer Änderung der Zeichnung die
den Gesichtsausdruck ändert. (“Der
Schülero sagt der Lehrero↙ ist ein Esel.”) Nicht ein
Wissen ist es daß uns die Änderung
bedeutsam erscheinen läßt.



     

    Gegensatz der Ausdrücke. —
    Gegensatz: Ausdruck — kein Ausdruck



     
Das [e|E]ine ist: Die Besonderheit des Ein-
drucks verführt uns <…> zu der Frage:
was ist das wesentliche des Lesens.
    Das Andere: Ich muß die Rolle des
typischen Beispiels klarer machen.
Nämlich: die Rolle die es spielt wenn

6
ich
die Erklärung gebe spielt: Das
ist jedenfalls ein typisches Beispiel —
einer Regierung, des kulturellen Verfalls,
d[e|a]s [r|R]afin[ierten|ement] des Geschmacks[,|.]

     Zuerst glaubt man nämlich man
rede von einem Gemeinsamen & dann
es ist das Ideal dieses anzugeben
darzustellen. Dann aber ist das
Feststehende nicht mehr ein Gemeinsames
sondern ein Beispiel. (Sozusagen ein
Zentrum der Variationen.)



     

    Die geschriebene Wörter einer ˇmir geläufigen
Sprache sind mir wohlbekannte Gesich-
ter. Und sie zu lesen ist mir sind
mir wohlbekannte Erlebnisse. Wenn
ich gefragt würde, was tue ich ˇbesonderes wenn
ich die Wörter lese, müßte ich sagen:
ich sehe sie & spreche sie aus. Und die
Hauptsache des Erlebnisses liegt in
der Wohlbekanntheit der Wörter. Aber
diese Wohlbekanntheit ist eine besondere
im besondern Fall sie ist ˇz.B. nicht das
Erlebnis der Wohlbekanntheit eines
Gesichts & hier gibt es ja auch verschie-
dene Fälle. ˇGeläufige Schrift zu lesen ist ein besonderes
Erlebnis anders z.B. als etwas zu Buch-
stabieren oder eine graphische Darstellung ablesen etc.

7


     

    “Ich weiß nicht, das Wort kommt mir auf
einmals so fremd vor”. —


     

    Es ist ganz abgesehen von Lesen eine
andere Art des Erlebnisses, wenn der
Blick über ihm geläufige Wortbilder
gleitet als über fremde.


     

    Was heißt das: “das Lesen einer uns
geläufigen Sprache ist ein ganz beson-
deres Erlebnis”?
D.h. wir haben beim lesenden
Durchlaufen der Zeilen ein Erl
gleichförmi-

ges
Erlebnis, & es unterscheidet sich vom
[d|D]urchlaufen beliebiger anderer Formenreihen.
Es wäre auch unrichtig zu sagen, daß
das Lesen einfach darin bestehe, daß wir
Zeichenreihen durchlaufen & uns dabei
Laute einfallen. Denn wenn ich die Reihe
durchlaufe & lasse mir dabei
laute Einfallen — was ganz leicht ist — so ist
das doch kein Lesen. Es ist anders ob ich
‘a’ lese & ausspreche, als wenn mir derselben
Laut bei
einfällt.
    Und diese Art des Erlebnisses ist
charakteristisch für jedes fließende Lesen
alles dessen was wir für gewöh<n>lich ‘Schrift’
nennen; aber nicht für das ‘Lesen’ überhaupt.


8


     

    Vergleiche ‘Lesen’ & ‘Bild’. Auch
in diesem Fall ein eng begrenztes Gebiet
an welches wir vorerst denken, dann
aber ein Drang der uns in immer weitere
Ferne zieht.


     

          Kreise







     

    Regel Glied eines Systems.


     
Eine Regel verstehen heißt manchmal
das System verstehen. Was aber heißt das?
In welchem Falle sagen wir es
verstehe Jemand das System
dieser Befehle? Er reagiert
auf Glieder des Systems in bestimmter
Weise; er kann das System erklären.
Wie tut er das?


     

    “Es ist eine Einstellung sich dem Befehl
wie er auch laute mag hingeben’.
    Beispiel des sich leiten lassens.
Die Hand leiten lassen. Maschine.



     
Betrachte einen allgemeinen Satz, wie “die
Regel leitet uns, wenn sie das Glied

9
eines Systems ist”! Was sind die Beispie-
le
dafür? Wie gehen sie in die Umge-
bung über?



     
Man könnte sagen Wenn wir die gewöhnliche
Schrift lesen geschieht immer ein & das-
selbe & man könnte sagen: beobachte
doch was geschieht & Du wirst sehen
worin das Lesen besteht. Du hast sozu-
sagen [s|Z]eit genug um es zu beobachten.
    Nun was sehe ich da?
       (Da ist etwas interessant: daß
man nicht im Stande ist ein uns gel geschriebenes
oder gedrucktes
Wort anzusehen ohne es zu lesen.)
    Ich gehe mit meinem Blick der Zeile
entlang & schon das geschieht nicht so
wie wenn ich ihn einer beliebiger Reihe
von Bildern entlang führe (ich rede hier
nicht von dem was experimentell durch
Darstellung der Augenbewegung fest-
gestellt werden kann)[,|.] [d|D]er Blick
gleitet möchte könnte man sagen besonders
[R|r]eibungslos & doch nicht flüchtig widerstandslos ohne hängen zu bleiben & doch rutscht er nicht (die
Wohlbekanntheit der Wortgestalten, — anders
wieder wenn man von rechts nach links liest).
    Dabei geht ein ganz unwillkürliches ‘Sprechen
in der Vorstellung’ vor sich. Und so verhält es sich wenn
ich deutsch, englisch, franz., & gedruckt,

10
geschrieben in lat. Schrift oder gothischer
Schrift lese.
    Was aber von dem allem ist für
das Lesen als solches wesentlich?
Nicht ein Zug der in allen Fällen von Lesen
vork[o|ä]m[m|e]en<.> müßte.


     

    Verstehen
     Bedeutung
     Denken
     Erwarten
     Wünschen
     Fürchten
     Glauben
     Überzeugung














11

     

  <A> “Warum nennst Du diese beiden
Farben ‘rot’?” — <B><B> Weil eine gewisse
Ähnlichkeit zwischen ihnen besteht.”



     

    Was heißt es “diese beiden Farben
sind ähnlich”; — wie gebraucht man diesen
Ausdruck?


     

    “Die beiden Farben haben ein Element
gemeinsam & das nenne ich ‘rot’”.


     

    A “Diese beiden Farben sind doch sehr
ähnlich”. B: “Ich finde sie sehr verschieden”.


     

     A: “Ach darum!”


     
Warum nennt man das Suchen im
Gedächtnis ein ‘Suchen’?


     

    Warum nennt man eine Stimmung “trübe”?
    Wie wenn man sagt, “weil beide ˇdas Wetter & die Stimmung uns
denselben Eindruck machen”?
    Ist es nicht [b|B]esteht die Gleichheit des Eindrucks ˇnicht zum Teil gerade darin daß wir
geneigt sind in beiden Fällen das gleiche Wort
& in ähnlichen Verbindungen zu gebrauchen?
Auch darin daß wir das Wort im gleichen
Ton sagen.


12


     

    “Ach Sie sind's!”


     

    (Die Problematik der Philosophie
ist die Problematik des Witzes.)


     

    Wie ist es wenn sich uns ein Vergleich
aufdrängt? Etwa der des ‘Suchens’
im Gedächtnis.


     

   Das Wort ‘gleichsam’. “Er schaut gleich-
sam trübe aus”. “Ich möchte immer
sagen ‘trübe’”.


     

    Eine geistige Spannung. Wir würden wahr-
scheinlich sagen sie sei etwas ähnlich
wie eine körperliche Spannung.
      “Nun weiß ich ˇauch warum ich das
immer ‘eine Spannung’ nennen wollte.” (Ich
habe etwa herausgefunden, daß dabei
gewisse Muskeln gespannt sind. —
Aber das wußte ich eben nicht als ich
geneigt war es Spannung zu nennen.)








13

     



     

    “Wenn wir in beiden Fallen von ‘trübe’ ‘schwarz’ rede,
so gebrauchen wir das Wort in verschie-
dener Bedeutung.” — Was ist das
Kriterium für den Gebrauch in versch.
Bedeutung?



     
Wie würde ich die eine Bedeutung von
der andern absondern?



     

    Oder auch: Wie weißt Du das? oder
besteht der Gebrauch in versch. Bed. eben
darin? Was willst Du sagen?


     

    Ich würde nun als Erklärung [v|V]er-
schiedenheiten der beiden Spiele aufzählen hervorheben.
    In der einen z.B. legt man etwas Schwarzes
an das andere um zu sehen ob die beiden

14
gleich sind im andern Spiel ist dies nicht
der Fall. Es heißt also mein
Satz: Wenn Du das Wort
‘schwarz’ in beiden [v|V]erbindungen
gebrauchst so kann ich Dich
auf andere Verschiedenheiten in
der beiden Spielen aufmerksam
machen.


     

    Darauf aber gäbe es keine Antwort,
wenn nun jemand sagte “aber ich
nenne, was Du zwei Spiele nennst, ein
Spiel”.


