It would be a genuine mathematical problem:
‘construct the 2-gon’.
And a mathematician might solve the problem
i.e. devise a construction which on such
& such grounds we should || could hardly
help calling “construction of the
2-gon”. |
Suppose
I said “there is something there”;
& on being asked,
“what || What do you mean?”, I painted a
picture of what I see. Would this justify
saying that statement? –
Wouldn't this picture have to be understood as
‘in a system’? And
mustn't I understand 2. it as an
expression within a system? |
‘Look at the geometrical proposition as
a member of the whole system of geometrical
propositions, then you shall see whether you
really want to have || accept this
proposition!’ |
p ∙ ~~p = p
= ~~p |
[sehr wichtig wenn auch schlecht
gesagt] “It's no use saying that
the other person knows what he sees & not
what I see & that therefore all is symmetrical,
because there is just nothing else corresponding to my visual image;
my visual image is unique!” |
“Obviously this↗) is what's
seen!” |
If
one says to the solipsist
John Smith
“so you say that of all people only John
Smith really sees”, he
doesn't really recognize
this to be his view. He didn't really mean
that if you regard him as one man amongst other men || person out
of many people he had any special privilege. –
He would be inclined to say: “Not John
Smith has any particular privilege (it would be
ridiculous to say this), but I have, as seen
by myself.” |
Couldn't one assume that all those persons had a right to
talk about what's seen who were being seen.
I.e. all those who were on a picture
could talk about the picture. |
“But I can persuade myself that nobody else has pains even
if they say they have, but not that I
haven't.” It makes no sense to say, that “I persuade myself that I have no pain” whoever says this. I don't say anything about myself when I say 4 that I can't persuade myself
that I haven't pain etc.. |
Can't I use the word
“to see” in such a way that I call only this→
‘seen’?” But how do I act according to this decision? Do I, e.g. admit that someone else besides me can see it, or do I say that only I can see it? Suppose everybody talked only about what we should now describe as ‘What's seen by me L.W.’. But they all know what I see; they don't ask me. And if anybody describes it wrongly we say that he can't || doesn't speak properly, expresses himself wrongly. There is no such thing as deceiving someone about what I see. – Isn't there even then a temptation || Can't I even then imagine a temptation to say, “I can only know what I see not what the others see”? |
If I say
“I see this→” I am liable to
tap my chest to show which person I am. Now suppose I had
no head & pointing to my geometrical eye I would point to
a place || an
empty place above my neck, wouldn't I still
5 feel that I pointed to the
person who sees tapping my chest? Now I might ask
“how do I know in this case who sees
this?” But what is
this. It's no use just pointing
ahead of me, & if, instead, I point to a description &
tap both my chest & the description & say
‘I see this’ – it
makes || has no sense to ask “how do you know
that it's you who sees it” for I
don't know that it's this person
& not another one which sees before I point;
but one could in certain cases say I know because I
point. – This is what I meant by saying that I
don't choose the mouth which says
“I have toothache”. |
25 × 25 =
625 3 + 1 = 5 π = 3˙141 31 π ≠ 3˙15 |
Der, wenn ich so sagen darf, krankhafte Charakter des Solipsismus
zeigt sich || wird offenbar || zeigt sich,
wenn wir die Konsequenz zu ziehen versuchen
daß nur ich N.N. wirklich sehe, da
wir vor dieser Konsequenz sofort
zurückschrecken. Wir sehen 6. sofort, daß wir das gar
nicht sagen wollten. |
Isn't it queer that if I
look in front of me & point in
front of me & say “this!”, I should
know what it is I mean. “I mean just
these shades of colour and shapes, the
appearance.” |
[Ein Wissenschaftler sagt er
betreibe nur empirische Wissenschaft oder ein
Mathematiker nur Mathematik & nicht Philosophie, –
aber er ist auch den Versuchungen der Sprache
unterworfen, er in der gleichen Gefahr wie jeder Andre || wie Jeder, er ist in der gleichen Gefahr &
muß sich vor ihr in acht nehmen.] |
If I say
“I mean the appearance”, it seems that,
I had said || tell || am
telling you what it is I am pointing to || at, or looking at, e.g. the chair
as opposed to the bed, etc.. It is as
though by the word
“appearance” I had actually directed your
attention to something else than
e.g. the physical
objects you are looking at. And indeed there corresponds a
peculiar stare to this ‘taking in the
appearance’. Remember here what
people || Philosophers of a certain
school 7. used to say so often:
“I believe I mean something, if I say
‘ …’”. |
It seems that the visual
image || impression which I'm having
is something I can point to; that I can say of it, it is
unique. || I can point to & talk
about; that I can say of it, it is unique.
