What should strike us about this
expression is the phrase “always I”.
Always
who? ‒ ‒ ‒ For, queer enough, I
don't mean: “always
L.W.” This leads us to considering the
criteria for the identity of a person. Under what
circumstances do we say: “This is the same
person whom I saw an hour ago”? Our actual
use of the phrase “the same person” and of the name
of a person is based on the fact that many characteristics which
we use as the criteria for identity coincide in the vast
103.
majority of
cases. I am as a rule re
cognized by the
appearance of my body. My body changes its
appearance only gradually and comparatively little, and
likewise my voice, characteristic habits, etc.
only change slowly and within a narrow range. We are
inclined to use personal names in the way we do, only as a
consequence of these facts. This can best be seen by
imagining unreal cases which show us what different
“geometries” we would be inclined to use if facts
were different. Imagine, e.g.,
that all human bodies which exist look
ed alike, that
on the other hand, different sets of characteristics seemed, as it
were, to change their habitation among these bodies.
Such a set of characteristics might be, say, mildness, together
with a high pitched voice, and slow movements, or a choleric
temperament, a deep voi
ce, and jerky movements, and
such like. Under such circumstances, although it would
be possible to give the bodies names, we should perhaps be as
little inclined to do so as we are to give names to the chairs of
our dining room set. On the other hand, it might be
useful to give names to the sets of characteristics, and the use of
these names would now
roughly correspond to the personal
names in our present language.