     
[|But ][W|w]hy do you call speak both of physical
& mental ‘strain’?” — “Because they
have a certain similarity, they have a
common element.” Whatt is this common
element can you point to it as you
¿pointed in¿…? Can you say anything
more about it than that it is the
element of strain? If not, it was no expla-
nation to say

    “It is a certain tention.” That doesn't get us
any further, for why do you talk of tension
in these different cases.
    “A certain feeling of tention accompanys is part
both experiences”. Are you not just translating
what you said before, into other language

15
or are you actually referring to an experience
like that of ˇfeeling your heart beat[.|,] Thus I could
as you could say that this feeling accom
is a constituent both of certain sensations
of fear & of hopes joy.


     

    “But why should we call both experiences
a strain if there was no similarity between
them?” But cann't the similarity just
consist in this that you feel are inclined to
use in both cases the same metaphor,
the same expression.


     

    And we are not only inclined to
use the phrase a deep sorrow & a deep
well but very often to accompany both
by the same gestures & to say them in the
same tone of voice.


     

    “There is something in common between the
two experiences only I don't know what”. Well
this too characterizes your experience &
when ˇI should say when you'll ˇsay that you know what is in common
between them your experience will be different.


     
To say that you use the same word ‘strain
in all the different cases because of a
similarity is all right if you wish to distinguish

16
this case from the case of the word ‘bank’.
The riverbank & the moneybank are
not so called because of any similarity.



     

    “But isn't there a particular experience
of similarity which you have when you
compare physical & mental strain; just
the experience you don't have when
you compare a riverbank & a money-
bank?”


     

    But do you also experience a simi-
larity between this similarity
other similarities? For what makes you
call this a similarity (if you think
there al[l|w]ays must be something to
make you call a thing what you call it).


     

    Concider uses of the word similar:
We say these two pieces of paper have
similar colour if it is difficult for us
to distinguish themˇ to say which of them is darker. Now compare the ex
experience of difficulty to say which is
darker with th[at|e] experience of similarity when it is impossible
ˇnot to distinguish them but when I say I
like my trousers & jacket to have similar
colours so as not to have to strong
a contrast.


17


     
ˇ“The feeling of [F|f]amiliarity ist a feeling of at-homeness.”


     

    Arent my chairs etc. familiar to me
& do I always have [t|a] feeling of at-
homeness when I see them?


     

    “But what else does it mean ‘that
you are familiar with them’?” I am not
surprised to see them; I should on
being asked, say that I s[ay|ee] them
every day that I have sat in them 100ds
of times. I could describe on what occa-
sions they were used & tell you a lot
about them. All the experiences wi[th|ch] go
along with saying these things & the
experience of doing so we can call expe-
riences of familiarity.






     
“Why do we call all these different experiences
exp. of strain?” — “Because there is a common
element in them all.”

     

    I can imagine a case in which this kind of answer
is certainly correct: Say I call all kinds of
states of excitement in which I feel the blood
rush up into my head congestional exp.,


18


     
Nor is it true th should we say that
whenever we feel a strain all the expe-
riences of strain have a common element?


     
‘Perhaps we had better say that they
are all similar in some respect similar.’


     

    Do you mean there must be a common
element, or there actually is one.
    If the latter, what makes you say ‘there
is a common element’? “


     
There seems to be a difference between this case
& that when we say “well, we
call this colour ‘red’ because it is red.”
I.e. we seem to use the word ‘strain’
here in a derivative sense, as opposed to
a direct sense.


     
What does it consist in to use a word
in a derivative sense? “In this that its
derivative [S|s]ense is not the same but only
similar to the direct one.” —


     

    There is something very queer in the prop.
‘when we look at a well known word
we have a particular sensation’
    “When we ponounce the words ‘and’, ‘if’
etc. we have peculiar sensations”.

19
↓ 648 “When we understand a<n> ˇordinary word like ‘tree’,
‘table’, we have a peculiar sensation”
    As opposed to what”.
The word ‘and’ <= +> gives me an different sensa-
tion from the word “and” = “‘and”



     

    I can, as it were, direct my attention to
the sensation. “The face
has a peculiar
Expression”.
    The question is: is [t|w]hat you call
the peculiar expression bound up with this
¿face¿ or could a different face have
the same expression?


     

    “This face gives me a peculiar impression,
the same impression which the other one
gave me”.
    “This face can & the other make me
smile”


     

    “These faces make a particular impression
on me which I can't describe.” What does
it mean ‘I can't describe’? Is there
anything to describe? What is this impossibi-
lity of describing like? For there are many
different cases. And in one ‘I can't describe’
is really a grammatical remark.


     

    “I had a definite sensation a moment ago

20
& I have it now”.


     

    “I'm seeing this as a ship now, whereas
I always say it ˇjust as a decoration be-
fore.” — “But what's it like to see
it ‘as a s[p|h]ip’”. “I can't describe”.
“But what made you say you saw it
[|]as a ship[|], what made you use this
expression?” — “I saw as it were how
the sails were inflated by the wind.” —
“But did they look as though they
bulged more?” — “[n|N]o, I just had a feeling
of & these words suggested themselves
for it.”


     

    When you say, you have a definite
[F|f]eeling which you can't describe, is this
a peculiar experience, don't you
always have a some definite feeling? Isn't
all you want to say something like: “I
feel very interested now.”


     

    We must do with thes expressions
something similar as with such ex-
pressions as “war is war!”


     

    The [F|f]orm of the expression “I have
a particular feeling which I cann't des-
cribe” is misleading.

21

    It would be just like saying “every-
thing has a particular peculiar charakter”.


     

    “A chair has a particular character
about it.”

     

    Aber ist nicht ein Unterschied zwischen
den Dingen die eine gewisse Wärme um sich
haben & denen die uns fremd sind?


     

    Man kann doch von Dingen reden die uns,
sagen wir, häuslich anmuten.


     

     Ich kann auch ein bestimmtes
gezeichnetes Gesicht einmal als das
Gesicht des so & so sehen & einmal
anders.


     

    “Jeder der geschriebenen Buchstaben hat
einen eigenen Charakter”. Das meint man aber
nicht im Gegensatz zu den gedruckten oder
zu denen einer andern Schrift.


     

    <Vergl.> “Jede dieser Wohnungen hat einen besonderen
Geruch.”


     

    Könnte man also Zeichen ohne Charakter
& Zeichen mit Charakter unterscheiden?


22


     

    Kann ich aber darum sagen, daß ich
die Buchstaben mir jeder ein bestimmtes
Gefühl geben? Es könnte so sein,
beim einen würde mir warm beim andern
kühl, — aber muß es so sein?
    Es kann das Erlebnis des ‘be-
stimmten Charakters auch bloß da-
mit bestehen daß man mit bestimmten
Tonfall sagt “er hat einen bestimmten
Charakter”.


     

    Das Wort als ‘Ausdruck des Gefuhls’


     

    “Er legt alles Gefühl in dieses Wort”.



     
Wenn man einen Gegenstand ab-
zeichnet ist man geneigt zu s<a>gen:
“er hat (oder die Krümmung hat) einen
ganz bestimmten Charakter”. Und man
ruft sich z.B. das Gefühl, Erlebnis,
dieses Character immer von neuem
vor. Das Erlebnis mag nun z.B.
darin bestehen daß uns ein Wort ein
Gegenstand vor dem Geist tritt, das wir
eine bestimmte Geste, ein bestimmtes Gesicht
machen. Aber auch daß uns nur
die Worte kommen: “diese Kurve hat
nämlich einen ganz bestimmten Charak

23
ter”. Und das ist eigentlich nur eine
Betonung der Kurve selbst. D.h.
es has die Multiplizität einer Be-
tonung dessen was z.B. beim Sehen des
Gegenstands erlebt wird.


     

    Wenn man der Ausdruck die Geste für das
Gefühl sucht findet so findetc sucht man auch
ein neues Gefühl.
    Es ist nicht wie wenn man etwa
nachschlägt was ‘Trauer’ auf Russisch
heißt.


     

    “Eine [E|e]rinnerungsreiche Gegend”. Formen
sind manchmal assoziationsreich. Aber
kann man den Assoziationsreichtum ein-
geführt nennen?


     

    “Er hat das Lied ausdrucksvoll ge-
sungen”. — Kann man fragen “mit welchem
Ausdruck?”?
    Wenn man fragte: “[w|W]orin bestand
es daß er ausdrucksvoll gesungen hat”,
so käme darauf etwas von der Art zur
Antwort: “er hat z.B. dies Stelle … so & so
gesungen & nicht, z.B., so …”. Aber diese Fest-
stellung hat eigentlich eine ganz andere
Multiplizität als die erste, denn sie
ließe sich nicht auf ein anderes Lied an

24
wenden das ausdrucksvoll gesungen
wurde. Es so Die Erklärung könnte
sein: “ausdrucksvoll ist es wenn es
so gesungen wird wie es ich es mir ge-
sungen wünsche.”


     

    “Wenn man dieses Gesicht ansieht, wird
einem warm.” Wenn man fragen würde:
“wird Dir wirklich warm”, würde er sagen
“nein, nur bildlich gesprochen”.


     

    “Eine warme Farbe”


     

    “Ist weiches Wasser nur bildlich ge-
sprochen ‘weich’ oder im eigentlichen Sinn
des Worts?”


