“But surely there is a case in
which I say ‘I see red’ & am
telling the (subjective) truth &
one in which I tell a ly!”— Yes,
that is, we distinguish between
telling the a case of telling the truth & not telling a case of not telling
the truth.— But what does lying
in this such a case, consist in? We may
thy all sorts of explanations:
“It consists in saying … & seeing green”,
“It consists in saying … & knowing that
I see …”, “It consists in saying
… & feeling that I'm not justified in
saying this” & others. Now ˇlet me ask : do
all these expl. come to the same
or do they describe different facts?
We might may can say : if they describe different
cases facts the differences are quite unimpor-
tant to us (here) don't matter to us here. For our purpose they
can ˇall be said to describe the same
fact case. (We might have said lying
consists in saying “I see red” & having
stomach ache but as stomac ache
is a priv. sens. why not rather con-
sider the priv. sens. of just seeing green a
colour other than red?) We may say
therefore that these explanations
for our purpose were no expla-
nations at all
. They left us just

where we were before, and they only (seem)
(so) confirm affirm say that the cases of lying
& saying the truth are distinguished
by ˇthe private experiences accompanying the
sentence. So let' us say ask ˇput our questions like this: lying or our case
consists in saying “I see red” & seeing
green , : What does seeing green consist
in? As an answer we immediately give
ourselves a sample of green ‘for green’. But is it
essential that this sample should
be what the others also call
green? No it might be what they call
yellow or blue or red etc.. But wou are
you inclined to say “it might be
what they call hot, cold or <…>”?
Then ˇafter all you arec thinking of games played
with the others though you left
a certain latitude ….