If someone explains to me the names of the colours by pointing to samples and saying, || : “This colour is called ‘blue’, this ‘green’, etc.” || ” etc., then this case is comparable || can be compared, in many respects, with that in which || to the case where he gives me a table in which the words are placed || stand under the samples of colours, – although || though this comparison may be misleading || mislead us in various ways. – One is inclined now || Now we are inclined to extend the || this comparison: To || to have understood the explanation means to have in mind a concept of what has been explained || possess a conceptof that which has been explained in your mind || , in your mind, of that which has been explained, and that is: a sample or picture || image. If || (to possess a sample or a picture) – so if someone shows me various leaves and says, || : “That || This is what we call || what's called a leaf || ‘leaf’” || ”, then I get || obtain a concept of ‘the form || shape of a leaf’, an image || a picture of it, in my mind. – But what does the image || a picture of a leaf look like which has no particular shape || look like which doesn't have any particular shape of leaf but rather “ || ‘that which is in common to all shapes of leaves” || ’? What colour has the sample in my mind || is the colour of the sample in my mind of the colour green, – i.e., of that which is common to all shades of green?
     “But mightn't || couldn't there be such a ‘universal’ sample? || ‘universal’ samples? Say a diagram of a leaf, or a sample of pure green.” – Certainly. – But the fact that this diagram is understood as a diagram and not as the shape of a particular leaf, and that the || a coloured square of pure green is understood as a sample of everything that is greenish and not as a sample for || of pure green: that lies again in the way in which these samples are used. || applied.

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