     
Denken wir uns jemand würde statt von
einem ‘rötlichen Blau’ von einem ‘roten
Blau’ sprechen & sagen das [w|W]ort “rot”
sei hier in übertragener Bedeutung
gebraucht.



     
Nun glaubt man aber sagen zu
können: Es kommt einfach darauf
an was Du mit dem Wort meinst; meinst
Du das was geistige Anstrengung & kör-
perliche Anstrengung mit einander

25
gemein haben so brauchst Du das Wort
in beiden Fallen in der eigentl. Bedeutg.;
wenn nicht dann hat es in ˇden beiden ver-
schiedene Bedeutung & man kann von
direkter & übertragener reden.


     

    Aber was heißt es das meinen was den beiden
gemeinsam ist? (Ich kann Beispiel gehört hierher doch nicht daraus
zeigen.) Heißt ‘das Gemeinsame meinen’
in diesem dem Fall nicht einfach ‘beides
meinen’?


     

    Denke, man sagte: “Man nennt das
siedende Wasser & das Blut des Menschen warm,
weil ‘warm’ das heißt, was beide Wärme-
grade gemeinsam haben”.


     

    a) Wenn gefragt wird was haben diese
Bilder gemein so zeigt man einen Fleck
ˇmit einer Farbe die in beiden vorkommt.
    b) Wenn gefragt wird was haben die beiden
Farben gemein (z.B. ein rötliches blau & ein rötliches gelb)
so zeigt man einen Fleck mit gelber Farbe.
    Hier sieht man wie verschieden man das
Wort gemeins “das & das gemeinsam haben”
gebrauchen kann. Und keiner der beiden
Arten ist direkter oder richtiger!


     
Man könnte nun z.B. sagen mit

26
‘gelblich’ meine ich was der beiden Farben
gemeinsam ist & ich tue es indem
ich mir dabei etwas gelbes vorstelle.


     

    “Man meint was den beiden gemeinsam
ist wenn “man <an> das denkt was ihnen
gemeinsam ist” aber wie tut man
das? Wie Denkt man z.B. an das
was den Buchstaben R & B gemeinsam.
Daran denken heißt manchmal
darauf zeigen, es sich vorstellen
u.a..


     

    “Denke an das was allen Pflanzen
gemeinsam ist!”.


     

    “Ich nenne beides eine ‘Anstrengung’, weil ich damit das meine, was beiden
gemeinsam ist”.


     

    Die Aufgabe die [W|V]okale nach ihrer
Dunkelheit zu ordnen ist in vielem ganz
analog einem sogenannten mathematischen
Problem.



     
“Warum nennst Du das ‘rot’?” —
“Ich dachte Du nennst ‘rot’ alles
was diese Farbe gemeinsam hat”.

27

    Dagegen kann man sagen: “[i|I]ch dachte
Du nennst Schmetterlingsblüten alles
das was so eine Blüte trägt.”.
    Auch: “Ich dachte du nennst ‘rötlich’
alles was diesen Ton gemeinsam hat”.


     

    Man könnte auch Ich meine nicht
daß man den Ausdruck “diese beiden
Farben haben das → (auf eine Farbe zeigend) ge-
meinsam” nicht gebrauchen kann. Man
könnte z.B. gefragt was zwei Schattie-
rungen von Rot mit einander gemein haben
auf das reine Rot zeigen. Aber was das
heißt muß erst in einem Sprachspiel fest-
gelegt bestimmt werden. Man könnte z.B. nun nicht
fragen: “Ist es wahr, daß sie dieses Rot mit
einander gemein haben?”


     
“Warum nennst Du das [|]Schmerz[|]?”
— “Nun daß heißt ‘Schmerz’.”
“Warum sprichst Du von einem seelischen
Schmerz?” — “Weil es wie ein Schmerz ist.”


     
Sprachspiel: ‘Hell’ & ‘dunkel’ wird an Farben
erklärt & verwendet. — Dann sage ich:
“Ordne die Vokale nach ihrer Helligkeit”.
    Hier würden wir von übertragener Bedeutung
reden.


28


     

    Philosophieren besteht darin daß
einem Beispiele in der rechten Reihenfolge
einfallen.



     

    Denken wir uns jemand würde sagen: “Die
Wörter ‘hoch’, ‘tief’ sind auf Töne
in ihrer ursprüngl. Bedeutg. angewandt;
das ist auch im Fall von ‘hoch’ & ‘tief’.”


     
<Je>[M|m]an<d> lernt die Farbwörte ‘rot’, ‘grün’ etc.
für die reinen Farben gebrauchen. Dann
zeigt man auf einen Haufen von
rötlich & grünlich blauen Stücken &
sagt: “sondere die roten von den grünen.”
War das Wort in der ursprünglichen oder
in einer anderen Bedeutung gebraucht worden.
    Man könnte hier sagen: Wenn Du mir
aufgetragen hättest einen roten Fleck zu
malen so hätte ich nicht diese Farbe ge-
malt.


     
In einem Fall fühlen wir, wir gebrauchen
eine Metapher, im andern Fall, wir
gebrauchen das Wort in direkter Weise.


     

    Worin besteht der Unterschied dieser
Erlebnisse?
    Wir sehen den einen Gebrauch als

29
etwas Abgeschlossenes an. Handelt es sich
hier um zwei klar getrennte Erlebnisse?
Das Erlebnis, ‘schwarz’ zu nennen,
was schwarz ist; & das, ‘schwarz’ zu
nennen, was gleichsam schwarz ist? —


     

    Ich könnte mir denken, daß Einer gewohnt
nur von ‘körperlicher Anstrengung’ zu
reden sagte: “das Denken ist gleichsam
eine Anstrengung.”.


     

    Könnten wir uns aber nicht auch diesen
Fall denken: Es kennte einer die rote
Farbe nur von der Gesichtsfarbe her;
er wollte nun die Farbe eines Apfels
beschreiben & sagte, der Apfel sei ‘gleich-
sam rot’. Wer das sagt denkt etwa
an Gesichter.


     

    “Der Himmel ist gleichsam blau.”


     

    “Das Gesicht macht einen dunkleren Eindruck
obwohl die Hautfarbe in Wirklichkeit heller ist.”


     

    Denke an die Menschen die, wenn sie einen angeschlagenen
Ton nachsingen sollen die Quint davon
singen. Ist die Quint nun der gleiche Ton oder
nicht?

30


     

    Ich könnte mir einen Menschen denken
dem man gelehrt hätte färbige Ge-
genstände durch malen zu kopie-
ren & der den Himmel immer weiß
kopierte. D.h. ich könnte mir, irgendwie,
leicht denken, daß ich es selbst so
machte. (Indem ich sozusagen eine
andere Projectionsmethode anwenden)


     

    “Er hat gleichsam eine dunklere
Stimme” — “Warum sagst Du nicht ein-
fach ‘er hat eine dunklere Stimme? sie
ist doch dunkler”. — “Aber dunkler
nennt man ja eigentlich diese Bezie-
hung zwischen diesen beiden Farben.
Z.B. das ˇ(zeigend) ist dunkler als das.” —
“Ja, aber dies seine Stimme ist auch
dunkler als die des Andern.”


     

    Man kann sich denken, daß ein Ge-
sicht dunkler aussieht, als das andere
obwohl seine Hautfarbe nicht dunkler
ist.


     

    Könnte man aber in diesem Falle
umhin von zwei Arten des Gebrauchs
zu reden?


31


     

    “Why do you call this ‘blue’?” — There
is no ‘why’ to it if you're referring to
a reason. —


     

    But there is also this case: “I call
this blue because in daylight it
looks blue.”
    But also: “I call this blue because
it is almost blue”.


     

    “What [D|d]o these two colours have
in comon?” — What sort of answer do
you want? For imagine these different
games: ---


     

    The capacity of solving philosophical
problems is the capacity of remembering
the right examples <(>in the right order<)>.
//of calling to memory the right examples.”//


     

    “Why do you call this a [|]strain[|] too?”
Because it has something in common
with bod[y|i]ly strain. — “What?” — I don't know
but there is obviously a similarity.


     
Then when you said the two experiences had
something in common this expression just
compared this case with that when one
primerily speaks of common elements between

32
two things. (¿Nr¿)


     
(If philosophy deals with it's own method
where how is it can does it come to an
end at all, how is it bounded? It<s>
is bounded domain field is that of circumscribed by limited by the field of our philo-
sophical troubles. It only devices
remedies of for mental troubles & where
such troubles actually don't arrise (as a matter of
psychology) it has nothing to say there is no job for philosophy.)


     

    It was ˇthen no explanation just to say
that the similarity consisted in the
occurrence of a common element.


     
Now shall we say that you have a feeling
of similarity if you compare, say, physical
& mental strain?


     
If you say you have let's hear some
more about let us ask a few questions about this feeling.
    Would you say it was lokated in this
or in that place of your body?
    And when is it present? ˇPerhaps you say When you compare
physical & bodily strain[.|,] but comparing



     

    |(This face has no real expression, no
meaning, it doesn't klick.)|


     
<is a complicated activity & do you have>

33
the same feeling throughout the whole activity?



     
Perhaps you say: ‘Anyhow, if I have com-
pared & say they are similar I mean what
I say & this too is some sort of mental
event & perhaps the feeling of similarity
is the feeling you have while you say the
word ‘similar’ meaning it.