¤ That I am pointing
to || at the physical objects I am
looking at || in my field of vision, but not
meaning them but the appearance. This object I am
talking about, if not to others then to myself. (It is
almost like something painted on a screen which surrounds
me.) |
This object seems to
be || is unsuitably || inadequately described as “that which I
see”, “my visual image”, as it has nothing
to do with any particular human being. Rather I should like
to call it “what's seen”. And
so far it's all right except
that || only now I've got to say what can be
said about this object, in what sort of language game.
“What's seen” is to be
used. For at first sight one should feel inclined to use
the words || this expression as
one uses a word designating a physical object & only on second
thought I see || it appears that I can't do
that. – When I said 8 that here seems to be an object I can
point to & talk about, it was just that I was comparing it
with || to a physical object. For
only on second thought it appears that the idea of
“talking about” isn't applicable
here. (I could have compared the
‘object’ to a theatre
decoration.) |
Now when could I
be said to speak about that || this object?
When would I say I did speak about it? –
Obviously when I describe – as we should say –
my visual image. And perhaps only if I
described || describe
it, & only if I
described || describe
it to myself. But what is the point in this case to say || of saying that when I describe to myself what I see I describe a (peculiar) || an object called “what is seen”? Why talk of a particular object here? Isn't this due to a misunderstanding? |
Imagine a game played on a kind of
chessboard. You can extend the game to 64, 81,
100, etc. squares & the situation which is
losing in the 64-game is winning 9 in the 81-game, losing
in the 100-game, winning in the 121-game
etc.. If you are asked “what did ‘meaning what he said’ consist in” you will describe phenomena || facts which however supplemented by certain other facts would be characteristic of his not meaning what he said, – and so on. |
“Can I
imagine 10101010 = μ
soldiers in a
row?” “Can I imagine an endless row of soldiers?” Why shouldn't I say, I can imagine an endless row of soldiers? The image is something like a row the end of which I can't see & a gesture & the words “on & on for ever –” said in a particular tone of voice. And suppose I said: μ soldiers would reach from here halfway to the sun if we placed them a yard apart! Isn't this too ‘imagining the row’? |
It is a very remarkable &
most important fact that there are numbers which
we || all of us should call
“big || large numbers”. |
There is a particular way of
explaining the sense (meaning) of an expression which we may
call …
10 |
In philosophy we often say that people wrongly imagine a
certain state of affairs, e.g.
“they imagine that a law of nature in some way
compels things to happen”, or
“they imagine that it's a question of psychology
how a person can know a certain fact whereas it is one of
grammar” etc. etc..
But it is necessary in these cases to explain what it
means “to imagine this || so &
so”, what kind of image is it they are using.
It often sounds as though they were able to imagine the logically
impossible & it is not easy to straighten out our
description of the case & to say what in this case
they actually imagine.
E.g.: People treat the question “how do we know what so & so is the case” as a question of psychology which has nothing to do with the sense of the proposition which we say is known. But first: where do they take this idea from, how do they come by it? Which really psychological question are they thinking of? Obviously there is a case in which the question “how does he find this out” is a personal &, perhaps, psychological 11 one. “How did he
find out that N was in his room?” –
He saw him through the window or he was hidden under the bed. – “How did he find out that the
glass was cracked?” He saw the
crack with his naked eye or he saw it through the
magnifying glass
etc. We say he finds out the same thing in
different ways & therefore not that what he finds
depends upon how he finds it. When do we say that he finds out the same thing in two ways? Imagine language games: somebody is asked a question “A?” & trained to answer “yes” if he sees a man || person A in the next room, “no”, if he doesn't. He is trained to answer the question “A?” by “yes” also if he hears A's voice from the next room. “What right have we to ask the same question in these two cases?” or “What right has he to use these two different tests to answer the same question?” Or, suppose someone asked: “Now are these || is this really one & the same question or do we have two different questions only expressed in the same words?” Now consider the ostensive definition: “This man is called ‘A’” & ask yourself whether this definition tells us whether || if we are to regard seeing A from a different 12 side or in a different position or
hearing his voice as criteria of him being there? –
Here we are tempted to say: “But surely I just
point to this man, so there can't be any doubt
what object I am meaning!” But that's
wrong though the doubt of course is not whether I mean this
→ or that
↘ thing.
