Suppose I explain: “By ‘Moses’ I

mean
understand

the man, if such a

one
person

existed, who led the Isrealites out of Egypt[,| ;] whatever he may have been called then his name and whatever else he may have done or not not have done”. But ˇregarding the same sort of doubts is are possible regarding the words of this explanation as ˇare possible there is about the name “Moses” (what do you call “Egypt”, whom do you call “the Isrealites”, etc.). In fact, these questions don't wouldn't even come to an end ˇeven when if we have had reached words like “red”, “dark”, “

sweet
old

”. – “But how

can
canch

an explanation help me to an understanding, then, , if it's isn't never the

ultimate
final

one? ˇThat means [T|t]he the explanation is never finished, then ˇcompleted; I still don't understa[d|n]d, and never will, what he means.” As though an explanation would h[a|u]ng, as it were, in the air unless there were another to support it another ˇone supported it. Whereas although [a|A]n One explanation may rest on another that one has ˇexplanation which has been given, none ˇbut no explanation is in needs of another, – unless we need it in order to avoid a misunderstanding. We

might
may

say: an explanation serves to remove a misunderstanding or to prevent one, – – one, that is, ˇone which would arise

without that
if there were not the

explanation[,| ;] but not,

any
every

one that I

could
can

imagine.
It

can
may

easily appear as though every doubt showed ˇ

was
were

just
only

a symptom of

some existing
an existing

gap in the foundations, so that a

well-founded
sure

understanding is only

only possible if we first doubt everything that can be doubted, and then remove all these doubts.

(2015–) Wittgenstein Source Bergen Nachlass Edition (WS-BNE). Edited by the Wittgenstein Archives at the University of Bergen under the direction of Alois Pichler. In: Wittgenstein Source, curated by Alois Pichler (2009–) and Joseph Wang-Kathrein (2020–). (N) Bergen: WAB.