     

    Pronounce the word ‘similar’ ˇin a sentence very slowly
meaning it & see if you realy have one
feeling accompanying it from beginning
to end
. But shurely it is a different experience
if I say similar & mean it & if on the other
hand I say it without meaning it.


     

    It is no more true that you have
one peculiar feeling corresponding
to the meaning of ‘similar’ as it
would be to say that you have one
peculiar facial expression when you
say it. Although on the other hand
there will probably ˇbe one some particular facial expressionˇs with which you often say the
word but you won't always have it when
you say (& mean) the word (meaning what
you say) & the same facial expression
will accompany other words & phrases too.


34



     

    It is often useful for us to speak about
gestures & <,> facial expressions & the like instead
of of the experiences bound up with them.


     

    What have these two figures in common
?




     

    Beispiel von dem der auf der Befehl
Dinge ihrer Dunkelh. nach zu ordnen
auch die Vokale ordnet.


     

    Ton des Befehles ordne die Töne nach
ihrer Dunkelheit & gewöhnlicher Ton.


     

    Man ist versucht zu sagen er muß
etwas anderes unter ‘dunkel’ verstanden
haben.
    Vergleich mit einem anderen Instrument
nach dessen Ablesungen er alles
ordnet.
    Aber ein solches Instrument nicht
vorhanden. Es muß vorhanden sein,
heißt daß wir entschlossen sind
dieses Bild zu gebrauchen.


     

    “Aber es ist doch gewiß eine anderer
Sinn von dunkel der wir hier gebrauchen.”

    Was soll das heißen?
Unterscheidest

35
Du hier den Sinn von Gebrauch & willst
sagen daß wenn einer das Wort so
gebraucht daraus folge, daß auch
anderswo etwas anderes vosichgehen
müsse, oder werde. — Oder willst Du nur sagen
dieser Gebrauch sei doch ein anderer als
jener?


     

    Bist Du nun zufrieden wenn ich die
Unterschiede in den [B|b]eiden Fällen aufzähle.
Oder muß ich noch etwas anderes zuge-
benstehen.


     

    Wie, wenn jemand sagte: “das sind doch
verschiedene Arten des Gebrauchs von
‘rot’”. Ich würde sagen das eine ist hell-
rot das andere dunkelrot, aber warum
soll muß ich das verschiedene Arten des
Gebrauchs von ‘rot’ nennen?


     
Aber besteht die Verschiedenheit Andersartigkeit des
Gebrauchs noch in etwas Anderem als
in den Verschiedenheiten die [ich|wir] aufzäh-
len können? Denn gewiß in einem Fall
lege ich etwa farbige Flecke zusammen
& vergleiche sie indem ich bald den einen bald
den andern ansehe, ich halte sie vielleicht
in ein besseres Licht; ich male eine Farbe
die heller ist als eine andere u.s.f. u.s.f. Im

36
Falle der Vokale fand kein solches
zusammenlegen, malen etc. statt.



     

    Aber ich sehe doch daß die Relation
zwischen einem helleren & einem dun-
kleren Stück Stoff eine andere ist
als zwischen ein dem e & dem u.
Wie ich anderseits sehe daß die
Relation zwischen u & e die selbe
ist wie die zwischen e & i.


     
Ob Du die Relationen dieselben
oder verschiedene nennt, das
hängt wohl davon ab<…>, wie Du sie
vergleichst.
    Ist → dieselbe Richtung wie ←
oder sind sie entgegengesetzt.
    Spiegel
Entsprechende Umstände können
uns veranlassen zu sagen die Re-
lationen sind verschieden, andere, sie
seien die gleichen.


     

    Es ist hier wie mit der Fortsetzung
einer Reihe. Intuitionismus.


     

    “It isn't only that you use the
word red for this colour but you use
it with a particular experience.”

37

    “[e|E]xperience when we use a word in
a derivative sense.” Tone of voice in
the order “now arrange the vowels
in order of their darkness”.



     
Now it cannot be doubted that


     

    The tone of voice may be, all things being
equal, the decisive experience?



     

    He sais & meant it sounds as thoug two
activities ˇhere ran parallel.


     

    But surely there is a difference between
saying something & meaning it, & saying it
without meaning it. There neednt be a
difference while he says it & if there
is a difference ˇthen this may be of all sorts
of different kinds according to the
surroundings [s|c]ircumstances.
    It does not follow from the fact
that there is what we call a friendly
& an unfriendly expression of the eye that
there must be a difference between the
eyes of a friendly & of an unfriendly face



38



     

    Suppose one said: “this line can't
make the face look friendly as
it could be belied by other lines.”


     

    Under these circumstances we
call this activity reading. If he
does it we say he is reading & if
we order him to read & he does it we
are satisfied.
    Under these circumstances we
call this picture of his eye a friendly eye.
    Under these circumstances this
was what saying & meaning it consisted
in.


     

    In a large group of cases believing
something is the same or something
very similar to uttering expressing your be[f|l]ief.


     

    Wh All the circumstances of which
make believing intersect in the present
moment.


     

    Now is he meaning it when he says it or isn't he?




39




     

    “I said it & meant it.” — How did
you do it? —


     

    Compare meaning: “I shall be delighted
to see you” with meaning “the train
goes at 3'30”


     

    There are certain mental events experiences expressions charakte-
ristic von of believing i.e. there is a large
group of cases in which they together
with other factors constitute what we
call believing. But because the
mental compon these first componen¿ts¿
arent present in all cases of belie-
ving you mustn't conclude that
any of the others is.


     

    Compar[i|e]ng lying about the train
with lying about being delighted.


     

    It is even possible while lying feeling
feeling quite strongly what is usually
felt when one means sincerely what
one says.


     

    And at the same time one justc refers
to ˇjust these feelings ˇsometimes when ones says I
sa[y|id] it and meant it. I.e. wh one would
mention these feelings as characteristic

40
for ones meaning what one said. And
if anyone said “But these same
feelings could also have been
present if you hadn't meant it”
one could answer: “not in the kind
of case this was”.


     

    “He was very friendly, he smiled at
me most kindly”. — But he might have
done that & felt unfriendly.


     

    “This is a frien<d>ly face, look at the eyes”
— But these ˇsame eyes would not be friendly in
another face. “Still in this face they are
friendly”.


     

    Should we say “under these circumstances
I call this reading” or “under these
circumstances I regard this as carrying
out my order read” etc.?


     
One remembers just that feeling
when one sais I meant what one
said, although etc.. This feeling then
stood out it is a question just whatever
one had it or not[,|.] And those circum-
stances which would could have contradic-
ted this feeling don't come ˇhere at all into
question.

41

    I would perhaps abov be ready
to say in this case that I
meant by ‘I meant it’ I had this
feeling.


     

    And there are cases where I
would be ready to give such an explana-
tion of ‘I meant’ & cases like that
of ‘the train leaves at 3'30’ where I might
say “well I just said it, why shouldn't I
have meant it”.


     

    Nobody We very often find it impossible
to think without speaking to ourselves
half aloud; <> & nobody would asked
to described what happened in this case
would ever say that something,
the thinking, accompanied the
speaking where they not tempted seduced to do so
by the existence of the two verbes
thinking speaking & thinking & there
use in many of our common phrases.
    If anything can be said to accom-
pany
go with the speach it would be something
like the modulation of voice means of expression.
But does the Ausdruck accompany
the words in the sense in which a
melody accompanys them?


42

     
Wir zählen nur eine Verwandschaft
zwischen der Dunkelheit der Farbe &
der Laute.

     
And this brings me
ˇOne thing is important If you say when I say
“blue” I have a particular expe-
rience, the word comes in a par-
ticular way you don't trouble
to think of (the) many different
experiences while saying the
word ‘blue’ & the word ‘three’


     
And this brings me to the following
point: When I am asked what makes you say

     

    Das gleiche Bild kann Vorstellung
von Verschiedenem sein. Die Umge-
bungen sind verschieden.
    Der Gebrauch, die Atmosphäre



     

    But moreover, the difference between
observing & acting does not at all
necessarily consist in a difference
in every moment or phase of the
action. Exactly the same may
happen in th during the action

443
but the surroundings will be
different. Moving in different circles.
Different atmosphere.

     
Es denkt


     
Absence of the experience of
saying “Oh thats where it's going
now”.


     
“Of course we aren't surprised as we do
it ourselves!”
    We take as the criterion of
doing it ourselves the absence of surprise.


     
One might think the absence of sur-
prise comes from knowing beforehand
what one is going to do.


     

    Involuntary speach “[s|S]top!”, “Oh”,
“Help!”
    Like blinking ones eyelids or raising
a Hand for to protecting [the|ones] face.


     
|Speaking as sombodys friend, doctor,
speaking as a private person, as a university
lecturer|. One might think that whenever
a man speaks he speaks as someone.|


44


     

    Involuntary
                         = without effort
                         = with an effort to the contrary
                         = unpremeditated
                         = it would have been impossi-
ble to stop it
                         =
    Is moving ones fingers in Exp. No ¿¿ involuntary
should we call it so?
    Is breathing voluntary


     

    Should we say that when we shout
“Help!” there is no act of volition,
whereas when we say “Hallo!” to a
friend there ist?


     

    Compare the cases when you raise in
your hand with ˇan effort
     or without move it ˇwithout effort in a particular
curve (say writing a letter in the air)
     or after deliberating whether
you lift it or not you ‘find yourself
lifting it’.


