From this it should follow that we sometimes rightly sometimes wrongly teach a man to say that he is blind: For what if he saw all the time but nevertheless behaved exactly like a blind man? – Or should we say: “Nature wouldn't play such a trick on us!”.
     We can see here that we don't quite
understand the real use of the word || expression “to see something” or “to see nothing”.
      And what is so misleading to us about when we consider this use is the following: We say “Surely we can see something without ever saying or showing that we do & on the other hand we can say that we see so & so without seeing it, therefore seeing is one process & expressing that we see another, & all they have to do with each other is that they sometimes coincide; they have the same connection as being red & being sweet. Sometimes what is red is sweet etc.”
     Now this is obviously not quite true & not quite false. It seems we somehow || that we look at the use of these words with some prejudice.
It is clear that we in our language use the expression || words ‘seeing red’ in such 1 a way that we can say “he sees … || A sees red, but doesn't show it” on the other hand it is easy to see that we would have no use for these words if their application was severed from the criteria of behaviour, that is to say, to the language game which we play with these words it is, both, essential that the people who play it (should) behave in the particular way we call expressing || saying, showing what
they see, & also that sometimes || under certain circumstances they should more or less or entirely conceal what they see.
     Balance: The point of the game depends upon what usually happens.
     Point of a game
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How does he know that he sees || has the visual image red i.e. how does he connect the word ‘red’ with ‘a particular colour? In fact what does the expression ‘a particular’ here mean. What is the criterion for his connecting it || the word always to the same colour || experience? Is it not often just that he calls it red?