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     The form of a proposition has meaning in the following way. Consider a symbol “xRy”. To symbols of this form correspond couples of things whose names are respectively “x” and “y”. The things x/y stand to one another in all sorts of relations, amongst others some stand in the relatio[j|n] of R, and some not; just as I single out a particular thing by a particular name I single out all behaviours of the points x and y the one between with respect to the relation R. of the other. I say that if an x stands in the relation of R to a y the sign “x of R y” is to be called true to the fact and otherwise false. This is a definition of sense.
 

(2015–) Wittgenstein Source Bergen Nachlass Edition (WS-BNE). Edited by the Wittgenstein Archives at the University of Bergen under the direction of Alois Pichler. In: Wittgenstein Source, curated by Alois Pichler (2009–) and Joseph Wang-Kathrein (2020–). (N) Bergen: WAB.



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