     

    Ordinary speaking is called volun-
tary not because there is a
particular effort present the act of will.





     

    Premeditated acts

45

     

    If against my will I shriek with
pain th[a|e]t overcoming of my will is not
like the overcoming of a muscular
effort.


     

    One might say “surely shrieking with
pain is a good exampl of involuntary
speaking because here so far from
there being an act of volition which
worked the speaking not only there is no
act of volition by which we speak
there even was
one against it. I should say: Certain-
ly I too wshould call this involun-
tary speaking. But the effort is
also absent in most cases of voluntary
speaking.
But in most of what we
call voluntary speaking I d

<And> I agree that an act of volition
preparatory <to> or accompanying the
speach, is absent if by act of
volition you refer to ˇcertain acts of intention ˇpremeditation or
effort. But then I don't see either
of these
in many cases of voluntary
speach I don't feel an effort, in many
there were not premeditated & as to intentions
sometimes the intended unintentional
action is characterized as such by
an experience of surprise in others
the intentional is characterized by
a spoken or imagined ˇexpression of intention.

46


     

    

    “All that happens is that I get out of bed”.
    “All that happens when I mean it
is in this case that I say it”.
That is to say: I don't call it ‘mea-
ning what I say’ because of any
peculiar experience which I have
while I say it. not because of
<…>
But what is a peculiar expe-
rience? Isn't the absence of an experien-
ce an experience? Yes but we don't call
the absence of a feeling a feeling or the
absence of pain a pain. It is certainly
sometimes misleading to say: “Not
the presence of something characterizes
this case but the absence of something”.
But when we are inclined to look
of out for a sensation it makes sense
to point out that in such & such a
cases we dont find a peculiar sensa-
tion but we do in the opposite case.


     

    In a great many cases the difference
is not one <…> lying in the action
or an accompanyment of it, but
in the surrounding circumstances
the environment of the action.

47

     

    It is as though I said “these
two people move in different circles”
does not mean that they are never
surrounded by exactly the same
people, e.g. when they walk in the
street.


     
A kind & an unkind expression might
look exactly alike only what
goes before & after as may be different.


     
Our tendency is to describe
something that is a matter of
atmosphere ˇround a situation as in a too primitive
way as a difference in the situation.


     
Thus one says: “something peculiar
happens when the name of a colour
comes, something different when the
numeral comes.” But we have no reason
at all to say this. But I aggree
that the surroundings of these
two are different.


     
Why do you say “something does
happen when I understand a word!”.
Do you remember that the same
thing always happens or do
you know that one of, say, four

48
things happen?
< “Es drückt etwas aus. Es sagt mir etwas.” >

     


     

    One face reminds you of someone,
one strikes you as Chinese, one makes
you think of an illustration you
have seen.


     

    I'm seeing this as a face as opposed
to seeing it as a wineglas in a round
hole.
    And when you change over from
the one to the other you change
the ‘attention’ & you look at it with a
different face.


     

    Look at W, alternatly as a W and
as an M upsidedown. How queer that you
can comply with this order. And what
do you do to comply with it?

49
“I see it resting on the upper end”.
But what does that mean? Arent there
lots of possibilities? & isnt one
of them that you read it M instead
of W?


     

    Do I get all sorts of impressions
from these figures and ˇall along see them as
faces?


     
And how about a real face, — does one see
that too as a face always?
    Is it correct to say that if we
dont see it as something else we have
one particular attitude towards it?
    And don't (or do) you look in a par-
ticular way at everything you look
at? Or: couldn't you look at everything
in several ways? Look at your tea kettle
& see it's spout as a nose. —


     

    Do you wish to say this soap has
a particular smell as opposed
to no particular smell; or that it has
this smell as opposed to another one
or both the first & the second.


     

    We are tempted to ask: “What does
seeing something as a face consist

50
in?”
    And we feel tempted to ask:
“does it consist in anything ob-
viously superadded to the mere
seeing of the strokes, or is there
only a ‘seeing it as a face’ as
distinguished from seeing it as
something else?”


     
Are we aware of to seeing a table
ˇwhich we see ‘as table’?


     

    Suppose I said “I am in a parti-
cular bodily position now”; What
happens is that I am concentra-
ting my attention to the particular
sensations I have in this situation.

     

    Ich sehe auf an einem Kleiderhaken
einen Rock & eine Kappe aufgehangen,
sie machen mir — bin ich versucht
zu sagen — gleich einen ganz bestimm-
ten Eindruck. Aber vergleichen wir den
Eindruck eines Pelzrockes & mit dem
einer Regenhaut, eines neuen glatten
Rockes & eines alten schäbigen. Ein
Hals macht einen andern Eindruck
als ein Gesicht & einen anderen machen
Füße. Aber diese Eindrücke erhält

51
man nicht immer wenn man diese Dinge
sieht. Kann man dagegen nicht sagen, :
wie ich den Rock gesehen habe, habe ich
ihn sofort als Rock gesehen, noch
ehe ich irgend einen besonderen Eindruck,
etwa der Wärme oder Weichheit hatte?


     
Aber bist Du sicher daß Du eben
nicht bloß diese bestimmte Form
des Rockes, gesehen hast, — , — & freilich
nicht mit [s|S]taunen, nicht mit der Frage
“was ist das?” u.dergl.?


     

    The answer to the question “how does
he enter the<…> room?” might in this case be
a picture showing him entering the room.


     

    “The word ‘red’” — we are inclined to say —
“comes in a particular way, namely in this
way.” But <>in this way<> ˇhere this only means: he <it>
comes in the way it he comes.


     

    It is as though calling it a particular
feeling when one sees red ˇstill had makes sense although
the feeling was to be bound up with seeing
red.


     
We use the word “particular” here as
an emphasis whereas it seems that

52
we use it transitively &<,> in particular<,>
reflexively.


     

    You think you compare it with a pa-
radigm & it agrees or it fits into a
mould ready for it in your mind. But
in your experience no such ¿mould¿
or comparisson enters there is only
this shape not any other to
compare it with & you, as it were,
say “of course” to it<.> ([b|B]ut not be-
cause it fits anything, but be-
cause of no reason.).



     
You lay You are laying an emphasis on it but you
express this in a form which tempts
you to believe that makes
it seem that
you are recogni-
zing it
.



     

    Instead of saying “it comes with
a particular experience” you should
have said: I concentrate my atten-
tion on the way it comes or on its
coming” (compare ‘I draw the way he
comes into the room)



     

    The word in this case comes with
a particular experience should
in this case mean ‘it always comes

53
with the same experience’, but you arent
ready to confirm that! So why are you
tempted here to use the phrase?
while contemplating the way it
comes? Because you are contempla-
ting it. You thereby lay an emphasis
on it.


     

    If you try to see what it is you
are comparing it with you should
be inclined to say that you compare
it with itself.
    And this is a most characteristic
situation.




     
The way can't in this case be separated
from him



     
Now if I whished to draw him coming
in & was contemplating his coming
in I should while doing so be
inclined to say to myself & repeat: “He has
a particular way of coming in”. But
the answer to the question “What is
this way?” would be “it's this way” (per-
haps drawing it. But there may be
no such answer & my phrase may

54
only mean: “I contemplate
his position”.
    Our expression on the other
hand made it appear as though
his position was not characte-
rized by anything but itself.


     

    We very often use the reflexive form
when we wish to ˇlay an emphasi[z|s]e on something
& its meaning & such expressions
can then always be straightened
out: Thus we say a man's a man
     à la guerre come, à la guere.
    If I can't I can't. <,> <I am what I am>
    that's that.
    Take it or leave it.
    I either rains or it doesn't rain ˇThis is no piece of information; if
it rains wes shall ¿---¿
<ˇThere must be a greatest Number of examples
let it be 500.>


     

    “If the length of the one is L the length of<…>
the other is L”. This is a Form of various props.
but not itself a prop. But we could
say: “If ˇLet us put ‘L’ instead of ‘length’<:> we put ‘L’ then
they have the same L.
    But it makes sense to say: “Let us con-
sider props. of the form “if A has the length
L so has B”.”


55


     



     

    “Denken wir daß der Radius r zwei
Verlängerungen habe”; — aber das ist
ja wirklich möglich! Wir machen keine
absurde Annahme.


     

    Stelle Dir diesen indirekten Beweis
so vor daß das was bewiesen wird nicht
offenbar zu Tage tritt sondern durch
eine Kette von Transformationen
versteckt ist; & ich zeige dann
daß wenn dort ↗ ein Spalt klafft
auch da ↙ einer sein muß. Man denke
sich einen complizierten Mechanismus
der zwischen zwei Stellungen vermittelt.


     
Der Beweis zeigt die Inconvenienz der
Fortsetzung daß der Radius zwei
Fortsetzungen haben kann.
    Der Widerspruch den der Beweis
ergibt ist harmlos.


     

    Aber die Annahme erscheint auf

56
den ersten Blick absurd. Aber
wenn sie ˇwirklich absurd ist dann
kann man sie nicht machen.



     

“The two measure L feet” is the general form
of a prop of saying that they have
a particular length in common.


     

    “This face has a particular Expression?
    I'm inclined to say this when
I'm letting it make it's full impres-
sion on me.
    And this is something like letting
it govern you (sich ihm hingeben).
    It is then as though I wished
to say what this expression consisted
in & really this is what one does when
one wants to find the right expression.


