When we say “A believes
p”, this sounds, it is true,
as if here we could substitute a proper name for
“
p”; but we can see that
here a
sense, not a meaning, is concerned, if we say
“A believes that
‘
p’ is true
”; and in
order to make the direction of
p even more explicit, we might say
“A believes that ‘p’ is true and
‘not-p’ is
false”.
Here the bi-polarity of
p is expressed and it seems
that we shall only be able to express the proposition “A
believes
p” correctly by the
ab-notation; say by making
“A” have a relation to the poles
“a” and “b”
of a-p-b.
The epistemological questions concerning the nature of judgment and belief
cannot be solved without a correct apprehension of the
¤
fo
rm
of the proposition.
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