MS 110

General note on MSS 105-122 (Bände I to XVIII)

Between 1929 and 1940 Wittgenstein produced 18 large manuscript volumes. He himself numbered them as Bände I to XVIII and gave most of them general titles like “Philosophical Remarks” or “Philosophical Grammar”. This indicates that he himself perceived these volumes as belonging to a series. Some of them evidently contain new material spontaneously written down and not drafted in other notebooks. Parts of several of these volumes, however, are based on earlier remarks recorded in pocket notebooks, for example, while other parts contain revisions of earlier manuscript volumes or typescripts. The best-known case of this last kind are MSS 114_ii and 115_i (Bände X and XI), which contain a revision (erste Umarbeitung) of parts of TS 213 (The Big Typescript). The same typescript forms the basis of the first section of volume XII (MS 116), but the process of selecting remarks from the TS and transferring them into Band XII is such that most people would not feel inclined to speak of a process of revision. At any rate, there are clear breaks between the earlier portion of MS 114 and the subsequent revision of TS 213 contained in the same ledger as well as between the first half (winter 1933-34) of volume XI and its second half, which was written in the late summer and the autumn of 1936 (containing the German revision of the Brown Book, entitled “Philosophische Untersuchungen”).

General note on MSS 105-114 (Bände I to X)

There are good reasons for treating the series of volumes from I to X (or, more exactly, up to MS 114_i) as forming a separate, or separable, part of Wittgenstein’s oeuvre. However, as has been pointed out above, even these volumes were not produced according to one uniform pattern. Some of the remarks were written spontaneously, as it were, that is to say without a basis in earlier drafts. Other remarks contained in these volumes were copied, or transferred in revised form, from earlier writings. Most of these volumes are punctuated by personal remarks of a private or confessional nature as well as by reflections on music, literature, religion and a few other kinds of topic. Sometimes, but by no means always, these reflections are separated from the more straightforwardly philosophical material by certain marks (e.g. “||…||”) or by being written in Wittgenstein’s usual code. But in spite of these and other qualifications that might come to mind it is helpful and surely not misleading to view volumes I to X as the central record of Wittgenstein’s strikingly  original and continuous production between his return to Cambridge in January 1929 and a new stage in the process of articulating and arranging his ideas. But even if we are agreed that these ten manuscript volumes are to be regarded as the core record of his thought during the early middle period of his philosophical development, it will be useful to divide this material into three parts, corresponding to interruptions of the writing process motivated by an urge to have his handwritten remarks typed up. Once in possession of a typed version, Wittgenstein was prepared to think about the order of his individual remarks, about possible arrangements and re-arrangements. Moreover, he could now proceed to actually carrying out such arrangements and re-arrangements by way of cutting typescript or carbon copy into fragments that were subsequently put together in a new order and, in some cases, supplemented by handwritten changes or explanations or exemplifications giving the older material a new twist. — There are three interruptions of the kind alluded to in the previous paragraph:

(1)     24 March 1930: Easter vacation, in Vienna Wittgenstein dictates selected remarks from vol.s I to IV. The result is TS 208, which is soon cut into fragments that are subsequently re-arranged so as to form TS 209 (Philosophical Remarks).

(2)     The material written down in the remainder of volume IV (MS 108) between 25 April and 9 August 1930 is dictated and typed sometime in the summer of this year (TS 210).

(3)     The contents of MSS 109-114_i are sifted and dictated to a typist while on vacation in Austria. The resulting typescript (TS 211) comprises ca. 800 pages and may have been dictated in the course of two or more series of sessions. But most of the work of producing this typescript was surely done after 5 June 1932 (the last date to be found in MS 114_i).