     

    The question “What impression expression does
it have here” means, I wish to get
its full impression.


     

    “But surely, this face has a pe-
culiar expression!” What does this mean?

57
Has it got something? Isn't it something?


     

    It would be interesting to imagine beings
which consisted in of nothing else than a
circular stroke & four two eye strokes &
nosestroke & one mouthstroke & whose move-
ments consisted of in movements changes
of shape of these strokes.

     

    Ich hebe es hervor!
    Es ist als machte ich eine Stampiglie
davon.


     

    Philosophizing is an illness & we are
[d|t]rying to describe minutely its symptoms,
klinikal appearance.


     

    “It couldn't be just these strokes! You'-
re obviously comparing them with
something else you know. There is
something behind those strokes!”


     

    To say ‘it has the expression’ makes
it appear as though I could
separate the expression from the
face.


     

   “You won't tell me that this tune
doesn't express something particular”.

58

    Does this mean that you make
particular movements to it?
But particular movements as
opposed to which?


     
“But these movements also
express something, they aren't
just movements!”


     
Supposing you said: “You won't
tell me that this tune hasn't
a particular r<h>ythm”! — “Why, of
course it has a particular
r<h>ythm, which tune hasn't.
    It here seems as though the
peculiarity must consist
in our recognizing it as this
rhythm which we have know
from somewhere else. But
this may be a delusion & it
has just its own rhythm but
a rhythm which strikes you, say
makes you sway.


     

    “It says something” could in this
case be translated into “it speaks
to me”.



59

     

    Als müßte ich diesen Ausdruck (
des Gesichts) noch irgendwo anders
wiederfinden!)


     

    <Oder> [Ich|ich] frage “Was drückt es denn
aus?” und will doch eigentlich keine
Antwort
    Es heißt eigentlich es has Ausdruck
es ist ein Gesicht



     

    Eine Zahl als J<a>hreszahl sehen



     

    There are experiences of [F|f]amiliarity.



     
“This is a serious face” — What is it
that is serious



     

    Does it mean that it makes me serious,
that it has such & such an effect
on me?
    And if eating a soup has this effect
do I call it serious? And [k|c]annt a
smiling face somehow make me feel serious?


     
On the other hand: does a ‘serious face’

60
always strike me as serious?


     

    Supposing ˇI got its impression if I imitated
it! (This can still easier be
imagined if it were is the posture of a
man
which I imitated.)


     
How is it that this kind of picture

[k|c]ann look serious & not this
?

What ‘can't’ is this?! Is it a hypothesis
to say this can never look serious?


     

    But can't a chair look serious? “But
not in the sense in which a face does” —
What does this mean?


     

    If looking at it so that you get its
expression consists in imitating it,
what has the expression, the face on
me? Is it the face insofar as it
has a certain effect?
    What is heavy the balance or the
weight?


     

    How can I be sure that lengthening
the mouth is what makes it look serious?
Are any experiments needed for that?


     

    Do I see it by introspection? Is

61
it selfevident?


     

    Isn't it that I measure the picture
by a different kind of instrument;
weigh it on a different kind of
balance.


     

    Does Harmony treat of our feelings? Is
it psychology?


     

    Is it a delusion consisting in “projec-
ting
” our own feelings into the thing
we see? Is there such a case of
projecting? Where do we take this
idea from?


     

    Is <…> ˇthe sugar sweet, or do we project
the feeling of sweetness into the
sugar?

     
Es ist als wäre jede Art & Weise des
Lebens etwas was beim Sehen gegenwärtig
ist. Als wäre jeder mögliche Kontrast
eine Färbung.
Als hätten wir zuerst
das ˇoffenbar reine Sehen & dann träten verschiedene

andere Erfahrungen hinzu.


     
Es ist als bestünde der Eindruck eines

62
Gesichts aus so & so vielen Teilen, dem
rein Optischen, dem Gesichtsausdruck
etc..


     

    “A word (particularly a well known
one) has”, we should like to say
“a particular expression (facial expression)
. It isn ˇWe don't just see it we feel some-
thing — or all sorts of things — when we
see it.”
    This is almost as if one said
“if I see red I have all sorts of feelings,
the feeling of the absence of green,
of blue, of yellow, etc. etc.”.


     

    It is as though we saw a face
first purely visual then in addition
to that as a face then in addition
to that as a Chinese face & in
addition
to that as a well known
one.


     

    Now we can imagine ˇadditional processes
corresponding to each such case
but these are not ‘directly percieved’.

     

    The word that has a peculiar expression.
What do you contrast it with? Can you


63




     

    Would you think about it as you do, if
you did not know something about
the optical aparatus of our eyes?


     

    It is as though I had necessarily got
to say that I distinguish elements
in the seeing of a face or a word.


     

    Should I say “This eye sparkles” or
that Iˇ, as it were, sparkle when looking at it.
    Should I say that the lines of the
drawn cube recede or that, as it were,
I recede when looking at them?
    Should I say “this aspect sparkles” or
“This drawing seems to sparkle in this
aspect”?

     

    Die Wörter sind wohlbekannt; worin be-
steht ihre Wohlbekanntheit?


     

    ↘668
If I look at the word ‘this’, e.g., it
looks well known familiar to me, it looks at me
with a familiar face, like an old acquain-
tance. — But does it always? Am I always
¿touched¿ when I see it?
    Do I remember to have seen it
before. Did you say to it “Oh, that's the

64
word …”?

     

    You are looking at this ‘as
a face<…>’! As what are you looking
at it? Can you show me that as
what
you are looking at it?




     

    Seeing the word ‘That’ gives me the
feeling of familiarity whereas seeing
the word ‘continuity’ doesn't give
it to me. But does the first word
always give me that feeling?


     

  Look at a word & let it seem
familiar. Then look at one of
its letters & ask yourself
whether that also seemed fa-
miliar (gave you the feeling of
familiarity) when the word as a
whole did. And on the other hand
the letter is, of course, familiar
too.


     
p⊃p = T            (p⊃p)∙q = q
     T∙p = <…>p
     p⌵T = T         p∙q ·⊃· p = T

(p∙q ⊃ p)∙r = r            (p∙q⊃p (p∙q)∙p = p∙q

65
<
     (p∙q)⌵p = p            p∙q = [q|p]
                      p⌵q = (p∙q)⌵p = p
                      ~p⌵q >
~(p∙q)⌵p = T           

                             p⊃p⌵q
(~(p∙q)⌵p)⌵(p∙q) = p∙q
                             pP·⊃·Q = T

     ⊢(p⊃q) = p     ~p = ~p∙q =       ~p∙~q = ~p
     ⊢p      ~p⌵q = ~(p∙q)⌵q = p∙q⊃q
     ⊢q                    ~(~p∙~)q = ~p
                             p⌵q = ~p
     q ·⊃· p⌵q = Log.


     
Where a logical prop. has a ˇmain ·⊃· we may infer
the right hand side from the left.


     

     ~~p =p Can we deduce this?


     

     p⌵p = p



     


q·⊃· p⌵q = ~q ·⊃· p⌵~q

66

     
<> When I read a line of a writing
in a well known language ˇtrying to see what reading consists in I get
a particular experience which I
take to be the experience of
reading.



     

  This experience doesn't simply
seem to consist in seeing & pronoun-
cing but in some ˇother, as it were, some kind of inti-
mate experience exp. of intimacy. We are on an intimate ‘footing’ with the words.


     
The ˇspoken words we are inclined to say
come in a particular way &
in fact they ˇthe ¿written ones¿ themselves don't appear just
like any skratches.
And at the
same time I seem unable to get hold
of that ‘way’. The process phenomena of reading ˇout the word seems
we, are ¿incl. to s. i.t.s.¿, surrounded enshrouded by a particular
atmosphere.
    But here again I don't mean to
say that I recognize this atmosph.
rather I notice it when in philoso-
phizing I read a line.
    And here again it is as though
I didn't notice it & did notice it.


     

    It is the atmosphere of contemplation
which I provide. And of course I see
what I see.

67

    Look at a written word, say ‘read’.
It isn't just a skribble its ‘read’. I
should like to say it has no definite
physiognomy. But what is it that I really
am saying about it[!|?]! What's this
statement, straightened out?! It falls
[I|one] am is tempted to explain, into a mould
of my mind long prepared for it. But
as I can't see any souch mould; this
simile can't mean must mean that my
experience is one of putting something into
a mould when I don't see the mould but
just feel it.


     

    Knowing what a thing is

a hat
a spectroscope
a piece of [k|c]ole
an ‘A’       etc.
some rubbish etc.


     

  What do we contrast all the different
experiences of familiarity with?


     

  Experience of familiarity added?
It is misleading dangerous to say that the
experience of seeing a face is a compound
one.


     
“This word now somehow looks queer
to me”.

68

     
We wish to say “it's that other thing”,
& yet


     

   It looks at me & I wish to
say “it looks at me in this way”!


     

   I can't say “I see this as this face”
but “I see this as a face”.

     

  Woher aber die starke Versuchung?

