Suppose I explain: “By ‘Moses’ I understand || mean the man, if such a person || one existed, who led the Israelites out of Egypt, || ; whatever he may have been called then || may have been his name and whatever else he may have done or not have done”. But the same sort of doubt is possible regarding the words of this explanation as there is || regarding the words of this explanation the same sort of doubts are possible as are possible about the name “Moses” (what do you call “Egypt”, whom do you call “the Israelites”, etc.). In fact, these questions don't even come to an end when we have || wouldn't come to an end even if we had reached words like “red”, “dark”, “old || sweet”. – “But how can || can an explanation help me to an understanding || understand, then, || , if it isn't || it's never the final || ultimate one? The || That means the explanation is never finished, then || completed; I still don't understand, and never will, what he means.” As though an explanation would hang || hung, as it were, in the air unless there were another to support it || another supported it || another one supported it. Whereas although an explanation may rest on another that one has given, none || An || One explanation may rest on another explanation which has been given, but no explanation is in need of || needs another, – unless we need it in order to avoid a misunderstanding. We may || might say: an explanation serves to remove a misunderstanding or to prevent one, – || – one, that is, || that is, one which would arise if there were not the || without that explanation, || ; but not, every || any one that I can || could imagine.
     It may || can easily appear as though every doubt showed || were || was only || just a symptom of an existing || some existing gap in the foundation || foundations, so that a sure || well-founded understanding is only ¤ possible if we first doubt everything that can be doubted, and then remove all these doubts.