⌊⌊ Moore good “Moore” ◇◇◇ ⌋⌋
  Logical so called props. shew logical properties of language & therefore of Universe, but say nothing.
  This
means
is shewn by fact
that by merely looking at them you can see these properties; whereas, in a proposition proper, you cannot see what
is true
it says
by looking at it.
  It is impossible to say what these properties are, because in order to do so, you would need a language, which hadn't got the properties . in question, & it is impossible that this should need a be a proper language. Imposs. to construct illogical language.
  In order that you should have a language which can express or say everything that can be said, this language must have certain properties; & when this is the case that it has them can no longer be said in that language or any language.
  An illogical language would be one in which e.g. you could put an event into a hole.
  Thus a language which can express everything mirrors certain properties of the world by those properties wh. it must have; & logical so called props. shew in a systematic way those properties. In Ordinary logic
  How, usually, logical props. do shew these properties is this. We give a certain description of a kind of symbol; we find that other
symbols, combined in certain ways,
yield
give
a symbol of this description; & that they do shews something about these symbols.
  As a rule the description given in ordinary Logic is the description of a tautology; but others might shew equally well, e.g.: a contradiction.


  Everyc prop. real prop. shews something, besides what it says, about the Universe: for, if it has no sense, it can't be used; &, if it has a sense, it mirrors some ˇlogical property of the Universe.
  E.g. take φa, φa ⊃ ψa, ψa. By merely looking at these 3, I can see that 3 follows from 1 & 2: i.e. I can see what's called the truth of a logical prop., namely of prop. (φa . φa ⊃ ψa : ⊃ : ψa) But this is not a prop.; but by seeng seeing that it is a tautology I can see what I already saw by looking at the 3 props.: the difference is that I now see that it is a tautology.
  We want to say, in order to understand above, what properties a symbol must have, in order to be a tautology:–
Many ways ˇof saying this are possible:
(1) One way is to say: Given certain symbols, give certain symbols; then to give a set of rules for combining them; & then to say any symbol ˇformed from those symbols, by combining them according to one of the given rules, is a tautology.
This obviously says something about the kind of symbol you can get in this way.
  This is the actual procedure of old Logic: It gives so called primitive propositions; so called rules of deduction; & then says that what you got by applying the rules to the props. is a logical prop. that you have proved. The truth is it tells you something about the kind of prop. you have got, viz that it can be derived from the first symbols by these rules of combination = ? is a tautology.
  :. if we say one logical prop. follows logically from another, this means something quite different from saying that a real prop. follows logically from another. For so called proof of a logical prop. does not prove its truth (logical props. are neither true nor false) but proves that it is a logical prop. = is a tautology.
  Logical props. are forms of proofs: they shew that one ˇor more props. follow from one (or more).