General note on MSS 105–122 (Bände I to XVIII)
Between 1929 and 1940 Wittgenstein produced 18 large manuscript volumes. He himself numbered them as Bände I to XVIII and gave most of them general titles like “Philosophical Remarks” or “Philosophical Grammar”. This indicates that he himself perceived these volumes as belonging to a series. Some of them evidently contain new material spontaneously written down and not drafted in other notebooks. Parts of several of these volumes, however, are based on earlier remarks recorded in pocket notebooks, for example, while other parts contain revisions of earlier manuscript volumes or typescripts. The best–known case of this last kind are MSS 114ii and 115i (Bände X and XI), which contain a revision (erste Umarbeitung) of parts of TS 213 (The Big Typescript). The same typescript forms the basis of the first section of volume XII (MS 116), but the process of selecting remarks from the TS and transferring them into Band XII is such that most people would not feel inclined to speak of a process of revision. At any rate, there are clear breaks between the earlier portion of MS 114 and the subsequent revision of TS 213 contained in the same ledger as well as between the first half (winter 1933–34) of volume XI and its second half, which was written in the late summer and the autumn of 1936 (containing the German revision of the Brown Book, entitled “Philosophische Untersuchungen”).
General note on MSS 105–114 (Bände I to X)
There are good reasons for treating the series of volumes from I to X (or, more exactly, up to MS 114i) as forming a separate, or separable, part of Wittgenstein’s oeuvre. However, as has been pointed out above, even these volumes were not produced according to one uniform pattern. Some of the remarks were written spontaneously, as it were, that is to say, without a basis in earlier drafts. Other remarks contained in these volumes were copied or transferred in revised form from earlier writings. Most of these volumes are punctuated by personal remarks of a private or confessional nature as well as by reflections on music, literature, religion, and a few other kinds of topic. Sometimes, but by no means always, these reflections are separated from the more straightforwardly philosophical material by certain marks (e.g. “||…||”) or by being written in Wittgenstein’s usual code. But in spite of these and other qualifications that might come to mind it is helpful and surely not misleading to view volumes I to X as the central record of Wittgenstein’s strikingly original and continuous production between his return to Cambridge in January 1929 and a new stage in the process of articulating and arranging his ideas. But even if we are agreed that these ten manuscript volumes are to be regarded as the core record of his thought during the early middle period of his philosophical development, it will be useful to divide this material into three parts, corresponding to interruptions of the writing process motivated by an urge to have his handwritten remarks typed up. Once in possession of a typed version, Wittgenstein was prepared to think about the order of his individual remarks, about possible arrangements and re-arrangements. Moreover, he could now proceed to actually carrying out such arrangements and re-arrangements by way of cutting typescript or carbon copy into fragments that were subsequently put together in a new order and, in some cases, supplemented by handwritten changes or explanations or exemplifications giving the older material a new twist. — There are three interruptions of the kind alluded to in the previous paragraph:
MS 113 IX. Philosophische Grammatik
Like the next volume (no. X), this manuscript book bears the title “Philosophical Grammar”. The first sentence on p. 1 continues the last sentence begun (and left hanging) on the last page (136r) of the previous volume (MS 112, vol. VIII, 28 November 1931). The first new remark, following the continuation of the last remark begun in volume VIII, bears the date 29 [November 1931]. The dating continues 1.12.31, 3.12.31, but then there is a long interruption coinciding with the Christmas vacation. Dates resume with 16.2.32 (p. 18v), 17.2.32, etc., but soon there is another gap between 8 March and 18 April 1932 (p. 51v), coinciding with the Easter vacation. After this, the dating is very regular and runs up to 28 May 1932 (p. 144r).
Parts of this manuscript volume are based on preceding work done in pocket notebooks 153b and 154 as well as on earlier material collected in TS 208 (in Kienzler’s terminology, this is the 3rd “resumption”, covering pp. 19–90 of TS 208, cf. my description of MS 111, above). The entire volume contains virtually no marginal marks indicating Wittgenstein’s judgement and his decision on what to do with individual remarks. Perhaps he felt that no such marks were needed, as almost 100 per cent of the material was transferred to TS 211 and later to TS 213.
There is a good deal on questions concerning the foundations of arithmetic and the idea of generality. The notion of a rule (of grammar, of a game) and, in particular, the idea of the arbitrariness of rules are extensively discussed, and there are occasional remarks on the relation between rules and empirical sentences. There are numerous references to Russell, Frege, and Ramsey; Augustine, Brouwer, Driesch, and Sraffa are also mentioned. The importance of the notions of Übersicht and Übersichtlichkeit (surveyability) is emphasized. The concept of verification plays a great role, and there is a sustained discussion of pain, especially toothache. As in most other manuscripts from this period, there is a number of observations and asides on philosophy in general. It seems that on pp. 45r (1 March 1932), 50r–51r (8 and 10 March) we encounter the earliest uses of the word “Sprachspiel” (“language-game”), cf. MS 154:52v. Moreover, there are discussions of mathematico-logical concepts (such as infinity vs. endlessness or continuity, the ancestral, and provability) and of our notion of a visual field and the relevant meaning of words like “hazy” & “blurred”.
Many sections of MS 113 are known to readers of the book Philosophical Grammar, especially of its second part. Moreover, a few remarks can also be found in Philosophical Remarks. MS 113 contains only one remark that was included in the collection Culture and Value.