∕∕  
  “But surely there is a case in which I say ‘I see red’ & am telling the (subjective) truth & one in which I tell a ly!” – Yes, that is, we distinguish between
a case of telling the
telling the
truth &
a case of not telling
not telling
the truth. – But what does lying in
such a
this
case, consist in? We may thy all sorts of explanations: “It consists in saying … & seeing green”, “It consists in saying … & knowing that I see … ”, “It consists in saying … & feeling that I'm not justified in saying this” & others. Now ˇlet me ask: do all these expl. come to the same or do they describe different facts? We
may
can
might
say: if they describe different
facts
cases
the differences
quite
don't matter to us here
. For our purpose they can ˇall be said to describe the same
case
fact
. (We might have said lying consists in saying “I see red” & having stomach ache but as stomac ache is a priv. sens. why not rather consider the priv. sens. of just seeing green a colour other than red?) We may say therefore that these explanations for our purpose were no explanations at all. They left us just
where we were before, and they only (seem) (to)
affirm say
confirm
that the cases of lying & saying the truth are distinguished by ˇthe private experiences accompanying the sentence. So let' us say ask ˇput our questions like this: lying in our case consists in saying “I see red” & seeing green
:
,
What does seeing green consist in? As an answer we immediately give ourselves a sample
‘for green’
of green
. But is it essential that this sample should be what the others also call green? No it might be what they call yellow or blue or red etc.. But wou are you inclined to say “it might be what they call hot, cold or tepid”? Then ˇafter all you arec thinking of games played with the others though you left a certain latitude … .