At first sight it may appear (but why it should can
only become clear later) that here we have two kinds of
worlds, worlds built of different materials; a mental world and
a physical world. The mental world in fact is liable to
be imagined as gaseous, or rather,
ether
eal. But let me
remind you here of the queer role which the gaseous and the
ether
eal play in philosophy,
‒ ‒ ‒ when we perceive that a substantive is not used as what in
general we should call the name of an object, and when therefore we
can't help saying to ourselves that it is the name of an
ether
eal object. I
mean, we already know the idea of
“ether
eal objects”
as a subterfuge, when we are embarrassed about the grammar of
certain words
¤ 78.
and when all we know is
that they are not used as names for material objects.
This is a hint as to how the problem of the two materials,
mind and
matter, is going to
diss
olve.