One may say that the ‘object’ I am inclined to say I am pointing to in the ostensive definition is not determined by the act of pointing but by the use I make of the word defined. And here one must beware of thinking that after all the pointing finger pointed to a different object in the sense in which the arrow ⟶
“But we conceive of objects, things, different from our sense data, e.g. the table as opposed to the views we get of it.” But what does conceiving of this object consist in? Is it a peculiar ‘mental act’ occurring whenever, say, we talk about the table? Isn't it using the word table in 13 the game we do use
it? Using it as we do use it? |
We are tempted to say that the word
“toothache” is the ‘name of a feeling of
which I don't know whether anybody except me ever
has it’. But even I can be said not to
know whether I always mean the same by this word.
|
“I always
thought that holding one's cheek was having toothache; then
he knocked out a tooth of mine, then I knew what
‘toothache’ meant”. Well what
does it mean? – And || Or what was it like “to know what
‘toothache’ means”? |
“Now I know what
‘pain’ means”. |
A
faked moan of pain
isn't necessarily a moan without
something & a real moan of pain a moan with
something. |
Aber wir möchten sagen: “die
Begleitumstände sind andere”. Aber daran ist
etwas Unrichtiges. |
You say in one case the expression 14 corresponds to the
feeling || experience. But how does it
correspond? Imagine, you were wrong about the correspondence, then what would remain? That you said these words & that you did not cheat, but now cheating & not cheating are not ‘private experiences’. It's no good saying “I recognize this experience as … ” as I can say I don't know whether I recognize the experience of recognizing rightly. |
We are using the word “to
cheat” in two different ways. In one way whether I
do it can be verified by the other person, in the other sense we say
“only I know whether I cheat”. |
“I knew all the time
that I had cheated.” |
Quite true, we distinguish simple acting & acting
prompted by feeling, & feeling with expressing
it || expression. These are distinctions in
our language. “But are you saying that all these
distinctions are distinctions in mere behaviour?”
– |
Can one by
multiplying 2 with itself reach || obtain
12? 15 |
“Mere behaviour”.
“There is only behaviour” would seem to say that
there was no life, that we (or I) acted as
automatons, as unconscious
machines. I wish to say: “The difference between me & a machine doesn't only || just consist in the difference of our actions but in this that I am conscious & the machine isn't”. But oughtn't I say that this only distinguishes a machine from me not from a human being? For why shouldn't I say that the difference between a human being, animal, sewing machine, etc., lies in their actions, if I except myself. But then I don't even except my body. |
“I know consciousness only from myself, I
don't know whether anybody else is
conscious || has consciousness, but it makes sense
to assume it & I do make the assumption in
certain || a class of
cases.” |
What
worries us is the idea of ‘behaviour +
experience’. – We might think
that it was possible to talk of behaviour without there being
experience. ‘Could I talk about moaning if there
was no such thing as hearing the moaning?’
Or: Isn't talking of
behaviour
[Continuation ⟶ S. 24] talking of experience &
therefore what we call “talking of private
experience” a special case of “talking about
‘behaviour’”? 16 |
“I want someone to explain to me a certain
game & to make it
easy || easier
I put the question to him: “tell me what a man does to
win the game.” Someone might say
“I don't want to know what a man does to win it,
this is a question about human beings; I want to
know what the game is they play.” You ask, what does it mean that “a rod is 6 inches long”. Someone answers one finds out whether it is so by using a measuring rod divided into equal parts. “What does this mean?” – One divides it into equal parts in such & such a way. I have given a definition in terms of the way of verification. “But isn't this an indirect definition?” Sometimes it is, sometimes it isn't. Sometimes how we look for something may determine what we are looking for, sometimes it doesn't. – We are always liable to think of the fact that we can find out that there is a chair here in many different ways & we forget that this is just conditioned by the particular use we make of the word “chair”, “table” & in general the generic names of physical 17. objects.
