We now have a theory (a “ || ‘dynamical” || ’ theory of the proposition, etc.) but it does not seem || appear like a theory. It || For it is a characteristic of this sort of || such a theory that it examines || looks at a special || particular, clearly visible || illuminating || illustrative case and says, || : “That || This shows the way it always is; this case is the prototype of all cases.” – “Of course; || , it must be like that || that's how it must be”, we say, and are satisfied. We have hit || come upon || found a form of description that || presentation which attracted || attracts, is evident to us || satisfies us. But it is as though we had now seen || now saw something which lies beneath the surface. || which lies under the surface.
     This || Now this tendency to generalise the clear case seems in logic to have its strict justification || be strictly justified; || : here for once we seem to be fully justified in concluding: “If one proposition is a picture, then every proposition must be a picture, for they must all be the same in essence || have the same nature || be of the same essence || nature.” For we are under the delusion that what is ¤ sublime, what is essential in our inquiry || about our enquiry || investigation, its essential features, consists in the || this fact || lies in this that it grasps one all comprehending essence || entity.