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MS 109

V. Bemerkungen

 

General note on MSS 105-122 (Bände I to XVIII)

Between 1929 and 1940 Wittgenstein produced 18 large manuscript volumes. He himself numbered them as Bände I to XVIII and gave most of them general titles like “Philosophical Remarks” or “Philosophical Grammar”. This indicates that he himself perceived these volumes as belonging to a series. Some of them evidently contain new material spontaneously written down and not drafted in other notebooks. Parts of several of these volumes, however, are based on earlier remarks recorded in pocket notebooks, for example, while other parts contain revisions of earlier manuscript volumes or typescripts. The best-known case of this last kind are MSS 114ii and 115i (Bände X and XI), which contain a revision (erste Umarbeitung) of parts of TS 213 (The Big Typescript). The same typescript forms the basis of the first section of volume XII (MS 116), but the process of selecting remarks from the TS and transferring them into Band XII is such that most people would not feel inclined to speak of a process of revision. At any rate, there are clear breaks between the earlier portion of MS 114 and the subsequent revision of TS 213 contained in the same ledger as well as between the first half (winter 1933-34) of volume XI and its second half, which was written in the late summer and the autumn of 1936 (containing the German revision of the Brown Book, entitled “Philosophische Untersuchungen”).

 

General note on MSS 105-114 (Bände I to X)

There are good reasons for treating the series of volumes from I to X (or, more exactly, up to MS 114i) as forming a separate, or separable, part of Wittgenstein’s oeuvre. However, as has been pointed out above, even these volumes were not produced according to one uniform pattern. Some of the remarks were written spontaneously, as it were, that is to say without a basis in earlier drafts. Other remarks contained in these volumes were copied, or transferred in revised form, from earlier writings. Most of these volumes are punctuated by personal remarks of a private or confessional nature as well as by reflections on music, literature, religion and a few other kinds of topic. Sometimes, but by no means always, these reflections are separated from the more straightforwardly philosophical material by certain marks (e.g. “||…||”) or by being written in Wittgenstein’s usual code. But in spite of these and other qualifications that might come to mind it is helpful and surely not misleading to view volumes I to X as the central record of Wittgenstein’s strikingly  original and continuous production between his return to Cambridge in January 1929 and a new stage in the process of articulating and arranging his ideas. But even if we are agreed that these ten manuscript volumes are to be regarded as the core record of his thought during the early middle period of his philosophical development, it will be useful to divide this material into three parts, corresponding to interruptions of the writing process motivated by an urge to have his handwritten remarks typed up. Once in possession of a typed version, Wittgenstein was prepared to think about the order of his individual remarks, about possible arrangements and re-arrangements. Moreover, he could now proceed to actually carrying out such arrangements and re-arrangements by way of cutting typescript or carbon copy into fragments that were subsequently put together in a new order and, in some cases, supplemented by handwritten changes or explanations or exemplifications giving the older material a new twist. — There are three interruptions of the kind alluded to in the previous paragraph:

(1)     24 March 1930: Easter vacation, in Vienna Wittgenstein dictates selected remarks from vol.s I to IV. The result is TS 208, which is soon cut into fragments that are subsequently re-arranged so as to form TS 209 (Philosophical Remarks).

(2)     The material written down in the remainder of volume IV (MS 108) between 25 April and 9 August 1930 is dictated and typed sometime in the summer of this year (TS 210).

(3)     The contents of MSS 109-114i are sifted and dictated to a typist while on vacation in Austria. The resulting typescript (TS 211) comprises ca. 800 pages and may have been dictated in the course of two or more series of sessions. But most of the work of producing this typescript was surely done after 5 June 1932 (the last date to be found in MS 114i).

It is likely that TS 211 was completed in the summer or autumn 1932. So we may assume that in the course of less than four years (1929-32) Wittgenstein managed to fill ca. 3000 pages of manuscript volumes and dictated almost 1100 pages of this material to a typist. The story of this material is continued in other parts of this account (see especially MSS 114-15, 140, TSS 208-13), but at this point readers should allow the message to sink in: if we remember that much of this material was absolutely new and the result of reflections that stood in contrast, or were diametrically opposed, to the author’s earlier convictions, we find that we are dealing with a unique document witnessing to Wittgenstein’s stunning creative powers.

 

Notes on MS 109 (Band V)

While the last remarks of MS 108 are dated 9 August 1930, the first entry of MS 109 (= Band V) was written on 11 August 1930. At this time Wittgenstein was living in the game keeper’s cottage of the family estate Hochreit (cf. note by Brian McGuinness in Wittgenstein in Cambridge, p. 189). The first 160 pages of this manuscript volume are filled with daily entries spanning the time between 11 August and 19 September 1930. At this point there is an interruption which seems to coincide with Desmond Lee’s visit to the Hochreit estate (see letter to G.  E. Moore [August 1930]). Work on this manuscript volume was only resumed after Wittgenstein’s return to Cambridge: his first observation, noted on 7 October, reads: “Es gibt keine Metamathematik — There is no such thing as metamathematics.” In the sequel there are scattered remarks up to 22 October. From this day onwards Wittgenstein continues his work in the shape of another uninterrupted series of remarks reaching up to 2 December 1930 (p. 271 of MS 109). At this point Wittgenstein was leaving Cambridge to spend the Christmas vacation in Vienna, where he began a new manuscript book (MS 110) on 10 December. Some time after his return to Cambridge, on 29 January 1931, he went back to MS 109 to fill its last 30 pages between 29 January and 3 February 1931.

            So, if a reader wishes to study Wittgenstein’s remarks in their chronological order, he will have to move from p. 271 of Band V to the first pages of Band VI (covering the period between 10 December 1930 and 28 January 1931) before returning to  Band V (p. 272, 29. 1. 31). The last remark contained in MS 109 (= Band V) ends in mid-sentence and is continued on p. 31 of MS 110 (= Band VI, 3 February 1931).

            Thus, most of the material contained in Band V represents the results of two uninterrupted periods of work. The first of these two periods continues the series of remarks begun in summer 1930 up to an interruption of seven weeks between 19 September and 7 October 1930. The second period coincides with Wittgenstein’s stay in Cambridge during Michaelmas Term 1930.

            Most of the topics discussed in MS 109 are known from publications like Philosophical Grammar and Wittgenstein and the Vienna Circle (one of the conversations recorded in this latter book took place on 25 September 1930). To mention just a few of these topics: grammar and grammatical rule, generality, and Wittgenstein’s technical notion of an hypothesis. There are a number of memorable observations on the practice of philosophy (e.g. the claim that the method of philosophy consists in curing one’s self-induced madness [p. 84, 2. 9. 30]) as well as striking remarks on the nature and the limits of language. There is a good deal on the notion of a Satz (sentence, proposition) and on drawing distinctions between sense and nonsense and between symptoms and criteria. Wittgenstein continues to discuss the concept of intention as well as problems concerning the idea of possible fulfilments of expectation. The Fregean notion of Annahme plays a certain role, and Wittgenstein keeps coming back to questions regarding our concepts of negation, logical multiplicity, analysis, belief, and the meaning of proper names (“Nothung”).

            Various interesting remarks known from the collection Culture and Value were jotted down in Band V, for example the well-known “Sketch for a Foreword”. Names mentioned include, besides those of Frege and Russell, Bergson, Paul Ernst, Freud, Meinong, and Renan.

            Many but by no means all the remarks contained in this manuscript volume were transferred to TS 211.