Supposing we said “what does it mean
to have an enlarged liver & someone answered
“we verify it by looking at the
person's eye & seeing
…” Describe an object by describing its use. Describe an object by saying what hollow it fits into. More or less of its use is expressed by different forms of a proposition. Consider this! The sense of a proposition is what you must know to understand it. What does understanding a question consist in? What does it mean to understand a mathematical question? Would you understand ‘25 × 25 = ?’ if you didn't know how to calculate it? Would you say you understood the || a position of a board game if you had no idea of the way the game was played? How much must you || Ask how much must you know to understand it? Would you not be inclined to say that you understand it more & more the more you knew about the game? But we could also imagine a case in which you would say that you understood the position even though you knew nothing about || didn't know the exact rules of the game, even if these rules had not yet been given! Now consider such a question as “are there an infinite number of primes or not, 18 & if not, how
many?” I show you what we call a prime
number & ask you if you
understand this question. Prima
facie you all say yes. Now I want to show you that you
could also look at it from a different & perhaps more
‘exact’ point of view & say
‘no’. We have here a question but we have
not yet got a method of its solution & I want
you to think of it in terms of 25 × 25 = ? when we
don't know what multiplication is. Now
I'll say (what I've said in a similar case
before): The question for you gets its
sense by the idea || picture of a small finite
number of cardinals
etc.. But what does that mean?
In the case of the small number of
cardinals you have a method, you know what to do, here you
don't know it, so how can || what
does it mean, that “the question gets its
sense from the case in which you do know
it”?
Our mind works on the line that there is
something which hasn't yet been calculated || which
could but for our weakness be calculated, it takes no
notice of the fact that we have no method & although this
can't alter the facts it determines the way of
expressing: We say we don't yet know so
& so; & if someone shows 19 us
Euler's proof we say
that now we know the answer to the question we have asked.
But are we bound to express ourselves in this way?
Can't I persuade you to adopt a different way of
expressing ourselves of which too we can't say that it is
inconsistent with the usual use of
words? What if I say: This question
i.e. the form of words was indeed suggested by
the finite case, but the analogy just breaks
down because there is no method of solution.
Euler's
“proof” || “Proof”
needn't be conceived as answering the question
“how many primes are
there”. This question might perfectly well be said to be nonsensical. (As e.g. “what colour has visual space.”). “But is it in our power to regard a question as nonsensical or as making sense? And what about Euler's proof?” Need we ask such a question as “how many cardinal numbers are there”? This question which seems in some way to get hold of the infinite i.e. the enormous for this reason might appeal to some of us & might, on the other hand, repel some of us, – e.g. me. Funeral. Consider such a proposition as: “There are as many squares as there are cardinals”. If we look at it like this: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9 … we should be 20. inclined to say that there
were less squares than cardinals; if we think
of them as 1²,
2², 3², 4², …, we
say, there are as many.
