Consider this example: If someone says, || : “Moses did not || didn't exist”, then that can mean different sorts of things || this can have different meanings. It may mean: the Israelites did not || didn't have one leader when they journeyed out of || left Egypt – or: their leader was not called Moses – or; || : there was nobody that || never was anyone who did all the things that || that the Bible records of Moses – etc., etc.. – According to Russell || In Russell's terminology we may say: the name “Moses” can be defined by various descriptions. For instance || E.g., as “the man who as a child was taken from the Nile by the daughter of Pharao”, etc.. And according as we take the one or the other definition the proposition || sentence “Moses existed” gets a different meaning || sense, and similarly with every proposition || sentence which treats of Moses. – And if someone says to || tells us, || : “N did not || didn't exist”, do we also || really ask questions like, || : “What do you mean? Do you wish to say that … , or that … , etc. etc.?”
     But if I make a statement about Moses, am I always prepared to substitute any one of these descriptions for “Moses”? I shall say, perhaps, that || : || – by “Moses” I understand || mean the man who did what the ¤ Bible records of Moses, or at any rate a lot || much of it. But how much? Have I come to any decision as to || decided how much of it must be shown || turn out to be false in order that I should abandon || give up my proposition || statement as false? Has the name “Moses” for me || them a fixed and clearly || unambiguously determined use in || So is my use of the name “Moses” fixed and determined for all possible cases? – Isn't it like this, that I have, so to speak || as it were, a whole row || lot of props in readiness, and am prepared to lean on one if another should be withdrawn || taken from under me, and vice versa? – Consider still || yet another case: If I say, “N has died”, then the position with regards to || as regards the meaning of the name “N” may be this: I believe that a person lived whom I (1) || (1) I have seen || saw in such and such a place, || places, who (2) looked like this and this (pictures), (3) did such and such things, and (4) in the social world bears this name || had the name “N”. Asked || If asked what I understand || mean by “N” I should enumerate all that || this or some of it, and different things || these things, or some of them, and different ones on different occasions. My definition of “N” would be then || thus be, say: “the man of whom all that || this is true”. – But suppose something in || some of it should turn || turns || turned out to be false, – || – should || shall || will I be prepared to declare the proposition || sentence “N has died” false, – even if only || though something which || that seemed to me || that to me seems incidental || quite inessential turned || turns || had turned out to be false? But where is the limit of what is || what's incidental || inessential? – If I had given an explanation of the name in such a case || Had I, in such a case, given an explanation of the name, then I should || would now be prepared to change || alter it.
     And we may express this by saying: || this can be expressed thus: I use the name “N” without a settled || firm || rigid meaning. (But that || this no more impairs its use than it impairs the use of a table that it stands on four legs instead of on three and so on occasion || standing on four legs instead of three impairs the use of a table though occasionally such a table wobbles.)
     Ought one || we to say that I use a word whose meaning || the meaning of which I don't know and so talk nonsense || thus what I say has no sense? – Say what you like, so long as this doesn't || does not prevent you from seeing what the situation is. (And if you ¤ see that || this, then there are a good many || some things you won't say.)