On the one hand it is clear that every proposition of our language “is in order just as it is”. That is, that we ¤ don't strive after || aren't trying to reach an ideal. As though our ordinary, vague propositions didn't have any meaning yet || yet have meaning and we had yet || still to show what a correct proposition looks like. On the other hand it seems clear that where there is meaning there must be perfect order. So that the || Therefore perfect order must be even in the vaguest proposition.
     “The meaning of the || a proposition – we should like || are inclined to say – can certainly leave this or that open, but the proposition must surely have one definite meaning.” Or: “An ‘indefinite meaning’, that would really be no meaning.” That || This is like saying, || : “A boundary that || which is not || isn't sharp, that is really no boundary at all”. The line of thought here is roughly || something like this: If || if I say, “I've locked the man || him up well || securely in the room – only one door remained || was left open”, then in fact I haven't locked him in || up at all; he only gives the illusion || there was only an illusion || a pretence of his being locked in || up. One would || We should be inclined to say here || here || in such a case be inclined to say, || : “so you didn't do anything || nothing has || nothing's been done at all”. And yet he did do something || something was || had been done. (A boundary that || which has a gap || hole – one would || we'd like to say – is as good as none at all. But is that || this really true?)
     Consider also this proposition: “The rules of a game can certainly leave || allow a certain freedom, but they must still || nevertheless be quite definite rules.” That is || That's as though you were to say || said, || : “By means of four walls you can indeed leave a person a certain freedom of movement, but the walls must be perfectly rigid” – and that || this is not || isn't true. If, however || on the other hand, you say, || : “the walls may, no doubt || of course, be elastic, but then they have a quite || one definite elasticity” – what does that || this say further? || ? It seems to say that you would have to || must be able to state this elasticity; but that || this again is not true. “The thing always has || has always one definite length – whether I know it || the length or not”: this is really the avowal || a declaration of || by this we really declare that we attach ourselves to a particular expression. That namely || That || The form of expression which makes use of || uses || makes use of the form of an ‘ideal of exactness’. So || – so to speak as a parameter of the description.