Thinking in terms of an analogy doesn't mean
that this analogy is constantly before our mind. The
idea of finding out something about the series of
cardinals. Why shouldn't we draw the
conclusion that this whole question doesn't make
sense? But we actually say that it does, &
that the answer is in a
way paradoxical adds for some to its
charm. (Some + some = some). It
seems to us that we have discovered a new element with utterly
different properties. I should like to get rid of this analogy. – Can “the heptagon be
constructed?” – A:
“Now surely this question makes
sense!” – B: “Now
surely this question makes no sense!” –
What argument would A use: “you know what it
means ‘to construct the pentagon,
etc. || hexagon, so … ,
you know what a heptagon is, what construction
means”. B: “It
makes no more sense to say ‘can the
7-gon be constructed’,
than to say ‘can the 5-gon be
constructed’. I know what we call ‘a
constructed (as opposed to measured) pentagon’, I know
what we call ‘the
pentagon-construction’. We use this
expression because of certain obvious analogies. But
I don't call anything heptagon
construction. So don't ask such a question as can
it be …. Compare this with the statement
“on this animal's forehead there
21. was a heptagon
construction” –
answer: I don't know what you're talking
about. “But what about the proof that the heptagon
can't be constructed?” As there is such a proof,
it is the answer to that question of which you say it makes no
sense. “Must I conceive of this proof as the
answer to that question?” When the
proof is given I can say: you have now given the
expression 13-gon sense
& you have decided that the expression ‘construction of the
7-gon is
not || never to be used at
all’. Further you have now given the
question: “can the
7-gon be constructed”
sense, analogous to that can 735912 be
divided by 19. |
Now back to the question
“how many 777 are there in
π.” When I say
that the case of the small first
number gives this question its first meaning
this is to say that our attitude towards this expression is due to it
sounding like that other kind of question. Our attitude can
however change if I now remind you of the cases
I've just been talking about. Why should we ask
this question? – “But don't
mathematicians try to solve it, or
similar questions?” 22. Why should we call what
they are doing “trying to solve this
question”. Why should we not say they add new
constructions to mathematics. Now
consider this expression:
“Surely, either there are n times 777 in
π or not!” A)
this is a tautology, B) if it means that you can't
help yourself & must ask this question, I contradict you
& say that you needn't look at it that way. – Now e.g. you say that the
difficulty about that question is that the
proposition “there are 777 in
π” can only be proved in a general
way, whereas the proposition
‘there are’ can be proved by finding a case of 777
in the development. I should say let that
teach you something about the sense of the question!
Remember that a position or a move in a game gets its sense from
the game. We are liable to get the idea that the
mere form of words has something in it which we must find
or of which we must say that we can't find it.
Now to the question “are there 777 in μ places”. “Surely there are, or there aren't”. This means nothing more nor less than “We know what it means to say 23 ‘that there
are’ or ‘that there
aren't’. Now it is obvious that we
can't straightforwardly say we know in this case what
it means, because to explain what it means we should have to point to
small numbers & why should I accept this explanation for
μ? This is all without much
interest as long as I don't actually
set the task “find out about
μ” for we could use
μ as example though we never thought of
answering the question with respect to
μ! – But if now we try to
find a new method of calculating the answer for
μ then indeed we may ask ourselves in
what sense we can be said to answer the old question, in what sense we
can say that we've found a short
cut. It will depend on the method actually
applied. Ask yourself: What are we to do if
somebody actually calculated
f(μ) by
counting & found a different answer? I
should say: to attribute it to human frailty ‘that we
can't develop all places of
π’ is just thoughtless, you
wouldn't talk like that if you saw the use of your words
clearly. But this is like saying: to say
0:0 = 1
is thoughtlessness, you would not say so if … But one can
never 24 know this & someone
might say this & we would respect it.
Contradiction. What are we to say if someone tells us about a proof: “that all mathematical questions can be solved”. One can use an appellation for a ‘proof’ without regarding it as the answer to a question. |
One might
put it by saying: “Experience is
at the bottom of everything we say about phenomena; so if we call
anything in particular talking about experiences || direct
experience it must be just a special case of talking
about phenomena as the ordinary way.” |
If we say “toothache is nothing
but behaviour” we seem to say that it is not so & so,
we seem to wish to exclude something.
But that's obviously what we mustn't
do. |
“Toothache is not a
behaviour but an ¤
experience.” “We
distinguish between ‘behaviours’ and
‘experiences’. “Dancing is
a behaviour, toothache an experience.”
¤ These are
grammatical statements. About the use of the words
“dancing” &
“toothache”. |
(“This form of words seems to mean something but means
nothing”. That is: We connect a
certain image with this expression or we are inclined to use it
because it sounds analogous to other expressions & we connect
a certain attitude, state of mind
etc. with it; but if we then ask ourselves how we are
going to use it we find that we have no use for it or a use
of a totally different kind from that, which we at first vaguely
imagined (expected).) |
First of all it seems that we are
partial for ‘behaviour’ that we wish to explain
everything in terms of it.