     

    “This isn't just a skribble, but it's
this particular face”



     

  I am tempted to say “I don't
see this as a face, I see it as this
face!” …


     

  Suppose I said “I see this s[k|c]ribble
like this”, — this would mean
something like: What at one time
appears to me like this, at another
appeared to me like that



     

  My language What I say predicates something
but I don't really wish to predicate
anything, I don't want to say I

69
look at this in such & such a way
which can be described without re-
ference to this.


     

    In fact I don't want to say
anything about it but I want
to say something to it.


     

    This proposition, in what game can I
use it? I seem to have construc-
ted a game & yet havent done
so.




     

    Why do I say what I say? What
[D|d]o I contrast the word with of which
I say it has a particular essence? Or
dont I contrast it with anything? because
<For> that shows me what game I'm playing
with it. For, what is the use of this
phrase? Do I say it of everything I see
or only of certain shapes or of anyone
when I contemplate it in some special
way?

70


     

    The word … isn't just skribble, [I|i]t's
this. (And if I say ‘this’, I let the
word make an impression on me, look
at it in a peculiar way.)


     
Now when I say there is particular
atmosphere about my reading a sentence
what do I contrast it with? What
is it that I notice?
Am I noticing that there is the
same tone throughout or one tone as
opposed to another tone?
    Do I oppose the experience to seeing
some s[k|c]ribbles & saying words as they
come into my mind looking at the
scribbles in turn?



     
Now is it very easy to describe differen-
ces in ˇbetween these two cases but difficultist
possible of all to specify differences which
between what is happening in the moment of saying
the words.


     

    I don't know this sign properly, Ich kenne mich in dem Zeichen nicht aus. the
other I know. What is the difference while
I look at then.


71


     

  “I notice that the same thing happens
throughout” — What, seeing word scribbles &
speaking? — “Not that alone there
is something else in the a particular
something particular about the way
its done. I don't know what it is but
there is something happening?
    All right, but let us see what it
signifies that you don't know what happens
& still know that something particular
goes on.
    For are you looking for that
which really happens? Have you a
method of finding it? I Are you
attempting an analysis? And what are
your means of analysing?
    If not, let us look at the
actual state of affairs. We have
just to take this as the description
of this state of affairs that you
notice something going on & don't know can't say
<.> it is.


     
For the word expression that the words came
in a particular way was misleading. You
dont even know what kind of thing the
word “wayc” alludes to. I doesnt for
instance allude to a process
of deriving the spoken word. If anything

72
one might use it as opposed to
other ways for instance ˇthat of thinking
of any ˇspoken word to associate with
the written one. Or the way is a lack
of ¿any¿.


     

    If you say you know that some-
thing goes on, while are you ever clear
that th[at|is] something might just
be the absence of anything?
    Perhaps a certain smoothness.
[a|A]gain the familiar look of the words.


     

    But nothing of which we can
enumerate is anything that you should
care to call the process of reading.


     

    Do you notice anything? Don't you
just direkt your attention on your rea-
ding. You look at how you are
reading, but









73

     

  Beobachte die spezielle Beleuchtung
die jetzt gerade in Deinem Zimmer ist, merkst
Du sie?? “Beobachte die bestimmte
Farbe Deiner Wand!” Ja wie solle was soll ich
(es) denn tun? Was Soll ich nur in
bestimmter intensiver Weise auf die
Wand schauen? oder nur dabei etwas sagen???

    “Look at the difference between
the colour of the chair & the colour of
the wall!” Well what about it
    “Look at the peculiar character of this
writing!”


     

    [|]Don't I notice something when
I observe myself reading?’
    But what could you notice?!


     

    “Notice this peculiar contrast of colours!”
But what about it?


     

    With what sense am I to notice
the way the word comes when I'm
reading?

     
Aber kann ich nicht das bestimmte
Korpergefuhl was ich jetzt habe mit
einem Namen belegen, es bemerken? Was
heißt das? Heißt es bemerken daß ich

74
eines habe oder daß es das ist welches …
Oder?


     

    Es gibt in der Musik so etwas
wie
eine eindrucksvolle Phrase
& wenn man so eine hört, mag man
sagen: “diese Phrase drückt doch
etwas aus!”
    ⋎ Nur will man aber sagen: sie ist
nicht bloß eindrucksvoll, sondern sie
drückt auch etwas bestimmtes aus.
Aber wir sagten ja, sie sei eindrucksvoll.


     
“It all happens in a peculiar way.”


     
“It makes a strong impression on me.” “It impresses itself on me”.


     
alsigon


     
“It all happens in the way A”

     

 Die “Art” ist wie eine bestimmte Farbung
Aber das Merkwürdige ist daß ich in
dieser Farbung scheinbar nicht im
Gegensatz zu irgend einer anderen
rede.

     

    N Now if I observe myself saying
it I find that I have to read a

75
longish sentence. And I wish to say
“it's all the same colour”.
    But ˇI don't just notice that it hasn't just got ˇall the same colours
but one particular colour!
    Yes, but you mistake the function
of language! <ˇ ˇIt seems you wish to specify it, but without
pointing to it
you don't not wish to saying anything about it,
& it seems to you as if pointing to it specified it as though you could explain it by itself. >
    
It is as though what I pointed to was
at the same time the sample & what one compares it with.



     

    You can, of course, take an ˇthe reading of an english
sentence as a sample for reading.
But taking it as a sample doesn't say
anything about the sample. You can
then say something by means of the
sample.


     

    In saying this wall has all one
particular colour we make the same
mistake one makes thinking that if we
give a<n> ˇostensive definition we say something about
the object we point to.


     
This is a particular shape (colour) be-
cause I make a particular face if
when looking at it.

     

 Als was funktioniert das Gesicht, die Farbe
etc. worauf ich schaue? Als Muster oder als
das worüber ich aussage?


76


     

    “Bei diesem Thema mache ich eine
ganz bestimmte Geste”.


     

    Obwohl wir die ‘bestimmte’ Be-
leuchtung eigentlich keiner anderer
entgegenstellen wollen, so gebrauchen
wir doch diesen Ausdruck in dem-
jenigen Fall, im welchen die Beleuch-
tung auf uns einen Eindruck
macht[,|.] — Und das ist eine Bestim-
mung die unabhängig von der
bestimmten besonderen Beleuchtung ist —, & wir
können den Eindruck auch [B|b]eschrei-
ben, anderen Eindrücken entgegenstellen.



     
[You can't move a King of Chess in
this way


     
It is absurd to say “you can't use
negation this way” as the use de-
termines whether it's negation”.
    What is to determine whether it is
negation or not.




77




     

     x=y, x=x
     2+2 = 4 is this the result of a
calculation or isn't it. If not it is a
definition & how could this be a tau-
tology?


     

     (∃x,y)ϕx∙x=y ·[|]· ϕx∙ϕy



     

     F(x,y)
           f(a)⊃f(b)       f(a)⊃f(a)
                           f(2+2)·⊃·f(4)











78

     

    But can't I say that I see
now, — what I do see?


     

    When I said, I …, I wished
to say that I didn't just see
anything, nor did I wish to
say that give any general
characteristic of what I saw but ---.


     
“Write a sentence! — While you write do you
feel something?” — “Yes, I have a particular
feeling while writing”.
    I dont want to say ˇjust that I
have the same feeling w the whole time
but also that I have this par-
ticular feeling. But what is this par-
ticular feeling characterized be ex-
cept itself


     
The word particular feeling belongs together
with the feeling itself.
    One could just say “I have …
while writing”. And during ‘…’ produce
the feeling.


     
“Observe the feeling which you have
while writing”


79


     
It seems it has sense to say “I
have this feeling while writing”. And
while saying this I produce a feeling.


     
“Shurely I can say that I have
this feeling while I'm writing”.
Of course you can say it & when you
say “this feeling” you concentrate on
the feeling (which is comparable to looking
not to seeing). But what do you do
with the sentence? What use is it to you?


     

  “Observe the feeling” can't mean
“feel it”. I can say look closely at
what you see, not see clearly
what you see.



     
I can't visually point to what
I see because I see the pointing
finger & it does not point to what I
see but is part of it.

     
It is as though I could say:
My act of concentrating the atten-
tion is an inward (act of) pointing
An akt which nobody else sees but that doesn't
matter.
But I don't point to the feeling

80
by attending to it but rather
produce it.

     

  “Beim [l|L]esen eines Satzes fühl ich geht
etwas
einen bestimmten Vorgang”
Was ist daran wahr?


     
Wenn ich wohlbekannte Dinge sehen
geht etwas bestim habe ich eine bes-
stimmte Erfahrung[?|;] was ist daran
wahr?


     
“I notice that the wall has this
particular colour”.


     
“Do you only notice that it has the
same colour throughout or do
you only no also notice the parti-
cular colour it has?”
    This might mean: are you impressed by
the particular colour it has.


     

   “I know what colour it has be-
cause I see it”. Well, what colour
has it.
   “I know which colour it has”
   I know the colour


     

   It has a particular colour A & I

81
know A.

     

  Ich wäge einen Geschmack auf der Zunge.


     

  You misunderst. the function of
language. It seems to you as though
you could say: I notice the coulour
besides seeing that it has all one colour.


     

  You think it makes sense to say:
the colour of this→ is this→


     

 Observe your the feeling of writing. “Yes I'm
looking at it”, or “yes I'm impressing
it on my mind”


     

    If I observe the peculiar particular ligh-
ting etc. I don't do anything with it.



