is used in a way to express an opinion which we reject. The opinion e.g. that all other people except A (or myself) are shaming when they say that they have t.. Or It seems that I want to s the solipsist wants to say of them that they haven't got t. i.e. that he wants to say of them what that which the sentence ‘they haven't got t.’ says in the ordinary nota language. Whereas what he realy wishes to do is to change the notation. Analogous when the idealist says that the tree doesn't exist when nobody looks at it. He is prompted to say this but the his sentence in ordinary language expresses a view which he isn't at all keen on holding. He doesnt wish to say that the tree in the sense in which it might vanish while we look at it actually alway vanish as soon as everybody turns its the[y|i]r backs on it. But he is not able to overcome the difficulty of expression which consists in his expressing himself as though t in the phraseology in which views about things are uttered in ordinary language instead of the phraseology of grammar; i.e.

laying down
giving

rules. Why he is unable to emerge of that phraseology? Note the usage of the word ‘possibility’. The confusion we talk about is all

prepared
here

in the terminology which talks about physical & logical possibility. Now I am temp[e|ted] to saythat ⌊:⌋ Whenever anything is really seen it is I who see. [ˇdieses Notitzbuch] “For I was taught to use the word ‘to see’ for that which only I do.” But that isn't true. Rather I am tempted to use this word in a way different from that I was taught (drawing the boundary of a cou⌊n⌋ty). (Imagine soeone who sa[y|i]d: the word ‘red’ ought only to be used when something is said to be red not where a thing's said not to be red. One could perfectly well have such a notation & there is in fact quite a strong urge for one sometimes.) Now when I say: ⌊α)⌋ “Whenever anything is really seen it is I who see” I am pleading for a notation in which ˇin certain cases [behaviourism] for me the use of the word ‘I’ is abolished. And that is what I want for I want to say that nothing in the visual experience necessarily points to my (or ˇin fact a person) having it. I.e. [a|A] person may be seen (or may be) round the geom. eye but no person need be there. It is a ˇthen a of experience whether a person sees, when

anything
something

is seen. When I said α it seemed as though I wished to be

partial but as a matter of fact I wished to be impartial. Let us see what experiences determine who sees what is seen[?|.] My tenden What I wished was to give a description of what is seen without mentioning a person. “Whenever anything is really seen it is I who see.” 1) Why then use the ‘I’ at all? What you plead for is a notation in which you say “so & so is seen” instead of ‘I see so & so’. But further: whom did you mean by ‘I’? Wittgenstein? Now he is distinguished from other people primarily by his body. But there are many criteria for identifying ˇthe person & if we imagine facts were a bit a bit different from what they are we

shall
should

see that the ˇuse of the personal name is used in a much more complicated way than it not as simple & straightforward as it appears. Examples: 1) Immagine all men looking alike but there existing definite sets of characteristics (like the four temperaments) inhabiting them & sometimes changing their habitation. One might in this case be inclined to call to a particular character Jones.
  2) Immagine 3)
  Think¹ of Jekyl & Hyde.
  In which cases would we talk of two persons inhabiting the same body? Memories. Immagine my memory today to leave out yesterday the day before the day before yesterday etc. but tomorrow remembering yesterday etc. We could

then say that two persons inhabited my body. But we needn't say this.
Immagine everybody getting two names for the odd & even days of his life because of memory leaving out every other day.

Editorial notes

1) See facsimile; line connecting this sentence with the previous one.

Editorial notes

(2015–) Wittgenstein Source Bergen Nachlass Edition (WS-BNE). Edited by the Wittgenstein Archives at the University of Bergen under the direction of Alois Pichler. In: Wittgenstein Source, curated by Alois Pichler (2009–) and Joseph Wang-Kathrein (2020–). (N) Bergen: WAB.