It is likely that TS 211 was completed in the summer or autumn 1932. So we may assume that in the course of less than four years (1929-32) Wittgenstein managed to fill ca. 3000 pages of manuscript volumes and dictated almost 1100 pages of this material to a typist. The story of this material is continued in other parts of this account (see especially MSS 114-15, 140, TSS 208-13), but at this point readers should allow the message to sink in: if we remember that much of this material was absolutely new and the result of reflections that stood in contrast, or were diametrically opposed, to the author’s earlier convictions, we find that we are dealing with a unique document witnessing to Wittgenstein’s stunning creative powers.

Notes on MS 110 (Band VI)

As was pointed out in our description of MS 109, the chronological order of remarks in MS 110 is interrupted (on p. 31) and requires readers keen on chronology to go back to Band V, whose last thirty pages constitute the continuation of the sequence of remarks running from p. 1 of Band VI (10 December 1930) to p. 31 (28 January 1931). The last remark of MS 109 is continued and concluded in MS 110 (p. 31, 3 February). This series of remarks runs on practically without interruption for more than one hundred pages (almost daily entries up to 13 March). Then there is one further short set of remarks dated 17 March, which is followed by a “Nachtrag [addendum] 3. 5”, thus signalling a gap of five weeks. It is likely that Wittgenstein spent some of the time between 17 March and the beginning of May working on other manuscripts (pocket notebooks, perhaps, or loose sheets). This would go some way towards explaining some of the entries marked as Nachträge in the remainder of MS 110 (e.g. pp. 185 [21(?) June 1931]; 202, 22 June; 212, 24 June). On p. 177 (19 June 1931) readers will find the beginning of remarks on Frazer’s Golden Bough and related matters well-known through various publications of this material (see e.g. Philosophical Occasions, pp. 115-155). Another notable feature of this manuscript volume is the fact that from p. 223 (25 June) most remarks are taken (in more or less revised from) from MS 153a (see there) — the first (and only) date in this pocket notebook is 10 May 1931 (p. 4v). The last remark in MS 110 taken in this way from MS 153a (p. 59r) can be found on p. 300 (6 July 1931). This use of pocket notebooks is continued in the following Bände VII to IX (partly based on pocket notebooks 153a, b, 154, and 155).

            The first entries of MS 110 date from December 1930, when Wittgenstein was staying with his family in Vienna. These Christmas vacations were punctuated by a remarkable number of conversations with members of the Vienna Circle (Wittgenstein and the Vienna Circle, 17, 26, 28, and 30 December 1930; 1 and 4 January 1931). He returned to Cambridge before 12 January and stayed there until 15 March (see description above, where it was observed that the uninterrupted sequence of remarks comes to an end around 13 March). He left Vienna for Cambridge on 17 April, returning on 8 June to Vienna, where he had regular meetings with Schlick.

            Most of the topics discussed in this manuscript volume are familiar to readers of Philosophical Grammar and Wittgenstein and the Vienna Circle. There is little on the philosophy of mathematics, but a lot on the nature and limits of language. There are a few remarks underlining Wittgenstein’s anti-dogmatic attitude. As was said above, there is a longish section containing observations on Frazer and related matters. In addition, there are tentative discussions of privacy and remarks on the notions of intention and convention, on the idea of separate or separable spaces (as in “visual space”) and on symbols and their sense. A certain prominence is given to the idea of thought as a process and the confusing effects of this idea. A good deal of space is devoted to questions of meaning, to problems arising from claiming to understand a given Satz, and to the nature of philosophy. There are echoes of Wittgenstein’s early thought in his remarks on the context principle and the variety of uses one can make of the concept of a picture. What seems particularly characteristic of Wittgenstein’s work of this period are his numerous observations on rules of various kinds, in particular grammatical rules, as well as on grammar and grammatical systems more generally conceived.

            Again, there is a fair number of remarks known from the collection Culture and Value. Among the names mentioned in this manuscript volume there are those of Augustine, Bergson, Cantor, Matthias Claudius, Paul Ernst, Frege, Goethe, Kant, Lessing, Ogden & Richards, Russell, Schiller, and Spengler.

            A great number of remarks was marked by a slash (“/”) and duly transferred to TS 211.