It
isn't wrong, according to our new convention, to say
“I have unconscious toothache”. For
what more can you ask of your notation than that it should
distinguish between a bad tooth which doesn't give you
toothache and one which does? But the new expression
misleads us by calling up pictures and analogies which make it
difficult for us to go through w
ith our
convention. And it is extremely difficult to discard
37.
these pictures unless we
are constantly watchful; particularly difficult when, in
philosophising, we contemplate what we
say about
things. Thus, by the expression, “unconscious
toothache” you may either be mislead into thinking
that a stupendous discovery has been made, a discovery which in a
sense altogether bewilders our understanding; or else you may be
extremely puzzled by the expression (the puzzlement of
philosophy) and perhaps ask such a question as
“How is unconscious toothache
possible?” You may then be tempted to deny the
possibility of unconscious toothache; but the scientist will tell
you that it is a proved fact that there is such a thing, and he
will say it like a man who is destroying a common
prejudice. He will say: “Surely
it's quite simple; there are other things which you
don't know of, and there can also be toothache which you
don't know of. It is just a new
discovery”. You won't be satisfied,
but you won't know what to answer. This
situation constantly arises between the scientists and the
philosophers.