     

    “I see this”. Surely it makes sense
to say what I see & how could I
do this better than by letting what
I see speak for itself.
    But I can't point visually to
what I see ---
    I seems as though I singled
something out but the sample
can't single out itself.

82

  When I said you mistake mistake the
funktion of language it was
because a sentence seemed to
you to do what only the sample
itself does.
    The sample seemed to be its
own description.



     

    “The wall has now got this colour”.
    imagine someone asked “Has it really this colour now”.




     

    Observe the lighting …. — Hasn't
it one particular lighting? Like how
the
doesn't the sentence read
give me one particular impression?
    Observe the particular impr thing
that takes place when you read.
    Impress the lighting of the
room on you.

    Suppose someone said “I am
now observing the particular lighting
it has This would sound as if he
could pr<i>nt out which it was.



     

  … because ˇby its help you seem to be pointing

83
out to yourself what colour you see




     

    You are ordered This tells you to concentrate
your attention on the sample
and I could in fact have
said “look at the colour colour of
this sample”. But this would
have to asked you to con-
centrate
to attend to it in a particular way, not to attend to a particular thing.


     

    By attending looking you produce
the impression. You can't
look at the impression.


     
Nothing yet is done with this
sample



     

   But you might think it might seem to you that you
can look at the partic. lighting
of this room. As though you
didn't look at the room
but at something else which
the room had. And you are
then in fact concentrating
your attention …
on the lighting which doesn't mean
to look at a part. thing but in a
part. way.

84

  (I must try to cheat
myself to believe that
I can look at the part.
lighting of ¿this¿ room.)



     

 It doesn't say anything
about the appearance
of the room. (Rather) the appea-
rance of the r is the sample.


     

    Observe … is like saying
get hold of it whereas it
it is obeyed by putting myself
into a certain state.


     

    This is how a part.
light., get hold of it.


     

  The order could have been
“see what lighting the
room has”.


     

    “There is a particular
lighting, I must observe”.





85





     
It seemed that I could
say: Now I've noticed it
something part. happens when I
read in reading.



     
<You read put yourself into the ⋎ state of attention
& say:> “Something peculiar happens un-
doubtedly”. You are inclined to
go on There is a certain smoothness
about it.” But you feel that
this is only an inadequate descrip-
tion & that the experience can
only describe stand for itself.


     

  “Something pec. hap. und.” is like saying
“I've had an experience!” But you
don't wish to make a general state-
ment independent of the particular
experience you have had but rather
a statement into which this ˇparticular experience
enters.



     

  You are under a particular impression. an impression.



     

  You are saying something ˇgeneral & at the
same time concentrating your attention
on a sample & so it seems as though
this sample entered your statement.

86

  It is as thought you looked
into a microscope say observing the motions of animals & said to a
pupil: “Something peculiar goes on
there”; intending to let him look too
& to use the what you observe as a
sample for further consideration.



     

  You think you've noticed the
process of reading, the particular
way in which signs are transformed
into sounds. You've seen the parti-
cular process of transformation.



     

    “This sentence is spoken in a particular
tone” — Every sentence is spoken in a par-
ticular tone, only what makes you say
that it's spoken in a particular tone
is that you're concentrating on this tone.

     

  You are under an impression.
Thats why you say what you say.
    But the sentence “you that you are under
an impression, is a general statement.
    You wish to make this impression
a sample drawing a circle round it.
And this action of saying something
to it you mistake for saying some

87
thing about it.



     
You are under an impression,. This
makes yo<u> say “I am under a par-
ticular
impression. And this
sentence seems it seems to say to yourself
under what impression you are ˇat least that you have told yourself under what impr. you are.
   As though you had pointed to
a picture ready in your mind & said
this is it.
    Whereas you have only pointed to
your impression.
   You did something like drawing a
circle round the colour …




     

    “That's how one reads!”.
You seem to have observed reading
as under a magnifying glass &
discovered seen the reading process (which
had escaped the … naked eye careless superficial observation.
)
But the case is more like that of observing something
through a coloured glass.




     

    You interpret your inte impression You are under an impression which you interpret & you interpret this
as as one of having noticed something which
was independent of the particular signs
you saw, the words you uttered, the writing etc.


88


     
Thought expressed by architecture.

     
Stiefmütterchen, “jede Farbenzusam-
menstellung sagt etwas”. speaks to me
    Everyone of these men says
something.

     
“‘That's what happens when I read (at
least what happened in this case)”. What was it?
“Oh I got a particular impression”.



     
I am impressed by the reading. And that
made me say that I had observed something
But why do you besides the mere seeing & speaking.
  “Something peculiar happens when
I read”. That is I am impressed



     

    The words old acquaintances of mine.
But do I always have toˇwards old acquain-
tances the one feeling of old acquain-
tance.


     

    The words easily awaken feelings
in me. Odd scratches don't.
    I can easier feel at home in
well known things than in others.

89

     

    Musik impresses you “sad”, “joy-
full”, etc..


     

   The only adequate way of expressing
your impression might be to draw
what you see.


     
“An impression” so<u>nds like something
amorphous.


     

  I don't want to say I see this
& am impressed as though being
impressed meant something like
having a particular feeling & the
sentence meant something like
I see this & feel a pressure





90



     

    “Do you remember having lived
yesterday?”



     

  Can one remember without language.
  Can one wish to be somewhere at
5.05 o.c. <…> if one has n knows no
clocks.



     

  What is the difference between
a memory image & an image
of our we deliberately make up.


     



     

  Russell doesn't really wish to say
that two classes are similar if they
are correlated. He needs a correlation
which isn't a grossly material one, which
in fact is the possibility of a materi-
al correlation. And that means that
when he says A & B are 1-1 corr. it really
means they can be, or it makes
sense to say that they are.
    So we are driven to consider cases
in which it makes sense & such in which
it makes no sense to say that

91
two classes are 1-1 correlated.
    What is the condition of their
being 1-1 correlatable.


     


     

    What in this case is the condition.
Or how would I get a contradiction?
E.g. if I said they ˇA B C D are aequidistant, α β γ δ are not eaquidis-
tant & parallel lines are drawn
between them.
    And here Russells correlation seems
to furnish a criterion of their correla-
tability. A logical criterion.
    Isn't it very queer that by just looking
at the names I should be able to
say whether or not a certain relation
held between the objects?
    But I correlate the names. And
why? To see whether a correlation can
exist subsist between the things.
Correlation
Correspondence
We draw lines in our thought


     

    They are thus correlated whether anybody

92

     

93

     

    “Remembering is a characteristic expe-
rience.” But the experience is seems curiously elusive.
There are indeed experiences connected
with it which are not elusive. We have
e.g. memory images, we see so & so before us.
But then there are other images besides
memory ones.
    They only seem elusive when we philoso-
phise about them. Otherwise we say
without any hesitation: “I remember
so & so”. And not o<n>ly very sensitive
people do so.
    Take as example the feeling of ‘l.l.a’
because this is a strong & clearly circum-
scribed experience. And yet in a sense it
seems just as elusive as any other feeling
of memory, [“Far away look in his eyes”]
  Tone & gesture of memory
  The experience of expressing singing
with expression without the feeling.
   Suppose the feeling consists a) of feeling
the heartbeat b) of not feeling its
beat.

     

   Wenn das Verständnis für ein Thema
kommt ändert sich freilich das
Erlebnis; aber kommt ein bestimmtes Gefühl
dazu?


94


     
knows it or not.







     



     

    Language treats our ‘particular
feeling’ as something separate. As
an experience separate from the
other sense experiences.


     
I say “I remember seeing him yester-
day” and now I look behind saying
these words for the experience of
remembering.


     

   If we say “The words came in a
particular way”, — in whi how is this
way to be described
?
For what the
word “way” meant can only be
seen by looking at the kind
of specification.


     

  Our sentence really meant no
more than: There is a difference be-

95
tween someone saying these words & re-
membering & saying these words without
remembering.


     

  “The image has some indefinable
‘past’ quality”. — Now do you say this
because you think you have to
say it or because you notice
a quality in the picture which you
want to give a name to.
    All right I dont ask you to define it as I don't ask you to define ‘blue’ either.
Let's hear how you are going to
use the word for this quality, then
I'll know in what sense it is a quality.
(Is it e.g., like size, shape, or colour?)


     

    Representing memory images in the Film.


     

    “Let me see what did I do before
that?”
    “A particular way of looking for an
image”.


     

    “Reading in the book of memory.” “Looking
up something in the book of memory.”


     

  Rising hot air



96


     

  “Kennst Du das Phänomen des ‘Suchens
im Gedächtnis’?”


     

  We are entitled

    “Intangible”


     

  “He started — like this.” —. “Was that
all, or did he have an experience
besides?”

     

  Mischfarbe: “[s|S]ehe ich eine oder zwei Farben
wenn ich ein weißliches Grün sehe?”
   “Macht die Erde zwei Bewegungen
oder eine Bewegung?”
    ˇVerwandt & doch sehr verschieden: Habe ich eine oder drei Klangerfah-
rungen wenn ich einen Dreiklang höre?”
    Ist süßer Tee ein Geschmack
oder zwei Geschmäcker?

     

  Couldn't a characteristic element
of fright be that of having a momentary
quick abnormally quick succession of
ideas.— Would I deny such a thing?

     
Zählen ˇ& Rechnen mit musikalischen Figuren.