Thus, though it would be possible to interpret the form which we take as the form of a tautology as that of a contradiction & vice vers, it would be impossib they are different in ˇlogical form, ˇbecause though the apparent form of the symbols is the same, what symbolises in them is different. & hence what follows about the symbols from the one interpretation will be different from what follows

from the other. But the difference between a & b is not one of logical form, so that we might, so far as the symbols nothing will follow from this difference alone as to the interpretation of other symbols. Thus, e.g. p.q, p ⌵ q are seem symbols of exactly the same logical form in the a–b notation,. Yet they say something entirely different; &, if you ask why, the answer seems to be: In the one case the scratch at the top has the form shape b, in the other the form shape a. Whereas the description of a contradiction & a tautology, being of different logical forms, make the interpretation of a tautology as a tautology is an interpretation of a logical form, not the giving of a meaning to a scratch of a particular fact shape. The important thing is that the meaning interpretation of the ˇform of the symbolism must be fixed by giving an interpretation to its logical properties, not by giving interpretations to particular scratches.

(2015–) Wittgenstein Source Bergen Nachlass Edition (WS-BNE). Edited by the Wittgenstein Archives at the University of Bergen under the direction of Alois Pichler. In: Wittgenstein Source, curated by Alois Pichler (2009–) and Joseph Wang-Kathrein (2020–). (N) Bergen: WAB.