“Surely seeing is one thing, & showing that I see is another thing”. – This certainly, is like saying “skipping is one thing &

jumping another”. But here there is a suplement to this statement & we can say “skipping is this (showing it) & jumping this (showing it)”. Now how about this supplement in the first case? “Seeing ˇred is this (showing it) & showing that we see ˇred, this( (showing it)” The point is just that there isn't a ‘showing that I see’ except t showing that I see. “But can't I say: seeing red is what I'm doing now” (looking at something red)? And although in a sense the other man can't directly

be aware of the acting or activity
see what

I'm talking about, I certainly know what ˇit is it is that I'm talking about. “That is although for him I can't point directly to the my seeing red, for myself I can point to it, & in this sense I can give an ostensive definition of the expression to myself. ← But an ostensive def. is not a ˇmagic act of conjury.
  If I explain to someone to the use of ‒ ‒ ‒ by ‒ ‒ ‒ [T|G]iving the o. d. simply consists in ‒ ‒ ‒.
     One might be inclined to say that castling was not just the act of … .
  But it is the game ˇof wh which it is part … .
Thus ˇSo what does giving to myself the ostensive def. of red consist in?

– Now how am I to describe it shall I say seeing red
I suppose we should say I suppose looking

saying to myself

‘this is red.’
‘ or I see red.’
that I do.

– Or is it “seeing a certain colour ˇsensation & saying ‘I see red’”? The first version it seems doesn't account for the fact won't do as it isn't essential to us that when I ˇdo for myself what call ‘seeing red’ that should ˇnecessarily be what the others

mean
understand

by seeing red. The first vers. I don't like I assume that the others

have
knows

what the

very same private
colour

impression which I am having So I [sh|w]ould rather leave it open what colour I am concentrating ˇmy attention on. But then how can I call it a colour? Isn't it just as uncertain that I mean by colour ˇwhat he means as that I mean by red what they mean & doesn't the same of course

applies to
holds for

‘seeing’ (for what ˇhere I mean by the word is not an activity of the human eye). (The second version is justified only if I wish to say that it does not matter here to which of the colours (say, red, green, blue, yellow)

he assigns
he gives

the name ‘red’ & so this means we might have describ said “he sees a ˇsame colour, say, blue & sais ‘I see red.’”.)

(2015–) Wittgenstein Source Bergen Nachlass Edition (WS-BNE). Edited by the Wittgenstein Archives at the University of Bergen under the direction of Alois Pichler. In: Wittgenstein Source, curated by Alois Pichler (2009–) and Joseph Wang-Kathrein (2020–). (N) Bergen: WAB.