Now why should we be biased in this way? Is it
because of some kind of materialism?
|
There is an
ordinary (& unproblematic) way
of using such a word as “toothache”, but we are
inclined on philosophizing about it to give
it a different use finding out however that we can then do away with
it entirely because that proposed use as a matter of
fact makes it into a useless symbol. |
“We use the expression
‘x has toothache’ when we
see || perceive a certain behaviour in
others, or, on the other hand, when we ourselves have
toothache”. What does it mean: “I
say ‘I have toothache’, when I
have || feel toothache”? What does
this explain? It could of course be an explanation in
several ways: I say to someone: “Now if I
have stomach ache I'll always say ‘I
have toothache’ in order to make
Smith believe so & so”,
“I won't lie again, I will
only say ‘I have toothache”
when I really have it¤” or “I say
‘I have toothache’ when I feel a
pain here (pointing)”. |
I wish
to say that we can't
adduce the ‘private experience’ as a justification |
We can't say “he is
justified in moaning because he has pains” if we call pain
the justification for moaning. – We
can't say “he is justified in expressing pain,
because he has pain” unless we wish to distinguish this case
of being justified in expressing pains from another way of
justification, e.g. that he is on the stage
& has to act a sick man. |
If I am tempted to say “my justification for moaning
is having pain”, it seems I point
– at least to || for myself – to something
which I express || to which I give
expression by moaning. |
The idea is here that there is an
‘expression’ for everything, that we know what it
means ‘to express something’, ‘to
describe something’. Here is a feeling, an
experience, & now I could say to someone “express
it!”. But what is to be the relation
of the expression to what it
expresses? In what way is this expression the expression
of this feeling rather than another?! One is
inclined to say “we mean this feeling by this
expression”, but what is meaning |
“We have two
expressions: one for moaning without pain, & one for
moaning with pain.” To what states of
affairs am I pointing as explanations of these
two expressions? “But these ‘expressions’ can't be mere words, noises, which you make, they get their importance only from what's behind them (the state you're in, when you use them)!” – But how can this state give importance to noises which I produce? Suppose I said: The expressions get their importance from the fact, that they are used not used coolly but that we can't help using them. This is as though I said: laughter gets its importance only through being a natural expression, a natural phenomenon not an artificial form of language. || code. Now what makes a ‘natural form of expression’ natural? Should we say: “An experience which stands behind it”? |
If I use the expression
“I have toothache” I may think of it as
‘being used naturally’ or
otherwise. But || ; but it
would be wrong to say that I had a reason for thinking
either. – It is very queer that
all the importance of our expressions seems to
come from that X, Y, Z, the private experiences,
which for ever remain in the background &
can't be drawn into the foreground. But is a cry when it is a cry of pain not a mere cry? |
Can one say: ‘If
I teach the child the use (meaning) of the word toothache
I can only hope that it really feels toothache, (or, that
it feels real toothache) for if it doesn't then
I've taught him a wrong meaning”? |
Why should I say that the
‘expression’ derives its meaning from the
feeling behind it, – & not from the
circumstances of the language game in
which it is used. For imagine a person crying out with pain
alone in the desert: is he using a language?
Could we say that his cry had
meaning? |
We
feel || labour under the queer temptation to
describe |
“But can't you imagine people behaving
just as we do, showing pain etc., etc.
& then if you imagine that they don't feel
pain all their behaviour is, as it were, dead. You can
imagine all their behaviour with or without
pain. –” |
The
pain seems to be the || is – as it were –
the atmosphere in which the expression exists.
(The pain seems to be a circumstance.)
|
Suppose we say that the image I use
in the one case is different from that which I use in the
other. But I can't point to the two
images. So what does it come to, to say this, except just
saying || to say it, using
this expression. We are, as I have said, tempted to describe our language by saying that we use certain elements, images, which however in the last moment |
Isn't the
expression in its use
an image, – why do I refer back to an image which I
can't show? |
“But don't you talk as though
(the) pain wasn't something
terribly real?” – Am I to understand
this as a proposition about
pain? I suppose it is a
proposition about the use of the word
‘pain’; & it is one more
expression, || utterance, an essential
part of the surrounding in which we use the word
‘pain’. |
Feeling justified in having expressed pain I may
concentrate on the memory of pain. |
Now what's the
difference between using my expressions as I do but yet not using
“toothache” to mean real pain & the proper
use of the word? – |
The
private experience is to serve as a paradigm
& at the same time
admittedly it can't be a
paradigm. |
The ‘private experience’ is a
degenerate construction of our grammar (comparable in a
sense to tautology & contradiction). And
|
What would
it mean to deny the existence of pain?! |
“But when we say we have toothache
we don't just talk of
behaving || expressing toothache in
this or that way!” – Certainly not, –
we express toothache! ‒ ‒ ‒ ‘But you admit
that the same expression || behaviour may be the
expression of toothache || pain or may
not be that.’ – If you imagine a man
cheating you always imagine him to use one expression
secretly for himself & another for someone else,
& this secrecy is not the ‘secrecy of
private experience’. || Cheating is done
secretly but this secrecy is not that of the
‘private experience’. Why
shouldn't it be considered wrong
of him
to use language in this way. |
We say “only he knows whether he says the
truth or
lies.”
