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      A very natural objection to the way in which I have introduced e.g. propositions of the form x R y is that by it propositions such as (∃. x. y). x R y and similar ones are not explained, which yet obviously have in common with a R b what c R d has in common with a R b. But when we introduce propositions of the form x R y we mentioned no one particular proposition of this form; and we only need to introduce (∃ x,y). φ(x,y) for all φ's in any way which makes the sense of these propositions dependent on the sense of all propositions of the form φ(a, b), and thereby the justificationness of our procedure is proved.
 

(2015–) Wittgenstein Source Bergen Nachlass Edition (WS-BNE). Edited by the Wittgenstein Archives at the University of Bergen under the direction of Alois Pichler. In: Wittgenstein Source, curated by Alois Pichler (2009–) and Joseph Wang-Kathrein (2020–). (N) Bergen: WAB.



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