Ramsey onceinsisted, in a discussion with me, || , in a discussion with me, stressed the point that logic is a “ || ‘normative science” || ’. Exactly what idea he had in mind, I don't know || I can't say, exactly, what idea he had in mind; but it was undoubtedly closely connected with one || related to that which dawned on me later || I only later got hold of: – namely that in philosophy we often compare the use of words with games, or with calculi, according to || having fixed rules, but that we cannot || can't say that whoever uses language must play such a game. – But if || If, however, you say that our expression of language only approximates || languages only approximate to such a calculi, then you stand immediately on || right at the edge of a misunderstanding. For this may make it || thus it may seem as though in logic we spoke about an ideal language. As though our logic were a logicas it were || , as it were, for empty space || a vacuum || was, so to speak, a logic not taking into account friction & air-resistance. Whereas actually logic does not || doesn't treat of language – or thought – || (or of thought) in the sense in which a natural science treats of a natural phenomenon, and the most || all one can || might say would be || is that we construct ideal languages. But here the word “ideal” || to use the word “ideal” here would be misleading; since it would then seem as though || that ¤ || for this would make it appear as though these languages were || are better, more perfect, than our everyday language; and as though a logician were needed || we needed a logician to show people || us, at last || after all this time, what a correct proposition || sentence looks like.
     But that || all this can only appear in the correct light when we have gained || reached greater clarity concerning the ideas of understanding, supposing || meaning and thinking. For then it will also become clear || get clear also what may mislead one– || , and did mislead || has misled me (Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus || Tract. Log.-Phil.), – into thinking that whoever utters a sentence and means, or understands, it is thereby working || doing || thereby is using a calculus according to definite rules.