What does it mean, to know what a game is? What does it mean, to know it and not be able to say it? Is this knowledge some equivalent of a definition that || which is not uttered || unuttered? So || Such that, if it were uttered, I might recognise it as the expression of my knowledge? Is not || Isn't my knowledge, my concept, of a game || ‘game’, expressed entirely || entirely expressed in the explanations that || which I might || I could give? namely in the fact that I describe examples of various kinds of games, show how you can construct all sorts of other games in analogy with these, say || In describing examples of various kinds of games, in showing how you can construct other games analogous to these in all sorts of ways, in saying that I should hardly call so and so a game any more, || ; || such & such, games; and so forth.

(2015–) Wittgenstein Source Bergen Nachlass Edition (WS-BNE). Edited by the Wittgenstein Archives at the University of Bergen under the direction of Alois Pichler. In: Wittgenstein Source, curated by Alois Pichler (2009–) and Joseph Wang-Kathrein (2020–). (N) Bergen: WAB.