“Only you can know if what you say is
true.” Now compare secrecy with the ‘privateness’ of personal experience¤! In what sense is a thought of mine secret? If I think |
“Only you can know what colour you
see”. But if it is true that
only you can know, you can't ever import this
knowledge, nor can you express it. Why shouldn't we say that I know better than you what colour you see if you say the wrong word & I can make you agree to my word, or if you point to the wrong sample etc.? |
“I didn't know that I was
lying.” – “You must have
known!” – |
Examine: “If you don't know
that you're having toothache, you
haven't got || don't
have toothache.” |
“I don't just say
‘I've got toothache || [a
feeling]’, but toothache || [a
feeling] makes me say this.”
(I deliberately didn't write ‘the
feeling of toothache’, or ‘a certain
feeling’.) This sentence distinguishes between, say, saying it as an example of a sentence, or on the stage etc., & saying it as an assertion. But it is no explanation of the expression |
“I know what the word
“ || ‘toothache” || ’
means, it makes me concentrate my attention on
some || one particular
thing.” But on what? You're
now inclined to give criteria of behaviour. Ask
yourself: “what does the word
‘feeling’ or still better
‘experience’ make you concentrate
on?”, “What is it like to
concentrate on experience?” If I try to do this
I, e.g., open my eyes particularly wide
& stare. |
“I know what the word
‘toothache’ means, it produces one particular
idea || image in my mind”.
But what image? –
“That
can't be explained.” – But if it
can't be explained what was the meaning of saying that it
produced one particular image? You could say the
same about the words “image in your
mind”. And all that it comes to is that you are
using certain words without an explanation.
“But can't I explain them to
myself? Or at least understand them
myself without giving an explanation? Can't
|
But how does this queer delusion come
about?! |
Here is
language, – & now I think that I can
embody || I try to embody something in language as an
explanation, which is no explanation. |
Privacy of
sense data. I must
bore you by a repetition of what I said last time. We said
that one reason for introducing
the idea of the sense datum was that people, as we say,
sometimes see different things, colours
e.g. looking at the same
object. Cases in which we say “he sees dark red
objects whereas I see light red”. We then are inclined to talk about an object other than
the physical object which the person sees who is said to see
the physical object. It is further clear that we only gather from
the other person's behaviour
(e.g. what he tells us) what that
object looks like & so it lies near to say
that he has this object before his mind's eye
& that we don't see it. Though we can
also say that we might have it before our mind's
eye as well without however knowing that he has it
before his mind's eye. The
‘sense datum’ is here is the way
the physical object appears to him. In other cases no
physical object enters. Now I must draw your attention to one particular difficulty about the use of the ‘sense datum’. We said that there were cases in which we should say that the person sees green what I see red. Now the question suggests itself: if this can be so at all, why shouldn't “And remember that we admit that the other may have pain without showing it! So if this is conceivable, why not that he never shows that he has pain; & why not that everybody has pain constantly without showing it; or that even things have pain?!” What strikes us is that there seem to be a few useful applications of the idea of the other person's having pain without showing it & a vast number of useless applications, applications which look as though they were no applications at all. And these latter applications seem to have their justification in this that we can imagine the other person to have what we have & in this way the proposition that he has toothache seems to make sense apart from any expression at all. “Surely”, we say, “We || I can imagine him to have pain or to see, etc..” Or “As I can see myself so I can imagine him to do the same”. In other words I We arrive at the conclusion that imagining him to have pain (etc.) does not fix the sense of the sentence “he has pain”. “He may all along mean something different by ‘green’ than I mean.” Evidence (Verification). But there is this consideration: “Surely I mean something particular, a particular impression & therefore he may have an other impression; surely I know what that would be like!” “Surely I know what it is like to have the impression I call ‘green’!” But what is it like? You are inclined to look at a green object & to say “it's like this!”