       “I want to call only that a ‘name’ which cannot stand in the connection ‘X exists’”. – And we ˇthus you canno't say ‘red exists’, because if there were no red you could not speak about it.” More correctl[t|y]: If “X exists” amounts to is saying, “‘X’” has meaning”, then it is not a sentence about “X” X but a sentence about our use of [p|l]anguage usage of words, namely viz, the use of the word “X”.
      It seems to us as thoughwe were saying , said something about the nature of red in, saying that the words “red exists” ˇdo not make no sense. It exists just ˇ– as it were – [“|‘]in itself[”|’]. The same idea, – that this is a metaphysical statement about red, – is expressed also when we say that red is timeless, and perhaps still more strongly in the word “indestructible”.
      But

, as a matter of fact,
actually

we want only to take regard “red exists” only as

the
a

a contradictioncould only be said to lies , if anywhere, might be said to lie in the fact that the sentence looks as though it were speaking

about
of

the colour, whe[r|n]eas whileˇ really , in fact, it is supposed to say something about the use of the word “red”. – In reality ˇIn As a matter of fact, however, we

do
may very well say

say

that such & such a
a particular

colour exists; // In reality, however, it is quite a natural thing to say that a particular colour exists; // and this means simply that ˇthere is something exists that has this colour. And the first expression is not less exact than the second; especially not in the case where [“|‘]that which has the colour[”|’] is not a physical object.

(2015–) Wittgenstein Source Bergen Nachlass Edition (WS-BNE). Edited by the Wittgenstein Archives at the University of Bergen under the direction of Alois Pichler. In: Wittgenstein Source, curated by Alois Pichler (2009–) and Joseph Wang-Kathrein (2020–). (N) Bergen: WAB.