. And these words though they don't explain anything to anybody else seem to be at any rate an explanation you give yourself. But are they?! Will this explanation justify your future use of the word ‘green’? In fact seeing green doesn't allow you to make the substitutions of someone else for you and of red for green. “The sense datum is private” is a rule “But surely I distinguish between having toothache & expressing it, & merely expressing it; & I distinguish between these two in myself.” “Surely this is not merely a matter of using different expressions, but there are two distinct experiences!” “You talk as though the case of having pain & that of not having pain were only distinguished by the way in which I expressed myself!” But do we always distinguish between ‘mere behaviour’ & ‘experience & behaviour’? If we see someone falling into flames & crying out do we say to ourselves: “there are of course two cases …”? Or if I see you here before me do I distinguish?? Do you? You Can we say that ‘saying that I lie is justified by a particular experience of lying’. Shall we say ‘… by a particular private experience’? or ‘… by a particular private experience of lying’? or ‘by a particular private experience characterized in such & such ways’? “But what, in your opinion is the difference between the mere expression & the expression & the experience?” |
“Do you know what it means that W. behaves as
he does but sees nothing; & on the other hand that he
sees?” If you ask yourself this & answer ‘yes’ you conjure up some sort of image. This image is it seems derived “I say ‘I have toothache’ because I feel it” contrasts this case with, say, the case of acting on the stage but can't explain what ‘having toothache’ means because having toothache = feeling toothache & the explanation would come to “I say I have it because I have it”. = I say I have it because it is true. = I say I have it because I don't lie. One wishes to say: In order to be able to say that I have toothache I don't observe my behaviour, say in the mirror. And this is correct, but it doesn't follow that you describe an observation of any other kind. Moaning is not the description of an observation. You || That is you can't be said to derive your expression from what you observe. Just as you can't be said to derive the word ‘green’ from your visual impression but only from a sample. – Now against this one is inclined to say: “Surely if I call a colour green I don't just say that word, but the word comes in a particular way”, or “if I say ‘I “But surely I know that I am not a mere automaton!” – What would it be like if I weren't || were? – “How is it that I can't imagine myself not seeing, hearing etc. || experiencing?” – We constantly confuse & change about the common sense use & the metaphysical use. “I know that I see.” – “I see.” – You seem to read this off some fact; as though you said: “There is a chair in this corner.” “But if in an experiment, e.g. I say ‘I see’ why do I say so? Surely because I see!” It is as though our expressions of personal experience needn't even spring from regularly recurrent inner experiences but just from something. Confusion of description & sample. |
The idea of the ‘realm of
consciousness’. |
Sir, it is pathetic || ridiculous to see
all the
discussion going on about the harmfulness of
the gangster films to the young
while the minds of both
adults
& children are being systematically
poisoned by the foul || worst kind
of
Vansittart
propaganda made by
the cinema newsreels || newsreel comments in our
cinemas, & condoned || inspired by
the M.O.P. Can there be anything
more swinish || foul || evil
than the gloating war news of the
British Movietone News unless it be
that of
Universal News? The gloating over
dead ‘Huns’, over the old German
cities flattened || razed to the ground, over
German civilians walking about || among the ruins
of their
towns? Everybody knows
about || Nobody
doubts the unspeakable horrors of the Nazi Regime
which are perhaps comparable only to … When they
were in full swing long before the war had started
& even after it had started we heard very little about them
… Now || Now that the enemy is completely
finished to use the words all the well known tricks of the
camera & the by far nastier ones of the commentators are
set into
action || in motion to make the German
people look || appear like a || represent the German people
to the unthinking cinema goer as one pack of
wolves. The commentators are worthy pupils of
Dr. Goebbels, of
the worst kind of Germans. We are not writing
this letter in what |
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